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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, 
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David 
Tuk Nedrow 
Supreme Court No: 41584-2013 
Case No: CV-2012-580 
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s), 
Vs 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Board Of County Commissioners for 
Fremont County, a political subdivision of 
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt, 
individually and in his official capacity, and 
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official 
capacity 
Defendant(s)/ Appellant(s). 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for 
THE 
COUNTY OF FREMONT 
Attorney 
Gregory W. Moeller 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
For Respondent 
Lynn Hossner 
109 North 2nd West 
St. Anthony, ID, 83445 
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Attorney 
For Appellant 
Blake G. Hall 
901 Pier View Drive, Ste. 203 
Idaho Falls, ID, 83402 
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Date: 1/31/2014 
Time: 09:37 AM 
Page 1 of 4 
Seventh Judicial District Court- Fremont County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller 
User: HARRIGFELD 
Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal. 
Date Code User Judge 
11/23/2012 NCOC MACE New Case Filed - Other Claims Gregory W. Moeller 
MACE Filing: L3- Appeal or petition for judicial review or Gregory W. Moeller 
cross appeal or cross-petition from commission, 
board, or body to district court Paid by: Karl 
Lewies Receipt number: 0005958 Dated: 
11/23/2012 Amount: $96.00 (Credit card) For: 
Atchley, Clen P (plaintiff) 
MACE Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Karl Gregory W. Moeller 
Lewies Receipt number: 0005958 Dated: 
11/23/2012 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: 
Atchley, Clen P (plaintiff) 
NOAP MACE Plaintiff: Flying A Ranch, Inc., Notice Of Gregory W. Moeller 
Appearance Karl H. Lewies 
12/5/2012 ORDR MACE Order Governing Procedure On Review-Filed In Gregory W. Moeller 
Chambers 12-3-2012. 
1/2/2013 HRSC MACE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 01/22/2013 02:30 Gregory W. Moeller 
PM) Motion To Disqualify Counsel 
1/7/2013 MOTN MACE Motion To Disqualify Counsel Gregory W. Moeller 
MOTN MACE Motion-Partial Motion To Dismiss Gregory W. Moeller 
NOTC MACE Notice Of Hearing Gregory W. Moeller 
AFFD MACE Affidavit Of Karl Lewies Gregory W. Moeller 
MOTN MACE Motion To Withdraw Gregory W. Moeller 
1/9/2013 NOTC MACE Notice Of Hearing Gregory W. Moeller 
CERT MACE Certificate Of Mailing-Amended Gregory W. Moeller 
1/11/2013 STIP MACE Stipulation For Substitution Of Counsel Gregory W. Moeller 
1/14/2013 STIP MCHANDLER Stipulation For Substitution Of Counsel Gregory W. Moeller 
NOAP MCHANDLER Plaintiff: Flying A Ranch, Inc., Notice Of Gregory W. Moeller 
Appearance Lynn Hossner 
1/16/2013 TRAN MACE Transcript Filed - Notice of Lodging Gregory W. Moeller 
1/22/2013 HRHD MACE Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Gregory W. Moeller 
01/22/2013 02:30PM: Hearing Held Motion To 
Disqualify Counsel 
Motion To Withdraw 
HRSC MACE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 02/26/2013 03:00 Gregory W. Moeller 
PM) Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
MINE MACE Minute Entry Gregory W. Moeller 
ANSW MACE Answer To Partial Motion To Dismiss Gregory W. Moeller 
1/30/2013 AFFD MACE Affidavit Of Attorney Fees Gregory W. Moeller 
1/31/2013 MISC MACE Objection To Attorney Fees Gregory W. Moeller 
AFFD MACE Affidavit Of Kristina Larson Gregory W. Moeller 
AFFD MACE Affidavit Of Karl Lewies Gregory W. Moeller 
2/4/2013 ORDR MACE Order On Motions-Filed In Chambers Gregory W. Moeller 
2/6/2013 NOTC MACE Notice Of Conflict Of Interest Gregory W. Moeller 
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Date: 1/31/2014 
Time: 09:37 AM 
Page 2 of 4 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Fremont County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller 
User: HARRIGFELD 
Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal. 
Date Code User Judge 
2/6/2013 NOTC MACE Notice Of Hearing Gregory W. Moeller 
MOTN MACE Motion For Partial Dismissal Gregory W. Moeller 
2/12/2013 CERT MACE Certificate Of Mailing Gregory W. Moeller 
MEMO MACE Memorandum In Support Of Petitioners Petition Gregory W. Moeller 
For Review 
MOTN MACE Motion For Extention Gregory W. Moeller 
AFFD MACE Affidavit Of Karl Lewies Gregory W. Moeller 
ORDR MACE Order Filed In Chambers-2-4-2013 Gregory W. Moeller 
AFFD HARRIGFELD Affidavit of Lynn Hossner Gregory W. Moeller 
2/14/2013 NOTC MACE Notice Of Hearing On Petitioners Motion For Gregory W. Moeller 
Extension Of Time 
NOTC MACE Notice Of Hearing On Petitioners Motion For Gregory W. Moeller 
Extension Of Time 
MISC MACE Respondants Motion To Strike Motion For Gregory W. Moeller 
Extension Of Time 
MOTN MACE Motion For Order Shortening Time Gregory W. Moeller 
AFFD HARRIGFELD Affidavit of Blake G. Hall in Support of Motion to Gregory W. Moeller 
Strike Motion for Extension of Time 
NOTC HARRIGFELD Notice of Hearing Gregory W. Moeller 
2/15/2013 ORDR MACE Order Modifying Briefing Schedule-Filed In Gregory W. Moeller 
Chambers 
2/19/2013 NOTC PARKER Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Gregory W. Moeller 
County 
2/21/2013 MISC MACE Reply In Support Of Motion For Attorney Fees Gregory W. Moeller 
MINE HARRIGFELD Minute Entry Gregory W. Moeller 
2/26/2013 MINE HARRIGFELD Minute Entry Gregory W. Moeller 
3/13/2013 NOTC MACE Notice Of Lodging Gregory W. Moeller 
3/29/2013 MEMO MACE Memorandum Decision Re: Rule 11 Sanctions Gregory W. Moeller 
4/4/2013 JDMT MACE Judgment-Final Judgment On Rule 11 Sanctions Gregory W. Moeller 
5/2/2013 MOTN MACE Motion For Dismissal Of Finding Of A Public Gregory W. Moeller 
Road 
AFFD MACE Affidavit Of Lynn Hossner For Dismissal Of Order Gregory W. Moeller 
Of Public Road 
CERT MACE Certificate Of Service Gregory W. Moeller 
MACE Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Gregory W. Moeller 
Supreme Court Paid by: Karl Lewies Receipt 
number: 0001997 Dated: 5/2/2013 Amount: 
$109.00 (Credit card) For: Flying A Ranch, Inc., 
(plaintiff) 
MACE Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Karl Gregory W. Moeller 
Lewies Receipt number: 0001997 Dated: 
5/2/2013 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: Flying 
A Ranch, Inc., (plaintiff) 
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Page 3 of 4 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Fremont County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller 
User: HARRIGFELD 
Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal. 
Date Code User Judge 
5/2/2013 NOTC HARRIGFELD Notice of Appeal Gregory W. Moeller 
5/8/2013 MISC HARRIGFELD Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Dismissal Gregory W. Moeller 
MISC HARRIGFELD Respondent's Opposition to Petition to Review Gregory W. Moeller 
AFFD HARRIGFELD Affidavit of Blake G. Hall Gregory W. Moeller 
5/9/2013 MISC HARRIGFELD Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript DUE Gregory W. Moeller 
7/15/13 
5/13/2013 AMEN HARRIGFELD Amended Notice of Appeal Gregory W. Moeller 
5/17/2013 CERT MACE Certificate Of Mailing Gregory W. Moeller 
MEMO MACE Memorandum In Response To Memorandum Of Gregory W. Moeller 
Defendants 
6/11/2013 TRAN HARRIGFELD Transcript Filed Gregory W. Moeller 
6/26/2013 ORDR HARRIGFELD Order Consolidating Appeals Gregory W. Moeller 
7/10/2013 HARRIGFELD Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Gregory W. Moeller 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Karl Lewies Receipt number: 0003230 Dated: 
7/10/2013 Amount: $231.40 (Check) APPEAL 
RECORD 
8/1/2013 HRVC MACE Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Gregory W. Moeller 
02/26/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
For Partial Summary Judgment 
Motion For Patrial Dismissal 
8/2/2013 CERT MACE Certificate Of Mailing Gregory W. Moeller 
NOTC MACE Notice Of Hearing On Petitioners Appeal Gregory W. Moeller 
8/5/2013 HRSC MACE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/27/2013 03:00 Gregory W. Moeller 
PM) Hearing On Petitioners Appeal 
8/22/2013 MISC HARRIGFELD Appellant's Brief Gregory W. Moeller 
8/27/2013 MINE HARRIGFELD Minute Entry Gregory W. Moeller 
9/19/2013 MISC MACE Respondant's Brief Gregory W. Moeller 
10/16/2013 MISC MACE Decision On Review Gregory W. Moeller 
MISC MACE Appelants Reply Brief Gregory W. Moeller 
10/23/2013 MISC MACE Amended Decision Of Review Gregory W. Moeller 
11/6/2013 NOAP MACE Defendant: Fremont County Board Of Gregory W. Moeller 
Commissioners, Notice Of Appearance Blake G. 
Hall 
STIP MACE Stipulation For Substitution Of Counsel Law Firm Gregory W. Moeller 
Of Hall, Angell And Starnes, LLP Substituted For 
Nelson, Hall, Parry and Tucker 
11/8/2013 NOTC HARRIGFELD Notice of Appeal Gregory W. Moeller 
HARRIGFELD Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Gregory W. Moeller 
Supreme Court Paid by: Hall Angell & Starnes 
Receipt number: 0005343 Dated: 11/8/2013 
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Fremont County 
Board Of Commissioners, (defendant) 
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Date: 1/31/2014 
Time: 09:37AM 
Page 4 of4 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Fremont County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0000580 Current Judge: Gregory W. Moeller 
User: HARRIGFELD 
Flying A Ranch, Inc., etal. vs. Fremont County Board Of Commissioners, etal. 
Date Code User Judge 
11/8/2013 BNDC HARRIGFELD Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 5344 Dated Gregory W. Moeller 
11/8/2013 for 100.00) 
BONC HARRIGFELD Condition of Bond Preparation of the Clerk's Gregory W. Moeller 
Record on Appeal 
11/26/2013 NOTC MACE Notice-Amended Notice Of Appeal Gregory W. Moeller 
ORDR HARRIGFELD Order Re: Amended Notice of Appeal Gregory W. Moeller 
12/20/2013 HRVC MACE Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Gregory W. Moeller 
08/27/2013 03:00PM: Hearing Vacated Hearing 
On Petitioners Appeal 
1/3/2014 TRAN MACE Transcript Filed Gregory W. Moeller 
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
Attorney for Petitioners 
j 
I 
\ ""'~~~::::::::::s~zg:,:;:,-:.;;..-;;;.--..~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12- S?fiJ 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
Fee Category: L.3. 
Fee: $96.00 
COME NOW Petitioners, by and through their attorney of record, Karl H. Lewies, and 
petition the Court as follows: 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 1 
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. Petitioners, Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard, George Ty 
Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow, are individuals and residents of Fremont County, Idaho. 
2. Petitioner Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., is an Idaho corporation that holds title to land located 
in Fremont County, Idaho that is the subject of this appeal. 
3. Petitioners are aggrieved persons under Idaho Code § 40-208, and the amount in 
controversy exceeds $10,000.00. 
4. Respondent, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County ("Board") is the 
governing body for Fremont County, Idaho, a political subdivision of the state ofldaho ("County"). 
5. Respondents, Ronald "Skip" Hurt and LeRoy Miller are elected county commissioners 
for Fremont County, Idaho ("Commissioners"). Each Commissioner is named individually and in 
his official capacity. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
6. Petitioners incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5, above, as if 
fully set forth. 
7. Petitioners have ownership interests in real property located in Sections 8, 17, and 20, 
Township 9 North, Range 42 East, Boise Meridian, Fremont County, Idaho, that will be adversely 
affected by Respondents' recent passage of Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting an official road map 
("Official Road Map") for Fremont County under authority of Idaho Code § 40-202 that depicts 
private roads located on their land and commonly known as the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 2 
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and Snow Creek Road, respectively, as public roads (the "Subject Roads"). 
8. Petitioners seek judicial review, under authority ofldaho Code§ 40-208, and Homestead 
Farms, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855 (2005), of the Board's 
October 29, 2012 action passing Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting the Official Road Map, and all 
related proceedings. Related proceedings include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: 
(1.) the Board's public hearing held September 27, 2012; (2.) the Board's public information 
meeting held July 20, 2012, in Island Park, Fremont County, Idaho; (3.) the Board's public 
information meeting held July 26, 2012, at Ashton, Fremont County, Idaho; and (4.) the Board's 
public information meeting held July 30, 2012, at St. Anthony, Fremont County, Idaho. 
9. Digital recordings of the Board's public hearing held September 27, 2012, in St. 
Anthony, Fremont County, Idaho was reportedly made by the County Clerk. Petitioners have been 
informed that such recording is in the possession of the County Clerk, whose address is 151 W. 1st 
N., St. Anthony, Idaho, 83445. Digital recordings of all related proceedings were reportedly not 
made by the County Clerk. 
10. Petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies available to them and they 
remain aggrieved because their real property will be adversely affected, and their substantial rights 
prejudiced, by the placement of the Subject Roads on the Official Road Map as part of Ordinance 
No. 2013-01. 
11. Petitioners hereby petition this Court for judicial review of the Board's October 29, 
2012 action passing Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting the Official Road Map, and all related 
proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of Idaho Code § 40-208, and other applicable 
provisions oflaw. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 3 
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12. Petitioners maintain that the Board's findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions 
violated the provisions of Idaho Code § 40-208, insofar as they were: (a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b.) in excess ofthe statutory authority of the Board; (c.) made 
upon unlawful procedure; (d.) affected by other error of law; (e.) clearly erroneous in view of the 
reliable, probative and substantial information on the whole record; or (f.) arbitrary or capricious or 
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
13. Specifically, Petitioners seek judicial review of the following issues, and reserve the 
right to assert additional issues for judicial review: 
a.) Whether the Board failed to make any factual determination of the status of the 
Subject Roads as public or private before placing them on the purported Official Road Map; 
b.) Whether the Board engaged in unlawful procedure, acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, or abused its discretion by placing the Subject Roads on the Official Road Map 
without first making a factual determination whether such road was public or private. 
c.) Additional issues may be later discovered to be in violation of Idaho Code § 
40-208, and other law, accordingly, Petitioners hereby reserve their rights to assert such 
additional issues. 
14. Petitioners request the preparation of transcripts of the Board's public hearing held on 
September 27, 2012, as well as any and all other related meetings that were recorded. 
15. Petitioners also request preparation of transcripts of any and all other related Board 
proceedings. 
16. Petitioners' counsel will make arrangements for payment with the County Clerk for the 
preparation of such transcripts and the preparation of the record herein. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 4 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
17. Petitioners incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 16, above, as if 
fully set forth. 
18. Petitioners maintain that any public use or public maintenance of the Subject Roads 
that may be undertaken in reliance upon the Board's adoption of Ordinance No. 2013-01 and the 
Official Road Map, will cause immediate and irreparable harm to Petitioners. 
19. Petitioners, therefore, seek temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions enjoining 
the Board, Fremont County, and members of the general public, and their agents and 
representatives, from maintaining or using the Subject Roads during the pendency of this appeal. 
CERTIFICATION 
I, Karl H. Lewies, attorney for Petitioners, hereby certify that true and correct copies of this 
Petition for Judicial Review have been served on the Board, the individual commissioners, and the 
County's prosecuting attorney; and further certify that the County Clerk has been contacted, and 
will be paid, the estimated fee for preparation of the transcripts and preparation of the record herein. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray for the following relief: 
1. That the Board's passage of Ordinance No. 2013-01 adopting the Official Road Map, be 
vacated; 
2. That any and all public use and public maintenance that could be undertaken in reliance 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 5 
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upon the Board's passage of Ordinance No. 2013-01 and the Official Road Map be enjoined 
pending the Court's final decision on this Petition for Judicial Review; 
3. That Petitioners be awarded attorney's fees and costs in accordance with I.C. §§ 12-117, 
12-119, 12-120, and 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54( e) and I.R.C.P. 84, as applicable. 
4. That Petitioners be awarded such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this 23rd day ofNovember, 2012. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 6 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
;G~ ?-::2'. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 23rd day of November, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW to be served upon the following persons at the 
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct 
postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below: 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 151 W. 1st N. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt 
151 W. 15tN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
LeRoy Miller 
151 W. 15tN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Joette Lookabaugh, Esq. 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney 
22 W. l 5tN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
DATED this 23rd day ofNovember, 2012. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 7 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
;6,?/X£2._ 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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By <i"~t). 
~Kl.P 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
FL YING"A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) _________________________) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW 
The Court has before it Petitioner's November, 23, 2012 Petition for Judicial Review of the 
Fremont County Board of Commissioners' action passing Ordinance No. 2013-01, dated October 
29, 2012, and all related proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that: 
1. This appeal shall be determined on the record. 
2. The above-named governmental entity shall prepare the record and lodge it with the 
District Court. Upon such lodging, the Clerk of the Court shall mail to counsel for both 
parties' a notice that the updated record has been lodged. The fee for preparing the updated 
agency record shall be paid according to statute; 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW -- 1 
oocur.1~NT 
SCANNE!l 
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3. An updated transcript of the proceedings before the agency shall be prepared at the 
petitioner's expense; 
4. Briefing shall occur according to the following schedule: 
a. Petitioner's brief shall be filed with this Court within 35 days of the date on which 
notice that the transcript and record have been filed with this Court is served; 
b. Respondents' brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of Petitioner's brief; 
c. Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed within 21 days after service of 
Respondents' brief. 
5. A courtesy copy of any pleading filed in this matter, including the briefs, shall be lodged 
with the District Court for Madison County, Idaho, 134 E. Main, Rexburg, Idaho 83440. 
6. When all the foregoing conditions have been complied with, Petitioner shall schedule a 
hearing for oral argument in Fremont County on the next convenient law and motion day 
following the expiration ofthe time limit for Petitioner's reply brief. Notice ofthe hearing 
date shall be served upon this Court and counsel for Respondents. In the event that no 
hearing is scheduled, this Court will assume that the matter has been submitted for 
resolution without oral argument. 
So ordered. 
Dated this D~ day ofDecember, 2012. 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW -- 2 
Gregory 
District 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON REVIEW was this :{\)\ day of December, 2012, sent via 
US mail to the following individuals: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC. 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
151 W. N. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Respondent 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt 
151 W. 1st N. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Respondent 
LeRoy Miller 
151 W. lstN. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Respondent 
Joette Lookabaugh, Esq. 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney 
22 W. l 5tN. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Attorney for Respondents 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON REVIEW -- 3 
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Blake G. Hall 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
(208) 522-3001 
(208) 523-7254 
Idaho State Bar No. 2434 
Attorney for Respondents 
.~ t:YJ:=N coURT 
OISIF'JC I S "t State of Idaho 
county ot r=remon -
filed:- I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision ofthe state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
COUNSEL 
COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this 
motion to disqualify Petitioner's attorney Karl Lewies pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1. 7 and Idaho Code § § 31-2604. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct clearly require that an attorney not engage in a 
representation of a client that is a conflict of interest with a current or former client. In this case, 
Petitioners have retained Karl Lewies to represent them on the Petition for Judicial Review. 
However, and despite Mr. Lewies having knowledge of his future appointment as the Fremont 
County Prosecutor, Mr. Lewies accepted a representation that would place him squarely in 
conflict against the entity that he has been elected to represent starting on January 14,2013. 
There will exist a concurrent conflict of interest and Mr. Lewies should be disqualified from 
continued representation in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Lewies should be disqualified from continuing to represent Petitioners because he has 
a concurrent conflict of interest that cannot be waived and will result in representation directly 
adverse to another client. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct specifically prohibits representing a 
client if that representation will cause a conflict of interest with a current client. Specifically, Rule 
1.7, Idaho Rules ofProfessional Conduct, states as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. 
A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to 
another client; or 
(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities 
to another client, a former client or a third person or by the 
personal interests of the lawyer, including family or domestic 
relationships. 
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(c) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected 
client; 
(2) The representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) The representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by 
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the 
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) Each affected client gives informed consent. confirmed in 
writing. 
I.R.P.C. 1.7 (emphasis added). 
In this case, Mr. Lewies was elected as the Fremont County Prosecutor. He officially 
takes oath on January 14, 2013. As the Fremont County Prosecutor, he has statutorily created 
duties that make it impossible for him to continue to represent Petitioners in this matter. Idaho 
Code § 31-2604 identifies the duties of the county prosecutor as follows: 
It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney: 
1. To prosecute or defend all actions, applications or motions. 
civil or criminal. in the district court of his county in which the 
people. or the state. or the county. are interested. or are a 
ruu:ty; and when the place of trial is changed in any such action or 
proceeding to another county, he must prosecute or defend the 
same in such other county. 
2. To prosecute all felony criminal actions, irrespective of whom 
the arresting officer is; to prosecute all misdemeanor or infraction 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL- 3 
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actions for violation of all state laws or county ordinances when 
the arresting or charging officer is a state or county employee; to 
conduct preliminary criminal examinations which may be had 
before magistrates; to prosecute or defend all civil actions in 
which the county or state is interested; and when a written 
contract to do so exists between the prosecuting attorney and a city, 
to prosecute violations for state misdemeanors and infractions and 
violations of county or city ordinances committed within the 
municipal limits of that city when the arresting or charging officer 
is a city employee. 
3. To give advice to the board of county commissioners. and 
other public officers of his county. when requested in all public 
matters arising in the conduct of the public business entrusted 
to the care of such officers. 
4. To attend, when requested by any grand jury for the purpose of 
examining witnesses before them; to draw bills of indictments, 
informations and accusations; to issue subpoenas and other process 
requiring the attendance of witnesses. 
5. On the first Monday of each month to settle with the auditor, and 
pay over all money collected or received by him during the 
preceding month, belonging to the county or state, to the county 
treasurer, taking his receipt therefor, and to file, on the first 
Monday of October in each year, in the office ofthe auditor ofhis 
county, an account verified by his affidavit, of all money received 
by him during the preceding year, by virtue of his office, for fines, 
forfeitures, penalties or costs, specifying the name of each person 
from whom he receives the same, the amount received from each, 
and the cause for which the same was paid. 
6. To perform all other duties required of him by any law. 
I. C. § 31-2604 (emphasis added). 
In this matter, Mr. Lewies has endeavored to sue both the County and two County 
Commissioners whom are his clients as of January 14, 2013. While he does not currently have a 
conflict of interest, on January 14,2013, Mr. Lewies will have a conflict of interest because he 
has an obligation to defend the County and to advise the County Commissioners. Mr. Lewies 
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cannot represent either party now because he has been provided with sensitive and privileged 
information regarding the Petitioners claims. Likewise, Mr. Lewies cannot discharge his duties 
as the County Prosecuting Attorney because he would have been normally required to represent 
the County. Mr. Lewies should be disqualified from future representation of either Petitioner or 
Respondent in this matter because his continued involvement is an indisputable conflict of 
interest with current clients. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Court disqualify from 
continued representation of Petitioners or Respondents because such representation is a conflict of 
interest with a current client. 
DATED this -I- day of January, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this 
----+--day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
J>t1 Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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DISTRICT SE'/i:h: COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Fiied: :___-==============!-
Blake G. Hall 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
(208) 522-3001 
~ 2013 0 
ABBIE MACE,-CCERK )'lj 
(208) 523-7254 
Idaho State Bar No. 2434 
Attorney for Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS 
COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this 
Partial Motion to Dismiss Commissioners Hurt and Miller in their individual capacity pursuant to 
Rule 12(b )( 6), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS 
In disposing of a motion under Rule 12(b )( 6), a court may only consider those facts that 
appear in the complaint. See Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 
1990). In order to survive such a motion, the non-moving party's complaint must, on its face, 
contain allegations that, if proven, would entitle the non-moving party to the relief claimed. See 
Wells v. United States Life Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). The standard 
for reviewing such a motion is the same as that employed in a motion for summary judgment -
the non-moving party is entitled to all inferences from the record being resolved in his favor. See 
Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993); Miles 
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991). A complaint should be 
dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b )( 6) motion if, "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Gardner v. 
Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 730,732 (1975). 
ARGUMENT 
This matter comes before the Court because Petitioner has named Commissioner Ronald 
"Skip Hurt and Commissioner Leroy Miller (referred to collectively as the "Commissioners") in 
both their official and individual capacities. A review of the Petition for Judicial Review fails to 
articulate any grounds for which the Commissioners can be named in their individual capacities. 
The central focus of this matter is a request for judicial review centered on the adoption of 
Ordinance No. 2013-01, adopting an official road map. Each paragraph of the Petition alleges 
that the Board of Commissioners failed to make the necessary factual determination prior to 
adopting the road relative to whether a road was private or public. Absent from the Petition is 
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any suggestion that the Commissioners acted in their individual capacity. Rather, the Petition 
recognizes that the actions of the Commissioners were while sitting as elected Commissioners 
for Fremont County. There was never any action by either Commissioner in their individual 
capacity. Because there are no allegations in the Petition that can be construed as action in their 
individual capacity, the Court should dismiss Commissioners Hurt and Miller in their individual 
capacity. 
There was never any reason for Petitioners to sue the Commissioners in their individual 
capacity. There is no suggestion that they acted in any capacity other than their official capacity 
as a Fremont County Commissioner. To include the allegations against the Commissioners in 
their individual capacity is bad faith, frivolous, and unjustified. Because Petitioners have acted 
with bad faith by including unsubstantiated allegations against the Commissioners, Respondents 
should be awarded their attorneys' fee incurred in this matter. Idaho Code§ 6-918A permits the 
award of attorneys' fees: 
At the time and in the manner provided for fixing costs in civil 
actions, and at the discretion of the trial court, appropriate and 
reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the claimant, the 
governmental entity or the employee of such governmental 
entity, as costs, in actions under this act, upon petition therefor and 
a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party 
against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad 
faith in the commencement. conduct. maintenance or defense 
of the action. 
(Emphasis added). Petitioners have acted in bad faith by commencing litigation that lacks any 
foundation for claims against the Commissioners in their individual capacity. Attorney's fees 
should be awarded in having to defend against these frivolous allegations. 
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS- 3 
Page 24 of 408
Respondents further requests attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. Rule 11.2 
provides in pertinent part: 
Every notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief and other document 
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one 
(1) licensed attorney of record ofthe state ofldaho ... The 
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the 
attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, 
brief or other document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that 
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. If the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other 
document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(Emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a signed legal document violates 
Rule 11.2 if "(1) it is not well grounded in fact; (2) it is not warranted by existing law or a good-
faith extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3) it was interposed for an 
improper purpose." Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264 (2010) (citing 
Readv. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364,209 P.3d 661,668 (2009)). The Commissioners are being forced 
to defend against allegations that are completely unsupported by fact and serve to only harass and 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation. As such, an award of attorney's fees is appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Court dismiss 
Commissioners Hurt and Miller in their individual capacity. Respondents further request that the 
Court enter an order awarding costs and fees incurred in preparing and arguing the instant motion. 
DATED this_$_ day of January, 2013. 
~6/¥1 AK G.HALL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
p/ I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this 
--t-- day of January, 2013, by regular mail, CM-ECF electronic notification or electronic mail. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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[ ] 
[ ] 
Mailing 
Hand Delivery 
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Overnight Mail 
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Blake G. Hall 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
(208) 522-3001 
(208) 523-7254 
Idaho State Bar No. 2434 
Attorney for Respondents 
OIST::IICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Fiiedi=: ==========;---
JAN - 7 2013 
ABBIE MACE, CL*_$ 
By: ~~ 
D puty Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision ofthe state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 22nct day of January, 2013, at 2:30p.m., of said day, 
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Courthouse, in Fremont County, Idaho, 
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Partial Motion to Dismiss will be brought on for 
hearing before the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller. 
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DATED this__£_ day of January, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IJJereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this-+ day of January, 2013 by regular mail, CM-ECF electronic notification or electronic 
mail. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N. , Suite #125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
~ Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
Page 28 of 408
• 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 3 72-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
Attorney for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation,) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP") 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, ) 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his ) 
official capacity, ) 
) 
Respondents. ) 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Fremont ) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
KARL H. LEWIES 
Karl H. Lewies, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES 
DOCUMENT 
o..J"'A'' 
'-<.i 1uN:n 
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1. I make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Effective as of January 14, 2013, I will be sworn-in as the duly elected prosecuting 
attorney for Fremont County, a political subdivision of the state of Idaho. 
3. Once I take office, a conflict of interest will arise in connection with my continued 
representation of Petitioners in this case. 
4. Under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.16, such circumstances require 
my mandatory withdrawal of representation. 
5. Given the nature and posture of the pending litigation, it is my good faith belief that 
Petitioners will not be prejudiced in any way by my withdrawal. 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2013. 
Karl H. Lewies 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to on oath before me this l day of January, 2013. 
2 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES 
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 3 72-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
Attorney for Petitioners 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT ~ounty of Fremont State of Idaho 
Flled:r=============:::=:;---
JAN - 7 20:: 
AB~:'· .. MA.CE, CLERK 
By: --~~+-~~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV -12-580 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
COMES NOW counsel for Petitioners, attorney of record, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., and moves 
the Court for an order allowing his withdrawal of representation in this matter based on the 
following: 
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1. Effective as of January 14, 2013, the date on which counsel will be sworn as prosecuting 
attorney for Fremont County, Idaho, a political subdivision of the state of Idaho, continued 
representation of the Petitioners will likely result in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 1.16(a)(l). 
2. Upon termination of representation, reasonable steps shall be taken to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect Petitioners' interests, as required under Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.16( d). 
3. This motion is based on the pleadings and the affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, filed herewith. 
DATED this ih day of January, 2013. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
;4~ 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the ih day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW to be served upon the following persons at the addresses 
below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon, 
or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Deputy Fremont County P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2013. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 3 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
Attorney for Petitioners 
• DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
filed:;::===========::;--
JAN -8 2013 
A~ACE,CLERK 
By: ./JL!.}. --~~~--~D~e-p~ut~a~e~rk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 
You will please take notice that on Tuesday, January 22, 2013, at 2:30P.M. o'clock, or as 
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, at the Fremont County Courthouse, located at 151 W. 1st 
N., St. Anthony, Fremont County, Idaho, counsel for Petitioners will move the Court for its order 
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allowing withdrawal from representation. 
DATED this gth day of January, 2013. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 8th day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING to be served upon the following persons at the addresses 
below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon, 
or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Deputy Fremont County P .A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc. 
Clen & Emma Atchley 
4054 E. 1300 N. 
Ashton, ID 83420 
Clay & Laura Picard 
4198 E. 1300 N. 
Ashton, ID 83420 
George Ty Nedrow 
David Tuk Nedrow 
1401 N. 3125 E. 
Ashton, ID 83420 
DATED this 8th day of January, 2013. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 3 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
Attorney for Petitioners 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed:~- _ o-· ___ _ 
j J,': . N- 8 l. 
L_ ________ ~ 
• MACE, CLERK 
By: Ul}4 ~~~----~D~e-p~ut-y~Cl~er~k 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision ofthe state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 8th day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW that I filed with the Court on January 7, 2013, to be served upon the 
following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. 
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,. -. 
Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set 
forth below: 
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc. 
Clen & Emma Atchley 
4054 E. 1300 N. 
Ashton, ID 83420 
Clay & Laura Picard 
4198 E. 1300 N. 
Ashton, ID 83420 
George Ty Nedrow 
David Tuk Nedrow 
1401 N. 3125 E. 
Ashton, ID 83420 
DATED this 8th day of January, 2013. 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE- 2 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
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Blake G. Hall 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
(208) 522-3001 
(208) 523-7254 
Idaho State Bar No. 2434 
Attorney for Respondents 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT ?;1~~;ty of Fremont State of Idaho 
JAN 1 1 2013 
ABBIE ,M ..ACE CLERK By: !Jl) ')' 
. / Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
STIPULATION FOR 
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
Defendants, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY, 
IDAHO, RONALD "SKIP" HURT, and LEROY MILLER by and through counsel of record, 
Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and Blake G. Hall and Nathan R. 
Starnes, ofNELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, hereby stipulate that the law firm ofNELSON 
STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 1 
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HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. shall be substituted as counsel of record for Defendants, and 
copies of all pleadings or other papers should be directed to: 
BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
NATHANR. STARNES, ESQ. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
/-9-13 .. 
Date 
Date 
Ne son Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this _t_ day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
[~ Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 2 
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
Attorney for Petitioners 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
STIPULATION FOR 
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
Petitioners, by and through their attorney of record, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., and Lynn 
Rossner, Esq., hereby stipulate that Lynn Rossner, Esq., has substituted as counsel of record for 
Petitioners, and copies of all pleadings and other papers should now be directed to him at the 
following address: 
STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 1 
DOCUMENT ORIGINAL 
SCANNED 
---------------------------------~. -~. '·-·-··"''"-·~C,i'>ci""'''" 
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Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
109N. 2"d W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2013 
DATED this J..!fday of January, 2013 
;~_/~:. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. ' 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
/;::::? 
~Li?~,Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am .a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the ~~~day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing STIPULATION F R SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL to be served upon the 
following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. 
Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set 
forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Deputy Fremont County P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
DATED this J.!{!aay of January, 2013. 
["-,~] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 2 
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DISTR: ,-;T SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JU ICffMcO:::IS~I~R!~C:=I==:=====:==::::;--
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FRE ONT Cr~~;N I i
1013 
) 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC. an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, ) 
and DAVID TUK NEDROW ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, individually and in his official 
capacity, and LEROY MILLER, individually and in 
his official capacity 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ABBIE MACE, CL 
Case No. 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
Notice is hereby given that on January 15, 2013, the Clerk's Record (X), 
Reporter's Transcript ( ) in the above referenced appeal was lodged with the 
District Court Clerk. 
Abbie Mace 
Clerk of the District Court 
/~ b,a&!&AJ ~ laUr;~ngleton 
Deputy Clerk 
VI 
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FLYING A RANCH, INC., ET AL. 
vs. 
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, ET AL. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
L ·-------~~~ . .:J:"r::..::>.:._· ~., '·. ___ _J 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Hearing 
Judge: 
Courtroom: 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
Tuesday, February 26,2013 at 03:00PM 
Gregory W. Moeller 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 25th, 2013. 
Attorney's will please notify clients of court date(s), time(s) and location(s). 
PlaintifPs Counsel: Lynn Hossner 
Defendant's Counsel: 
I 09 North 2nd West 
St. Anthony ID 83445 
Mailed ____:i,__ 
Blake G. Hall 
Attoney At Law 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Id. 83405-1630 
MailedL 
Dated: January 25th, 20 I 3 
Abbie Mace 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: 
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DISTRJCT SPIEN COtn:;T 
C;.n.:nty of Fremont St8te ot idaf-1o 
Fued: 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH J DICiifrmffiFfF~H:=~-
THE STATE OF IDAHO COUNTY 0 FRE 
DISTRICT COURT 2 2 ?.013 I 
-@i. J 
By: __ A_B -l;I}J-.EI#MrAC_E_, -C;::::-LE-. ~-.~-., -. -
.__ ___ ---.:, _ ____:D~·:t:.f· :.:.:_·· L_::Y ~· 
TYPE OF HEARING: LAW AND MOTION 
GREGORY W. MOELLER 
JANUARY 22,2013 
PRESIDfNG JUDGE: 
DATE: 
ATTORNEYS PRESENT: 
COURT REPORTER: 
CLERK: 
DAVE MARLOW 
DEBORAH MACE 
257 FLYING A RANCH VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM. 
E.C GWALTNEY VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM. 
MR HOSSNER APPEARS ON BEHALF OF FL YfNG A RANCH 
MR HALL APPEARS ON BEHALF OF BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
MR LEWIES APPEARS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS. 
THE COURT COMMENTS ON MOTIONS. 
WILL TAKE UP REPRESENTATION ISSUES. 
THE COURT ASKS MR LEWIES AS TO SEEKfNG TO WITHDRAW 
AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS. STATES COUNSEL ON FL YfNG A 
MR HOSSNER WILL STEP fN ON THAT CASE. 
ON GWALTNEY HAS NOT HEARD BACK FROM THAT PLAfNTIFF 
THE COURT ASKS AS TO MOTION TO DISQ. 
MR LEWIES WILL NOT REPRESENT FREMONT COUNTY OR 
PETITIONERS ON THESE CASES. 
FEELS MOTION TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE FfNE. 
THE COURT CLARIFIES CASES. ARE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW CASES. 
THE COURT ASKS MR LEWIES WHY THESE CASES WERE FILED 
WHEN HE KNEW HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE THESE CASES. 
MR LEWIES STATES TIME WAS OF THE ESSENSE AND DID NOT SEE 
ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT. HIS CLIENT KNEW HE WOULD NOT BE 
ABLE TO TAKE CASES. 
304 THE COURT IS TAKEN ABACK AS TO HOW THESE CASES WERE 
FILED. MR LEWIES STATES NO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
-----...l 
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WAS BREACHED. 
WAS UP AGAINST A DEADLINE. THE COURT WANTS TO KNOW WHY 
MR HALL HAD TO FILE A MOTION TO DISQ. 
307 MR HALL WANTS TO MAKE SURE TIME LINE IS ACCURATE. 
COMMENTS ON FILING DATES. 
316 THE COURT WILL ALLOW MR LEWIES TO RESPOND ON REPRESENT 
A TIONAL ISSUE. MR HOSSNER ON MOTION TO DISMISSAL 
MR LEWIES DOES NOT FEEL MR HALL SHOULD BE REPRESENTING 
FREMONT CO. GIVES REASONS. COMMENTS ON FINDING OF 
NEC. STATES BILLIE SIDDOWA Y SHOULD BE REPRESENTING FREM. 
COUNTY. 
324 THE COURT COMMENTS ON CONCERNS OF RULING FROM THE 
BENCH ON THESE MATTERS. GIVES CONCERNS. 
THE COURT STATES MR LEWIES SHOULD HAVE NO ROLL IN THESE 
CASES WHAT SO EVER IN THESE CASES. DOES NOT FEEL MR HALL 
SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD TO FILE A MOTION IN THESE CASES. 
THE COURT WILL ALLOW MR LEWIES TO WITHDRAW AND NOT TO 
HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THESE CASES. 
THE COURT WILL ORDER ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE COUNTY. 
MR HALL MAY MAKE THAT REQUEST. WILL NOT BE AGAINST THE 
PETITIONERS BUT AGAINST MR LEWIES. MR LEWIES MAY CONTEST 
THE ISSUE OF MS SID DOW A Y REPRESENTING THE COUNTY NEEDS 
TO BE BRIEFED MORE. 
MR HOSSNER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL. 
330 MR HOSSNER COMMENTS. 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL-THE COURT WILL MR HURT AND 
MR MILLER BOTH SHALL BE DISMISSED INDIVID. AS RESPONDANTS 
IN THESE CASES. ISSUE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION, MR LEWIES 
CANNOT BE ATTORNEY FOR ANY PARTIES IN THESE CASES. 
MR HALL WAS JUSTIFYED IN MOTION TO DISQ. COUNTY DOES 
HAVE A RIGHT TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
WILL DEFER RULING ON ATTORNEY FEES ISSUE. 
WILL ALLOW 14 DAYS FOR MR LEWIES OFFICE, THROUGH BILLIE 
TO FILE APPROP BRIEFING AS TO WHY THEY SHOULD BE CONSID. 
AS ATTORNYS OF RECORD. AND MR HALL TO FILE RESPONSE 
WITHIN 17 DAYS. WILL HAVE HEARING ON FEB 26m. 
MR HALL ASKS AS TO MOTION TO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
THE COURT COMMENTS ON JURISDICTION ISSUE. 
WILL NOT AWARD ATTORNEY FEES ON PARTIAL SUMM JUDGEMENT 
MR HALL MAY SUBMIT REQ FOR ATTORNEY FEES. WILL ALLOW 
MR LEWIES TO RESPOND TO THAT. 
MR HALL ASKS AS TOMS SID DOW A Y OR WHO EVER TO FILE A 
MOTION. THE COURT DOES NOT FEEL A MOTION IS NEC. 
WANTS BOTH SIDES TO SUMIT LEGAL ARGUMENT. 
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Lynn Rossner 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State Bar No. 1074 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Attorney for Plaintiffs -------~~:::_-_~-""--.--~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
LAURA PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE ) 
TY NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
' Petitioners 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision ofthe State of Idaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, individually and in his 
individual capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
ANSWER TO PARTIAL 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Comes now Lynn Rossner, attorney for Plaintiffs, and in answer to Defendants' Partial 
Motion to Dismiss, alleges as follows: 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL 
Commissioners Hurt and Miller were named in their official capacity as well as 
individually. Plaintiffs allege, in their Petition for Judicial Review of the "Boards" action on 
October 29, 2012 in passing Ordinance No. 2013-01 and the adoption of an Official Road Map, 
that the public hearings and lack of specific Findings of Fact do not support the findings. In this 
case, commissioners' Miller and Hurt are the individuals who passed the adoption of the Official 
Road Map and passed Ordinance No. 2012-01. If it is determined that the legal process was not 
adhered to as required by law, then plaintiffs claim they were damaged not only by the 
commissioners in their individual capacity, but also by the named commissioners. 
It is text book law that if a party "may" be affected by a judgment in an action that those 
parties should be included and are "proper parties." 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parties, paragraph 8. By 
joining the commissioners individually, litigation is kept at a minimum, with the rights of all 
Page 1 of 2 
I 
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persons who have an interest or are concerned may be determined by one action. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Parties, paragraph 8. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
There is nothing in Defendant's Petition for Partial Dismissal to indicate that the above 
action brought against the two named commissioners in "bad faith, frivolous or unjustified" as 
urged by defense counsel which merits an award of attorney fees. The Motion for Partial 
Dismissal brought by defense indicates plainly in the first paragraph that "Come now 
Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt 
and Leroy Miller, .... " There is no indication that defense counsel is acting for commissioners 
Hurt and Miller individually. 
DATED this 22nd day of January 2013. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on January 22, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs 
Response to Partial Motion to Dismiss as follows: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001 
METHOD OF SERVICE: 
[]Mailed [X] Hand Delivered [] Facsimile 
Page 2 of 2 
Page 48 of 408
Blake G. Hall 
Nathan R. Starnes 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
(208) 522-3001 
(208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorney for Respondents 
{ 
...,. 'T SE"EN COURT D'STniG -" t Idaho 1 nt State o County ot Fremo -
Filed: 
r 
JAN 3 0 20\3 
j 
ASBIE MACE, CLERK 
By: ~'ll i ' ~!-·~· ,, D·~:p·.::'J ·-· ·. , J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney for Respondents in this action. 
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2. That our office has spent substantial hours in preparation and attendance of the 
Motion to Disqualify previously heard by the Court. Said motion was heard by the Court on 
January 22, 2012, at such time the Court granted Respondents request for attorney's fees. 
3. That Respondents have incurred attorney's fees in filing and arguing the Motion 
to Disqualify in the sum of $1,777.50. Attorney time for Blake G. Hall (BGH) was billed at 
$225.00 per hour. 
4. The following are the entries billed in preparation and argument of the motion to 
compel: 
• 12/2112012: BGH 
• 1/3/2012: BGH 
• 1/22/2013: BGH 
Prepare motion to disqualify (2.0); research re: disqualification 
standards (.7); research re: county prosecutor duties and 
requirements (.7). 
Revise and file motion to disqualify Karl Lewies ( 1.0). 
Prepare for hearing on motion to disqualify (.5); telephone call 
with L. Hossner concerning pending motions (.3); travel to St. 
Anthony for hearing (.7); participate in argument on motion to 
disqualify (1.3); return to Idaho Falls (.7). 
5. The attorney's fees incurred by Respondents in the within action were 
necessitated by Plaintiffs failure to recognize an indisputable conflict of interest with current 
and future clients given his prior election as the Fremont County Prosecutor. The Motion to 
Disqualify was not a routine motion and required unique research in its preparation. The time 
expended in preparing and arguing this motion was reasonable and necessary. 
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6. The rates charged Defendant for representation in the within action are reasonable 
and similar to, or less than, those charged by attorneys with comparable experience and expertise 
in the vicinity of Fremont County, Idaho. 
7. To the best of the moving party's knowledge and belief, the items of fees are 
correct and in compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and are in compliance with 
relevant case law and statute. 
DATED this .J.~ day of January, 2013. 
4--
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of January, 2013. 
Residing at: ~ ~ , rD 
Commission expires: ~(/l._!t::_:_o+{__:_:'t'~----
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this ----t:1.S_ day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
343 E. 4th N. , Suite #125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Lynn Hossner 
1 09 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
[ {Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[;(Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
L:\BGH\7525 -Fremont County files\7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pleadings\Defendant's\DQ Attorneys Fee Affidavit.docx 
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ SE\/EN COURT 
C'Q' }'~Y of Frernunt State of ldaro 
'""":!,~ N 3 1 1"13 Jl Karl H. Lewies, Esq. KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
L -0-~-,_~--~-··--~~- . 
ABBIE MACE, CLE! ,., .. 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
By: ~' Li 
C. ·•yr'""l"vk ·epL,, ._. t., 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV -12-580 
 
S 
COMES NOW Karl H. Lewies, Esq., in his individual capacity and respectfully objects to 
the Court's award of attorney's fees to Respondents' counsel, on the following grounds: 
1. On November 11, 2012, Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies") accepted the representation of 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 1 
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Petitioners to complete1 on their behalf the filing of a petition for judicial review pertaining to their 
private road. 
2. On January 2, 2013, Blake Hall, Esq. ("Hall"), or his representative, telephonically 
scheduled a court hearing on his forthcoming motion to disqualify counsel.2 
3. On January 7, 2013, Lewies, filed a motion to withdraw from his representation of 
Petitioners, citing afuture conflict of interest that would arise, "[e]ffective January 14, 2013 .... " 
4. Also on January 7, 2013, Hall filed his motion to disqualify Lewies stating in relevant 
part, "While [Lewies] does not currently have a conflict of interest, on January 14, 2013, Mr. 
Lewies will have a conflict of interest .... "3 
5. On January 22,2013, the Court granted Lewies' motion to withdraw.4 
6. Also on January 22, 2013, however, the Court ordered Lewies to pay attorneys' fees to 
Respondents' counsel, Hall, on the grounds that, "Mr. Hall should not have had to file his motion to 
disqualify. Your actions, Mr. Lewies, put everyone injeopardy." 
7. Yet, Hall did not have to file his motion to disqualify at all. A simple, courteous 
1 "Complete" is explained by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRPC") Rule 1.16, Comment 1, as, "Ordinarily, a 
representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been completed." Here, the Petitioners wanted 
Lewies to quickly file a petition for judicial review in order to meet a rapidly approaching 28-day deadline for filing such a 
petition, under I. C. § 40-208. Petitioners and Lewies first communicated on November 20, 2013, just two (2) business days 
before the time for filing a petition was to expire. Under IRPC 1.3, Lewies acted diligently to "pursue the matter on behalf of the 
client despite personal inconvenience." 
2 At no time prior to telephonically scheduling a court hearing on his forthcoming motion to disqualifY did Hall make any effort 
whatsoever to confer with Lewies. Analagous to the discovery rules, if Hall had "in good faith conferred or attempted to confer" with 
Lewies "in an effort to secure disclosure without court action," he would have been informed that Lewies would seek to withdraw 
prior to any actual conflict of interest arising, and therefore, there would be no reasonable basis in law or fact for Hall to file a motion 
to disqualifY. 
3 Hall had no reasonable basis, in law or fact, for filing a motion to disqualifY Lewies since in his own motion he admitted "Mr. 
Lewies does not currently have a conflict of interest .... " 
4 CD recording of court hearing held January 22, 2013, where District Court Judge Gregory Moeller is heard saying, "The Court 
allows Mr. Lewies to withdraw." (CD recording at 31:00 minutes.) 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 2 
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telephone call by Hall to Lewies prior to filing his motion could have quickly resolved any doubt 
whether Lewies intended to continue representation, or withdraw. But, Hall made no such 
"reasonably inquiry"5 prior to filing his motion; rather, he interposed his disqualification motion for 
an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
of litigation. "6 
8. Whereas, the Court "allowed Mr. Lewies to withdraw,"7 it must find that Lewies was the 
prevailing party. 
9. The Court may award attorneys' fees only upon a finding that "the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I.C. § 12-117. In this instance, Hall was the 
nonprevailing party. 
10. Imposition of attorney's fees against a prevailing party is an abuse of discretion. 
11. The Court should find that Hall's motion to disqualify was without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law, and was interposed for the improper purpose of harassing Lewies, contrary to Idaho 
Code§ 12-117 and Rule 11(a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively.8 
12. Alternatively, if the Court reverses its existing ruling in this matter, and rather than 
allowing Lewies to withdraw as it has already done, decides to grant Hall's motion to disqualify 
Lewies, then the Court should not allow the amount of attorney's fees requested by Hall in his 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees because of the following: 
5 See, IRCP Rule ll(a)(l). 
6 The Court, itself, noted on the record that, "It's time to end the pettiness." (CD recording at approximately 43:45 minutes.) 
7 See, footnote 4, supra. 
8 When Hall filed his motion to disqualifY Lewies, on January 7, 2013, the undisputed fact is that Lewies had no current conflict 
of interest. Further, Hall had failed to cite any legal or ethical violation by Lewies that had actually occurred at the time he filed 
his motion to disqualify. Therefore, Hall's motion was obviously not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry; and was not 
warranted by any existing law. See, IRCP Rule ll(a(l). 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 3 
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a.) Hall was employed by Fremont County, Idaho as a salaried deputy prosecuting 
attorney through January 14, 2013; 
b.) Hall's Fremont County salary was $805.94/week; 
c.) Based on a 40-hour work week, Hall was earning $20.13/hour while employed 
by Fremont County, not $225.00/hour; 
d.) According to ,-r4 of Hall's own sworn affidavit, he billed Fremont County 3.4 
hours on 12/21/2012 at the rate of$225/hr. for a total of$765.00, and he billed Fremont County 1.0 
hour on 1/3/201[3] at the rate of$225/hr. for a total of$225.00; 
f.) According to Hall's own sworn affidavit, he billed Fremont County an extra 
$990.00 on top of his regular county salary. 
12. The Court should disallow Hall's request for attorney's fees during the period of time 
during which he was employed by Fremont County as a salaried attorney. 
13. This objection is based on the record and the affidavits of Karl H. Lewies and Kristina 
Larson, filed herewith. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 31st day of January, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES to be served upon the following persons at the 
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct 
postage thereon, or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
NELSON, HALL 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013. 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES- 5 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
;0d~ 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
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• 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
• 
DISTRICT SEVEN COU~T 
County of Fremont State ot idaho 
Filed::.======:::;--
JAN 3 1 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Fremont ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
KRISTINA LARSON 
Kristina Larson, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am employed by Fremont County, Idaho, in the county clerk's office. 
2. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTINA LARSON. 
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4. Blake Hall was employed by Fremont County as a deputy prosecuting attorney and paid 
an annual salary of$39,413. 
5. From December 30, 2012, through January 12, 2013, Fremont County paid Blake Hall a 
bi-weekly amount of$1,611.88. 
6. A copy of the payroll information is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013 
2 -AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTINA LARSON. 
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Exhibit 11A" 
Payroll Information 
(Fremont County's Deputy Prosecuting Attorney- January 2013} 
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01/31/2013 15:17:00 FN504 KRISTINA LARSON FREMONT COUNTY PAGE 1 
FISCAL YEAR 2013 FROM 0110112013 TO 09/30/2013 FUND 0008 DEPT 0001 
FUND 0008 JUSTICE FUND 
-01 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
----------PAYMENT----------
Acct No. Acct Description I Vendor Name Payment For Invoice No. Warrant No. Date Amount 
. - ... ::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::.::::::::::: ~--:.- ------:::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::---- :: -.::::::::::::::-::::.::::::::::.::::::::.::::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::.:.:::::::::::.:;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
0401-0000 SALARIES-OFFICER 
0402-0000 CHIEF DEPUTY 
0402-0001 SALARIES-ADMIN ASSISTANT 
0402-0002 DEPUTY-CRIMINAL 
0402-0003 DEPUTY CIVIL 
0406-0001 PARALEGAL 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL - EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL-EXPENSE 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
*PAYROLL* 
01/03/2013 
01/17/2013 
01/31/2013 
AcctTotal: 
01/03/2013 
01/17/2013 
01/31/2013 
01/03/2013 
01/17/2013 
01/31/2013 
01/03/2013 
01/17/2013 
01/31/2013 
01/03/2013 
01/17/2013 
Acct Total: 
01/03/2013 
01/17/2013 
01/31/2013 
Acct Total: 
3,326.35 
3,326.35 
3,326.35 
-------------------------
9,979.05 
9,979.05 
96.15 
115.39 
96.15 
-------------------------
307.69 
293.76 
293.76 
257.04 
844.56 
1,515.88 
1,515.88 
1,515.88 
----------------
4,547.64 
1,515.88 
1,819.06 
------------------
3,334.94 
9,034.83 
1,555.19 
10,959.29 
1,509.62 
14,024.10 
" 
** 
" 
* 
** 
14,024.10 ** 
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01/31/2013 15:17:00 FN504 KRISTINA LARSON FREMONT COUNTY 
EXPENDITURE ACTIVITY DETAIL 
FISCAL YEAR 2013 FROM 01/01/2013 TO 09/30/2013 FUND 0008 DEPT 0001 
FUND 0008 JUSTICE FUND 
-01 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
AcctNo. Acct Description I Vendor Name Payment For 
Total 'D' Expenses- (Benefits): 
0439-0000 TRAVEL- OTHER 
BANK OF IDAHO- CARDMEMBER 
SERVICE 
0440-0000 SUPPLIES - OFFICE 
JOETTE L'S CARD@ THE HICKORY 
ALSCO INC FLOOR MAT ROTATION 4 X 6 MATS 
THOMPSON WEST PAYMENT CENTER ARREST LAW BULLETIN 
0559-0000 MISC. EXPENDITURE 
Invoice No. 
4798 5100 4209 
9065 
LBLA 1302362 
JENSEN, CAROL A. 
NALA PAYMENT CENTER 
NALA CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COURS 
NALA PARALEGAL CERTIFICATION D 
Total 'B' Expenses-- (Other Expenses): 
0806-0000 CAPITAL- OFFICE EQUIPMENT 
LOOKABAUGH, JOETTE REIMBURSEMENT FOR TABLE & MICR 
Total 'C' Expenses -- (Capital Outlay): 
DEPTARTMENT TOTALS: 
Total 'A' Expenses-- Salaries: 
Total 'D' Expenses -- Benefits: 
Total 'B' Expenses-- Expenses: 
Total 'C' Expenses -- Capital Outlay: 
33,037.98 
7,854.71 
488.35 
300.00 
41,681.04 
PAGE 3 
----------PAYMENT----------
Warrant No. Date 
Acct Total: 
7,854.71 
2013-0002619 01/11/2013 
Acct Total: 
2013-0002651 01/14/2013 
2013-0002684 01/14/2013 
Acct Total: 
2013-0002472 01/07/2013 
2013-0002474 01/07/2013 
Acct Total: 
488.35 
2013-0002473 01/07/2013 
Acct Total: 
300.00 
Dept Total: 
Amount 
175.22 .... 
27.34 
~ ~ .. - .. -------
27.34 .. 
27.34 .... 
44.22 
41.79 
----------------
------------
86.01 
86.01 .... 
250.00 
125.00 
------------
375.00 .. 
375.00 
300.00 
300.00 .. 
300.00 .... 
41,681.04 
Page 62 of 408
• 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
• DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed: 
JAN 3 1 2013 
By: 
ABB~E, CLERK 
/ Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official capacity, 
and LEROY MILLER, individually and in his 
official capacity, 
Respondents. 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Fremont ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
KARL H. LEWIES 
Karl H. Lewies, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES - JANUARY 31, 2013. 
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2. On November 20, 2012, Clen Atchley telephoned me saying he "had a project that had to 
be done right away." 
3. In discussing the matter with Mr. Atchley, it became apparent that he was facing a strict 
28-day deadline for filing a petition for judicial review and that such time period would 
expire in two (2) business days. 
4. Knowing that I had special expertise in filing petitions for judicial review, and 
recognizing that Mr. Atchley was in need of urgent legal assistance, I accepted 
representation for the limited purpose of filing the petition for judicial review to preserve 
his legal rights. 
5. Once I reviewed the official road map, I determined that a private road belonging to some 
close friends of my family, namely petitioners E.C. Gwaltney, III, of Alexander City, 
Alabama and Lana Varney, a partner in the Houston, Texas law firm of Fulbright & 
Jaworski, had also been listed by Fremont County as a public road, contrary to the law 
and facts of the matter. Accordingly, I contacted my friends notifying them of the 
looming expiration of time to file a petition for judicial review. They promptly asked me 
to prepare and file a petition for judicial review to preserve their legal rights. 
6. On November 23,2013, I filed petitions for judicial review in Fremont County cases CV-
12-580 and CV -12-581, just one (1) day before expiration of the 28-day time for filing. 
7. On January 7, 2013, I filed a motion to withdraw from representing petitioners in both 
pending cases, CV-12-580 and CV-12-581. 
8. Also on January 7, 2013, Blake Hall, Esq., of Idaho Falls, Idaho, filed a motion to 
disqualify me from representing petitioners in the two above-referenced cases. 
9. Prior to filing his motion to disqualify me, Blake Hall, made no good faith effort to 
confer, or attempt to confer, with me to determine whether I intended to withdraw from 
representing the petitioners once I was sworn-in to office as the elected prosecuting 
attorney for Fremont County. 
10. I believe that Blake Hall filed his motion to disqualify me for an improper purpose, to 
harass me. 
11. Indeed, following the court hearing on these matters held January 22, 2013, District 
Judge Gregory Moeller, invited me into his chambers and told me he was aware of the 
ongoing bitter personal disputes among my predecessor-in-office, Joette Lookabaugh and 
2 - AFFIDAVIT OF KARL H. LEWIES - JANUARY 31, 2013. 
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her deputy prosecutor, Blake Hall, and myself. Judge Moeller advised me that everyone 
would be better off if the disputes ended. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2013 
;04~ 
Karl H. Lewies 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to on oath before me this 31st day of January, 2013. 
·········· '~ .... .... / ·, 
/ <1\C\A L. S •••• I ____) h . ~ . .. .  . / 
.... ,::. .. •• ··~/.)>"·.. -- '--:-_:__ -- . \_ __ /_~ - --. /~:·~oTAJ( ··.'),.\ ~ ./>)·/ F)~~ 
! :' r : ! NOTARY PUBLIC 
" -•- ' " / _ I 1\ ~ * :. p C .: * j Residing at:.sf. f~-vt---~-tw-"'2-0 1 'fj u ~ •• VBL\ · : · 
\ t.P.?>··. ..-"o / My comm. expires: cJ--.-/1 51= 
••• <1 r:· ....... \l"-~ •• • 
•••• l? OF \U ••• • 
················· 
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~ MADISON COURTS 2083585425 (TUE)FEB 5 2013 10:28/ST.10:24/No.7518178080 P 1 
MAmSON C)'Ulf!."l, !1.: ·. i:lv,, __ _ 
Fl .. YING"A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, CL.EN ATClfl..EY, EMMA ) 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY ) 
PICKARD, G~ORGE TY NEDROW, and ) 
Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV·l2-581 
DA VJD TUK NEDROW, ) 
) 
Petil.ioners, ) 
) ORDER ON MOTIONS TO: 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
1) DISQUALIFY COUNSEL, 
2) WJTHDRA W, AND 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY. IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, ) 
3) DISMISS INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS. 
RONALD "SKIP'' HURT, individually and ) 
in his ofticial capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) 
E.C. GWAL ThJEY, III and ) 
LANA K. VARNEY ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) 
On November 23, 2012, Karl H. Lewies filed Lwo petitions for judicial review of 
decisions made by the Fremont CounLy Board of Commissioners ('~he County''). The petitions 
were filed on behalf of various individuals and one corporation identified in the c.:apLion 
("Petitioners"). At the time Mr. Lcwies filed these petitions, he was the prosecutor-elect for 
Fremont County, having been duly elected in the general election on November 6, 2012. Mr. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS -- Page 1 
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Lewies ran unopposed in the general election. havin2. defeated the incumbent Fremont County 
prosecutor in the primary eJection on May Is. 2012. Mr. Lewies had not yet taken office when 
he tiled the petitions; he was sworn in on January 14,2013. 
On January 2, 2013, Fremont County, through Blake Hall, its then deputy prosecutor, 
tiled a motion seekjog to disqualify Mr. Lewies from representing Petitioners against the County. 
Mr. Hall also filed a motion for partial dismissal of the individual claims against the 
commissioners. Mr. Lcwies then filed a motion to withdraw on January 7, 2013. On January 14, 
2013, after a substitution of counsel was signed, Lynn Rossner appeared on behalf of Petitioners 
Flying'"A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard. Clay Pickard, George Ty 
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow in Case No. CV-12-580. As of the date of the hearing, no 
other attorney had appeared on behalf of the Petitioners in Cast: No. CV·l2-581. 
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had 
failed to withdraw voluntarily until the County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also 
questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity he had just recently been 
elected to reptesen.t on behalf of clients he could no longer represent. Mr. Lcwies attributed the 
delay to an oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct wa..:; violated. He claimed 
that his clients were operating under time constraints due to the statute of limitations. He agreed 
that he should no longer represent his 1onncr clients or the County on these matters in the future. 
Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Mr. Hall to file any motions or argue on behalf of 
the County. Mr. Hall responded by noting that he was still an acting deputy prosecutor for the 
County when he filed his motions and that he is now acting under a contract with the County 
Commissioners. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County 
of legal counsel in this matter. Mr. Lewies asserted that his newly appointed deputy prosecutor, 
Billie Siddoway, could take over his representation of the County in this matter. Mr. Hall 
disagreed and ao;;ked tor attorney fees incurred by the County in filing both motions. 
Mr. Hall also addressed his motion tbr partial dismissal. arguing that the County 
Commissioners could not be sued "individualJy." The Court questioned Mr. Lewies and Mr. 
Hossner as to the appropriateness of making claims against elected officials individually in a 
petition for judicial review wtder I.RC.P. 84. 
After considering the pleadings and arguments of counsel. the Court ordered as follows: 
ORDER ON MOTIONS ·- Page 2 
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1. Noting its stron.~~t disagreement with Mr. Lewies' action~ in tn1~:. m~tter. the Cnuri 
hereby bars Mr. Lewies from further representing Petitioners or Respondents in these matters. 
2. The motion for partial dismissal of the named County Commissioners as individual 
Respondents is hereby granted. Neither Mr. Lcwies nor Mr. Hossner could articulate a factual or 
legal ba.~is tor bringing individual claims against the commissioners via a petition for judicial 
review. Future pleadings shall contain a correct caption, removing the words "individually and" 
after each commissioner's name. 
3. The Court concludes that the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in 
filing the motion to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against Mr. Lewies personally, but not 
against his clients, the Petitivners. Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with appropriate 
supporting documents within 14 days. Mr. Lcwies will be allowed to appear tbr purposes of 
contesting the attorney fees only. 
4. The Court concludes that the inclusion of the individual claims against the 
commissioners in the caption was likely an oversight that could have been cleared up without 
tiling a motion. Thcrelbre, no fees will be assessed at this time. 
5. If Ms. Siddoway wishes to assert the position that she should be pem1itted to represent 
Fremont County on these matters, ruther than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing, she 
may ti.le an appropriate motion within 14 days. Mr. Hall will be allowed to respond within 7 
days. 
6. All pending matters (attorneys 1ees against Mr. Lcwics and Ms. Siddoway's eligibility 
to represent the County in this matter) will be taken up on February 26, 2013, at 3:00p.m. 
7. This order is effective immediately; however, the Court is willing to reconsider any 
portion ofthe order during the hearing on February 26,2013. 
8. Inasmuch as the Court does not possess the individual addresses of Mr. Lewies' 
unrepresented, fanner clients in Case No. CV-12-581., he shall provide a copy of this order to 
each of them as soon a" possible by certified mail, and submit proof of mailing to the Court. 
SO ORDERED thislst day of February, 2013, nunc pro tunc January 22, 2013. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS -- Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER WdS this 
f'!!""'tl"" . 
_o __ day of february, 2013, sent via US mail to the following individuals: 
Karl H. Lcwics 
Billie Siddoway 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorneys Office 
22 w. 1St N. 
Sr. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Blake Hall 
:P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Lynn Hossner 
109 North 2"d West 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
151 W.N. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
By: 
ORDER ON MOTIONS -- Page 4 
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Feb 06 2013 0!5:39PM Siddoway Law Office, PLLC 208-3!54.0440 
Billie J. Siddoway (ISB No. 6628) 
bsi.ddowa.y@co.fremont.id.us 
OFFICB Of THE FREMONT COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
22 West 1st South 
St. Anthony, ID B3445 
Tel: 208-624-4418 
Fax: 208-624-3404 
P•se 1 
DISTF<:CT SEVEN COURT 
Cou!1ty of Fremont State of Idaho 
F11eo.:r ============::::;--
l_ FEB - 6 2013 
ABI.:l!E-MACE:'CLER_K_ ;~}1, 
By: _________ _ 
DepL;ty Cie:k: 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FREMONT COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
FLYING A RANCH, INC. et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, ,, a/., 
Defendants. 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, et aL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, et ai., 
Defendants. 
STEPHEN A. HUBER, 111 al., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FREMO~T COUN1Y BOARD OF 
COMMISSIOKERS, et al., 
Defendants. 
1 
Case Nos. CR-2012-580, CR-2012-581, 
CR-2011-215 
NOTICE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
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I respectfully submit this notice in response to the Court's request fat briefing of January 22, 
2013. A conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct prevents me 
&om taking a position adverse to the decision of the Fremont County Commission to retain outside 
counsel in thi3 matter. I have provided legal advice to the Fremont County Commiesion on the 
matter of retaining outside counsel and, while I do not represent the County in this mAtter, I 
consider the County to be a "cuttent client" as that tetm is used in Rule 1.7. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of February, 2013. 
OFFICE Of TI-IB FREMONT COUNTY PROSBCl:TOR 
2 NOTICE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on February 6, 2013, a true a.nd cottect copy of the fotegoing 
was caused to be sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Blake Hall 
NeLson Hall ParryTucket, P.A. 
490 Memorial Dtive 
Idaho Fa.llil, ID 83402 
Lynn Hossner 
109 North 2nd West 
St. Anthony, ID 8l445 
3 NOTICE OF CONFLICf OF INTEREST 
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Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone: (208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorneys for Respondents 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed:i=======:::;--
FEB - 6 2013 
ABBIE rv~, CLERK 
By: ____ ..e:.:.z.U.J?\4 -=--__,.--Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
I 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 26th day of February, 2013, at 3:00p.m., of said 
day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Courthouse, in Fremont County, Idaho, 
Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss will be brought on for hearing before the Honorable 
Gregory W. Moeller. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
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DATED this___£____ day of February, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this___£____ day of February, 2013 by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109N2ndw 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
~ Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
Page 74 of 408
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
DISHiiCT SE'/f::.N COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Filed::.=================;--
P. 0. Box 51630 FEB - 6 2013 
AB~ACE,CLERK 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone: (208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorney for Respondents 
By: __ ...~.LJ~ h~l),l.----;::;:-:-::-:-:T.:""~::i7 Deputy C!erk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL 
COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this 
Motion for Partial Dismissal of any challenge to the January 7, 2013 actions of the Fremont 
County Commissioners based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the explicit 
language ofldaho Code§§ 31-1506 and 67-5273. 
Page 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Respondents' Motion for Partial Dismissal of any challenges to the 
January 7, 2013 Fremont County Commissioners decision to retain Mr. Blake G. Hall and the 
firm of Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. to handle four pending lawsuits against Fremont County. 
An oral motion was made by Fremont County Prosecutor Karl Lewies following a motion by 
Fremont County to disqualify Mr. Lewies from the above-referenced matter given his concurrent 
conflict of interest. At the hearing, the Court disqualified Mr. Lewies. Following the order 
disqualifying Mr. Lewies, the Court entertained a verbal motion by Mr. Lewies, after being 
disqualified, about Fremont County being represented by Mr. Hall and his law firm in the 
instant matter. Mr. Lewies mislead the Court by indicating that the County had not retained Mr. 
Hall. In reality, Fremont County had adopted a resolution on January 7, 2013 to hire Mr. Hall 
and Nelson Hall Parry Tucker to handle the pending litigation. The Fremont County 
Commissioners are entitled to retain outside counsel for pending litigation and the instant matter 
is not a proper forum to challenge a County Commission decision. 
ARGUMENT 
1. There Is Not Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Hear A Challenge To The January 7, 
2013 Commissioner's Action. 
For a Court to issue any binding order, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject 
matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type or class of dispute." State 
v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162-63,244 P.3d 1244, 1248-49 (2010) abrogated by Verska v. 
Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) (quoting Bach v. Miller, 
144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007)). Article V, Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution, 
provides that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in 
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equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." Idaho Const., art. V, § 20. 
Thus, subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to, and a court has a duty to 
ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. See Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 163, 244 
P.3d at 1249. See also I.R.C.P. 12(g)(4). A judgment or order issued by a court that lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction is void and subject to collateral attack. !d.; Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. 
Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1978). 
In order to challenge an action of the county commissioners a petition must be timely 
filed. The failure to timely file a petition will moot any challenge. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-
1506, the judicial review of a Commissioners decision must be initiated by the filing of a petition 
that complies with the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act. 
order or proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person 
aggrieved thereby within the same time and in the same manner as 
provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of 
actions. 
I. C. § 31-1506(1) (emphasis added). Thus, judicial review of any act, order or proceeding must 
comply with Idaho Code§§ 67-5201 et seq. A petition that fails to comply with the 
requirements ofldaho Code§§ 67-5201 et seq. will be denied. 
Idaho Code §§ 67-5273(3) specifies the time period in which a petition for judicial 
review of an action must be filed, "A petition for judicial review of a final agency action other 
than a rule or order must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action, except as 
provided by other provision oflaw." The failure to timely file a petition within the prescribed 
period of time will render the petition invalid. 
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The specific challenge raised by Mr. Lewies is to the Commissioners hiring of Mr. Hall 
to represent the County in four pending civil matters. On January 7, 2013, the Fremont County 
Commissioners took up the following motion: 
We currently have three lawsuits pending that are being handled by 
our civil deputy Blake Hall. They are Flying A Ranch, Inc., et al. 
v. Fremont County; Gwaltney, III, et al. v. Fremont County; and 
Stoddard Bros v. Fremont County. Additionally, we have the case 
of Huber v. Fremont County that Mr. Hall has been our legal 
counsel. In each of these cases, the incoming prosecuting attorney, 
Karl Lewies, has a conflict of interest and neither he nor his office 
can represent us. Therefore, pursuant to our authority under I.C. 
31-813, and to ensure continuity in the representation of the 
County, Commissioner Miller moved that we retain Blake Hall of 
the firm Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. to represent us in the 
above matter commencing on January 16, 2013. Commissioner 
Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with 
all commissioners voting in favor. 
(Fremont Co. Minutes, January 7, 2013, p. 7, attached hereto as Ex. A). Thus, the failure to file a 
petition within 28 days of the January 7, 2013 action-or February 4, 2013 is invalid. Moreover, 
it is important to note that the issues addressed in this proceeding deals with a challenge to the 
County's classification of a road. The instant petition does not challenge the January 7, 2013 
action. No petition challenging the Commissioners decision was timely filed. Challenging a 
commissioner decision that is completely unrelated to the instant petition is inappropriate. The 
instant matter is not the proper forum for a challenge to the Fremont County Commissioner's 
January 7, 2013 action to hire independent counsel and the Court should dismiss any such 
challenge. 
2. The Fremont County Commissioners Can Hire Outside Legal Counsel To Handle 
Pending Civil Litigation. 
Notwithstanding the above, the oral motion made by Mr. Lewies is without legal support. 
The Fremont County Commissioners are entitled to retain outside counsel to address "suits to 
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which the county is a party in interest." I.C. § 31-813. Specifically, Idaho Code § 31-813 
specifically vests a board of county commissioners with the right to control who handles civil 
suits where the county is a party in interest: 
To direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to 
which the county is a party in interest, and employ counsel to 
conduct the same, with or without the prosecuting attorney, as 
they may direct. 
(Emphasis added). Pursuant to the unambiguous language of Idaho Code § 31-813, the Fremont 
County Commissioners have the right to hire counsel to defend the County in civil actions where 
the County is a party. The language further states that hiring outside counsel does not have to be 
the prosecuting attorney. Rather, the statute vests the decision solely with the Commissioners-
"as they may direct." Jd. 
In this case, the County specifically determined that, based on the clear conflict of 
interest, that Mr. Lewies was unable to defend the County in four pieces of pending litigation 
against the County: Flying A Ranch, Inc., eta! v. Fremont County, Gwaltney, et a!. v. Fremont 
County, Stoddard Bros v. Fremont County, and Huber v. Fremont County. Given the pending 
nature of the civil suits and a desire to ensure continuity of the representation of the County, the 
Commissioner determined that it was in the County's interest to continue to have Mr. Hall 
represent the County on those pieces of litigation. While there is no statutory requirement that a 
resolution be adopted prior to hiring outside counsel, the Fremont County Commissioners 
adopted a resolution further confirming their intentions. 
In the January 7, 2013 Commissioners meeting, the Fremont County Commissioners took 
up the issue of hiring Mr. Hall and his law firm, Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A., to continue to 
represent the County on the four above-referenced matters. Based on the unambiguous authority 
granted to the Commissioners pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-813, the Commissioners were 
Page 5 
Page 79 of 408
entitled to hire Mr. Hall. When the hearing in this matter took place on January 22, 2013, Mr. 
Hall had been retained to represent the County in the four above actions. Given the appropriate 
actions taken by the Commissioners to hire Mr. Hall in this matter, any challenge to the 
Commissioners' actions is without merit. Based on the unambiguous language of Idaho Code § 
31-813, the Commissioners acted within the scope of their authority and there is no viable legal 
grounds to challenge the Commissioners January 7, 2013 action. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Respondents respectfully request that the Court dismiss any 
challenge to the January 7, 2013 Fremont County Commissioners action to to employ Mr. Hall 
and Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. in the four pending civil actions for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. In the alternative, the Respondents request that the Court find that the Fremont 
County Commissioners actions were legal and appropriate under Idaho law. 
DATED this .5' day of February, 2013. 
~Hi[~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this__£___ day of February, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Hossner 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
M 
[ ] 
[ ] 
Mailing 
Hand Delivery 
Fax 
Overnight Mail 
L:\BGH\7525 -Fremont County files\7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pleadings\Defendant's\Jurisdiction Challenge (Mot).docx 
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FREMONT COUNTY St. Anthony, ID 
Present for the meeting was: Commissioners Skip Hurt, Lee Miller and Jordon Stoddard. 
Also attended by: Deputy Clerk Laura Singleton, Assessor Kathy Thompson, Sheriff Len 
Humphries, Treasurer J'Lene Cherry, and Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh 
Commissioner Hurt called the meeting to order and welcomed those in attendance. 
Extension Agent Lance Ellis offered the prayer. 
Public Works Director Brandon Hanis led the pledge. 
Elected Officials & Department Heads 
Emergency Management Director Keith Richey reported they have been monitoring the rivers tor 
ice build~up, He has been working in Island Park on sustainable tire issues. He reported the public 
has been very responsive to this program. Mr. Richey stated he is getting ready to do Hazmat 
reports. He also stated there is an extra $7,000 available to send Sheriff Humphries' officers to 
SWAT training. Mr. Richey stated he has also been working on several grants. 
Five County Juvenile Detention Administrator Nicky Chavez reported they had a bit of a water 
problem with a broken sprinkler head but everything is deaned up now. They have hired five part 
time reserve officers and are preparing to send three of their employees to POST. Mr. Chavez 
stated they are working with PREA. He also reported that there are fourteen kids in treatment with 
several that have been released. Mr. Chavez gave a quarterly report of the numbers at the facility. 
He is now preparing for the Five County Board Meeting next week. 
Extension Agent Lance Ellis reported they have finished up the last of their classes that were 
taught at 5C. Mr. Chavez thanked lance for sharing his expertise with the student there. Mr. Ellis 
stated they have been running the Master Gardner Program at the Work Camp. They will start 
doing projects when the snow is gone in the spring. He would like any suggestions on work they 
could do in the community to use as service hours. They will start the Master Gardner Program for 
the people in the community on Jan. 30th. They will be holding a Grain School on Feb. 7th at the 
Relay Station. Mr. Ellis stated they are hoping to start a new program for people who own small 
acreage. They would like to be able to teach them ways to farm their land and make money off the 
ground they own or at least make it productive. He reported on the Designated Surveillance Area 
Line meeting. This involves testing for brucellosis in cattle. All of Fremont County is in this 
surveillance area. · 
4-H Coordinator Dana Miller stated now is the time she starts to go to the public schools to teach 
classes to the students. Ms. Miller stated she is traveling to the Capital with a number of students 
in February to Jearn about government. She reported she received a grant from Walmart and also 
Northwest Farm Credit. She hopes to buy some seWing machines with the money to teach kids 
how to sew. 
Sewer Supervisor Dan Lostutter gave the year-end report for 2011-2012 for the Mack's Inn 
treatment plant and the Last Chance treatment plant. They have put a hold on working on the Lift 
Station due to the onset of winter. Hopefully they can start working on it again in June or July. Mr. 
Lostutter reported on the total number of lines they have cleaned. Mr. Lostutter reported they held 
two classes last fall. One class was on electrical safety and one was on repairing pipes without 
having to dig them up. He stated both classes were very good. Mr. Lostutter reported they hired a 
1 
Page 83 of 408
--JAN. 23.2013 10:33AM FREMONT COUNTY St. Anthony, ID NO. 115 P. 3 
'* .-·--
' ~ 
542315 
new employee that started today. He also reported snow making season is under way and they 
have gone from working four days a week to five. 
Weed Supervisor Brvce Fowler reported they have been working on grants. He has been asked to 
do a presentation at a conference in Twin Falls. Mr. Fowler stated he will be spending a lot of time 
in Boise working on getting grants. Mr. Fowler also reported the state is changing things on the 
aquatics program so he has been working on that. So far Idaho has tested negative for mussels. 
They have also been working on setting up their new 4-wheelers and equipping them with a GPS 
system. 
Assessor Kathy Thompson reported things are going well in her office. The appraisers have been 
out doing appraisal work. They have gotten a lot of calls regarding personal property and how it is 
going to affect them. They have had quite a few deeds come through which has surprised her. Ms 
Thompson stated mapping is going well. They have started some property reductions which 
usually benefits the older people. She reported the office looks really nice now that all the work has 
been done. Ms. Thompson stated the Motor Vehicle Department has been very busy. There has 
been concern about Fremont County not getting all the money for roads when people license their 
vehicles. They did some checking into this and stated there really aren't very many Fremont 
County residents who buy their plates in Madison County. 
Planning and Building Administrator Tom Cluff stated things are going well. November and 
December were slower like they typically are. They are in the middle of renewing cabin permits. So 
far there have been no problems. He reported there still are many people who rent cabins but are 
not getting permits. One of their employees will be cutting back their hours while he is in school. He 
reported they need to be thinking of people to replace those who are working on the HUO Grant 
who are leaving office. Commissioner Miller asked Mr. Cluff to check into those people who have 
moved trailers or mobile homes onto their property by filing for hardship status and see if they still 
qualify for this. 
IT Administrator Lisa T umer reported that the tower is now up and turned the rest of the time over 
to her assistant Josh Warnke to update the commissioners on the status of the rest of the work that 
needs to be done on the tower. 
Josh Warnke updated the commissioners on the work that still needs to be done on the tower and 
how they will be hooking up to all the departments. There has been some concern over radiation 
levels from the tower. Mr. Wamke stated the radiation level from the tower is very low because the 
antenna is actually higher. Commissioner Miller asked Keith Richey to check into some kind of 
funding so we can put a fence around the tower because there could be some safety issues that 
arise. 
Public Works Director Brandon Harris reported things are going welt. There haven't been too many 
complaints as far as plowing goes. He reported the sander went down, so they had to make a 
quick trip to Twin Falls to get a part. Mr. Harris stated Red Road Is closed now. The crews have 
been working on shoulder material. The crews will be starting work on the cross cut bridge on 
Monday (400 North). They will then work on the bridge in Chester. Mr. Harris reported Stonebridge 
is being redesigned with four foot piers instead of eight foot piers. Hopefully this will bring the cost 
of the project down. Also the construction window is bigger so that should help lower the price of 
the bridge. Mr. Harris stated they would like to work on the Salem Highway, but they still need to 
find help with the funding. Mr. Harris also reported the St. Anthony Landfill Transfer Station design 
for the landfill should be back this week so they can review it. 
Juvenile Probation Director Darin Burrell stated they are seeing a lot more marijuana issues and 
said this was to be expected because of the issues in the surrounding states. He reported that kids 
are stealing cough medicines now and prescription medications are still an issue. 
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Treasurer J'Lene Cherrv stated they are winding down on taxes. They have collected close to 62%. 
They are starting on the warrants. Ms. Cherry stated she will send out reminders first before they 
send out warrants. She also reminded everyone that credit card bills need to be tumed in by the 
12th of the month with receipts. Ms. Cherry reported she is working on a public administrator case 
and stated it will have to be published in the newspaper before we can do any more with this. She 
stated she hopes she can close this case out in about a month. She stated her office doesn't have 
any heat this morning and they have called someone to come check it. 
Sheriff Len Humphries reported 12 inmates in county custody this morning. There were several 
slide offs this morning. He reported deputies have started doing snowmobile checks. There is 
concern on how things will work next year with snowmobile licensing. Mr. Humphries stated that 
according to Idaho code, those who have filed for a concealed weapon permit will not have their 
names released to the public. He stated they will need a replacement for Commissioner Hurt on 
the DIGBY 6 Board. Commissioner Jordon Stoddard will take Commissioner Hurt's place. There 
has been a lot of talk about increasing 911 fees. Sheriff Humphries stated he doesn't foresee this 
happening until possibly next year though. 
EMS Director Bob Foster reported numbers are basically the same as last year. He reported 
collections seem to be higher than last year. Mr. Foster stated Radio Narrow Banding has been 
completed. Mr. Foster stated that the bids have been sent out for the new ambulance. Also, the 
training program for 2013 starts next Tuesday. He reported the Island Park area had a busy 
weekend and the St. Anthony area had a busy week last week. 
Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh stated she had a quiet holiday with her family. She 
reported she is wrapping up things in her office since this is her last week as prosecutor. 
Commissioner Lee Miller stated that he hoped everyone had a great holiday with their families. He 
stated he has mixed feelings at this time with Commissioner Hurt leaving office and Prosecuting 
Attorney Joette Lookabaugh also leaving office. He also reported he had a conference call with 
Dustin Miller last Friday about wolf depredation. Apparently there was some money left over so 
they were able to pay some late applicants. He stated they have a lot of documentation coming in 
on loss of livestock and money is running out. Dustin Miller will be meeting with the legislature on 
this issue. Commissioner Miller stated he is looking forward to moving ahead with the Transfer 
Station at the Landfill. He also expressed appreciation to all the employees for all the hard work 
they are doing. 
Commissioner Jordon Stoddard has received an estimate for the repairs on the electrical work at 
the fairgrounds. He is still doing a little bit of work in the Assessor's Office. He went to the swearing 
in of the new judge. He thanked everyone for their work. 
Commissioner Skip Hurt stated this is his last week as County Commissioner. He stated we are all 
under scrutiny of the public and everyone watches us. He appreciates the way everyone works 
together here. Everything hasn't always gone smoothly but it has all been ironed out and come 
to~ether. 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to go into executive session pursuant to IC 67~2345(1){b) To 
consider the evaluation) dismissal or disciplining of, or to hear complaints or charges brought 
against, a public officer, employee, staff member or individual agent~ or public school student; at 
10:18 a.m. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A roll call vote was taken with 
Commissioner Miller voting "Aye·~ Commissioner Stoddard voting "Aye·, and Commissioner Hurt 
voting "Aye•. Commissioner Hurt declared the meeting open at 10:34 a.m. 
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Veterans Service Officer stacy Whitmore RE: Increasing Office Hours 
Ms. Whitmore asked the commissioners if she could increase her hours from six to twelve hours 
per week. She stated that she has been busy enough that she has to tell veterans that they will 
have to come back the following week in order for her to help them. The commissioners feel that 
there is enough work for her to add the additional hours. 
Commissioner Stoddard made a rnotion to change Veterans Service Officer Stacy Whitmore's 
hours from six per week to twelve per week. Commissioner Miller seconded the motion. A full voice 
vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor. 
Parks and Recreation Director Tamra Cikaitoga RE: 2014 Grant Applications 
Ms. Cikaitoga reported she has been putting together three grant applications. She needs approval 
to move forward with a boat ramp at Jump-Off Canyon, which is about ~of a mile from the Ashton 
Bridge. She also stated she would need to use the Road and Bridge Crew to get this done. She 
would also like to put new boat docks in at Buttennilk and Mill Creek. There was discussion on 
putting some parking area in at the Jump-Off area. 
She also reported that the Forest Service is working on grant applications so they can repair a 
couple of boat docks in the Island Park area. 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to sign and approve a grant application with Idaho Department 
of Parks and Recreation in the amount of $3,000 with a match from the county of $2,500 for a 
Jump Off Canyon Angler Access Development Project. Commissioner Miller seconded the motion. 
A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor. 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to sign and approve a grant application with Idaho Department 
of Parks and Recreation in the amount of $10,000 with a match from the county of $3,000 to fund 
the upgrade of Mill Creek Boat Launch. Commissioner Miller seconded the motion. A full voice vote 
was heard with all commissioners voting in favor. 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to sign and approve a grant application with Idaho Department 
of Parks and Recreation in the amount of $10,000 with a match from the county of $3,000 to fund 
the upgrade of boating facilities at Buttermilk Boat Launch. Commissioner Miller seconded the 
motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor. 
Ms. Cikaitoga updated the commissioners on how trail grooming is going. She stated everything 
seems to be going good but there just isn't a lot of snow up there. 
Planning and Building Administrator Tom Cluff RE: Department Report 
Mr. Cluff stated that he didn't really have any more to add than what was said this morning. He will 
report next week. 
Social Services - Debbie Adams Re: Indigent Claims 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to go into executive session pursuant to IC 67-2345(1)(d) to 
consider records that are exempt from disclosure as provided in chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code at 
1:00 p.m. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A roll call vote was taken with 
Commissioner Stoddard voting ~Aye", Commissioner Miller voting ~Aye", and Commissioner Hurt 
voting ''Aye". Commissioner Hurt declared the meeting open at 1:10 p.m. 
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Commissioner Miller made a motion to approve case #G2013-16, deny case #M2013-9, and deny 
case #M2013-11. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with 
all commissioners voting in favor. 
Commissioners signed three new liens and two lien releases. 
Public Works Director Brandon Harris RE: Department Reports 
Mr. Harris reported on the issue of plowing John Searle's road. Mr. Searle had to flU out a form and 
according to the score on the fonn he does not qualify to have his road plowed. Mr. Searle still 
feels that the county should plow his road. Mr. Harris asked the commissioners what they would 
like to do. The commissioners discussed other roads in the county that are not being plowed 
because they are private roads or because the county does not maintain those roads. The 
commissioners stated we need to slick to the standards that the previous Public Works Director put 
in place to determine if they qualify to have their road plowed. It was also stated that Mr. Searle 
lives on a steep road and it is hard to get the graders up the hill. The commissioners feel that it 
would be in the countYs best interest to stick with the county's standard; therefore they will not 
plow the road to his house. 
Landfill - There were no issues at this time. 
Sewer- Mr. Harris brought in a document for the commissioners to sign giving an extension on the 
Mack's Inn Sewer Expansion Project. Also, Mr. Harris stated that there is some concem regarding 
someone trespassing at the Island Park Sewer Station and looking into the garage on December 
26tll. 
Mr. Harris stated he is going to meet with people today in Driggs to make sure we are meeting the 
requirements of both OSHA and DEQ on the Transfer Station. 
Commissioner Hurt signed a contract extension for the wheel case loader with Bank of Idaho. 
The commissioners directed Mr. Harris to go ahead and order a new loader. 
Mr. Harris asked the commissioners if they would be willing to hire two of the work camp guys, 
whose time is about up, to work for the county. One would be employed at the Landfill and the 
other would work with Carey Daniels in maintenance. The commissioners asked to put this on the 
agenda for next week and discuss it some more at that time. 
Jerry Greenfield/Trails to Yellowstone Development Co. RE: Letter of support for Forest 
Service Land Swap 
The commissioners were updated on the current standing of the Land Swap between Trails to 
Yellowstone Development Company and the Forest Service. The land that would be swapped is 
currentiy the ground that the Landfill is on. 
Mr. Greenfield gave a presentation on the history of the company's organization and how the idea 
came about. He gave statistics on the tourism to Yellowstone National Park. He stated the 
concerns he has regarding Yellowstone National Park. They feel they can come up with solutions 
to the congestion, lodging, parking, etc. They would like to create a place outside the park that 
would have a variety of restaurants available. Also, water parks and family type entertainment 
would be available. He stressed the economic development that this project would bring to the 
area. The first thing that would have to be done though, is finalizing the land swap. Therefore1 they 
are asking the commissioners for a letter of support for the land swap. 
There was some discussion of the pros and cons of creating something like this in Island Park. 
Commissioner Stoddard stated he likes to be able to drive his own vehicle through the park. He is 
5 
Page 87 of 408
-·· -JAN. 23. 2013 10: 33AM F REMON T C 0 UN T Y S t. An t h o n y, I D NO. 115 
---·" 
' . 
not sure he likes the idea of traveling through the park on a tour bus as was stated by Mr. 
Greenfield. 
Mr. Cluff stated this letter that is being requested is just to support the land swap, not what they are 
proposing to do with the land. 
Mr. Miller stated the land swap would be a positive thing for Fremont County. He feels we should 
support the land swap and ff that goes through, we will deal with the other issues as they come 
about. 
Commissioner Hurt directed Mr. Cluff to draft a letter for the commissioners to sign. 
Board of Equalization 2nc1 Sub Roll Only 
Commissioner Hurt opened the Board of Equalization 2nd Sub Roll at 2:27 p.m. There are no 
requests at this time. Commissioner Hurt closed this at 2:29 p.m. 
Sheriff Len Humphries RE: Contract for Communications System 
Sheriff Humphries brought in a contract for the commissioners to sign to have A VTEC put in a 
radio console at the Sheriff's Office. 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to approve the contract with A VTEC for the radio 
communication system. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard 
with all commissioners voting in favor. 
Sheriff Humphries stated the school district has approached him about hiring an officer to rotate in 
the schools. This officer would work about five or six hours a day. The commissioners feel this 
would be a good idea. 
Storage building at Sand Dunes 
Shannon Bautista, from the Bureau of Land Management, stated they are applying for a grant to 
build a storage building at the Sand Dunes. This grant is based off the Motor Vehicle Fund and the 
Off-Road Fund. This building will be built on BLM ground. She presented a floor plan of what they 
would like to build. The BLM would like to know how much money the county would be able to 
come up with to help fund this project. With this storage building, it would help to clean up the area 
so everything is stored in one place and there won't be several little trailers that store supplies. 
Commissioner Miller stated that to begin with, we just wanted to build something that would house 
the sand rail and now the project has grown to be a lot bigger building than was expected. 
Everyone discussed the things they would like to have available at this facility. A major issue is 
making a storage area that is big enough to house the sand rail so there is a bigger opening to pull 
the sand rail in and out without damaging the tires. Commissioner Miller stated he feels safe in 
contributing about $30,000 to this project. Mr. Foster also stated that we need to consider how we 
will provide for the utilities there. BLM stated they will be responsible for maintaining the facility, but 
would welcome help from the county in any form. 
Commissioner Miller would like an alternate plan in place in case the grant does not come through. 
He would also like an agreement where there is no limit of time as far as being partners with the 
BLM on this project. Ms. Bautista stated she will look into that. 
Commissioner Miller made a motion to apply for a grant together with the BLM with a match of 
$30,000 to build a storage facility at the Sand Dunes. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the 
motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor. 
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Miscellaneous 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to approve the claims for January 7, 2013 as presented . 
Commissioner Miller seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners 
voting in favor, 
Commissioner Hurt made a motion to approve a duplicate copy of Liquor License #36 to Golden 
Bear Lodge, LLC doing business as Lakeside Lounge. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the 
motion. A full voice vote was heard with all commissioners voting in favor. 
Commissioner Miller made a motion to approve the Junior College application for Brittney Leavitt 
and Aubree Hill. Commissioner Stoddard seconded the motion. A full voice vote was heard with all 
commissioners voting in favor. 
We currently have three lawsuits pending that are being handled by our civil deputy Blake Hall. 
They are Flying A Ranch, Inc., et al. v. Fremont County; Gwaltney, Ill, et al. v. Fremont County; 
and Stoddard Bros. v, Fremont County. Additionally, we have the case of Huber v. Fremont County 
that Mr. Hall has been our legal counsel. In each of these cases, the incoming prosecuting 
attorney, Karl Lewies, has a conflict of interest and neither he nor his office can represent us. 
Therefore, pursuant to our authority under I. C. 31-813, and to ensure continuity in the 
representation of the County, Commissioner Miller moved that we retain Blake Hall of the firm of 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. to represent us in the above matters commencing on January 16, 
2013.Commlssioner Stoddard seconded the motion, A full voice vote was heard with all 
commissioners voting in favor. 
There was some discussion on the Legislative Tour that will be held this year. Rexburg Chamber of 
Commerce would like Fremont County to contribute $5,000 to help cover costs for this event. 
Commissioner Miller stated he has reservations about donating that much money. Commissioner 
Stoddard also feels that $5,000 is too much. Commissioner Stoddard stated he would like to 
discuss this with people from the county and hear how they feel about this. No decision was made 
on whether to contribute money. 
There being no further business to come before the board the meeting was adjourned, 
~~ e(MIIl;Chairman 
Fremont County Commission 
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County of Fremont State of Idaho Filed: 
·r=====--Lynn Hossner 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State Bar No. 1074 
109 North Second West 
FEB 1 2 2013 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Attorney for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
, ) 
Petitioners ) 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and 
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity, 
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) 
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) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February 12th, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of Petitioners 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Petition For Review and Affidavit of Lynn Hossner to: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001 
Facsimile (208) 523-7254 
Honorable Greg Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Facsimile (208) 356-5425 
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[]Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [x] Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
' Petitioners 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision ofthe State of Idaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and 
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITIONERS' PETITION 
FOR REVIEW 
Comes now Lynn Hossner, attorney for Petitioners, and in support of Petitioners' Petition 
For Judicial Review ofthe proceedings ofthe Board of County Commissioners for Fremont 
County, Idaho, hereinafter termed "the Board," whereby the Board designated that certain road 
which cross Petitioners' land in Sections 8, 17 and 20, Township 9 North, Range 42 East, Boise 
Meridian as a public road which were designated as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road and 
Snow Creek roads, ("the Subject Road"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the court is Petitioners' Petition For Judicial Review of the actions of the Board in 
adopting Ordinance No. 2013.01 on October 29, 2012 which adopted the Official Road Map of 
Fremont County, Idaho. The Ordinance, among other things, designated a road as a public road 
which commences at 1425 North 3125 East in Fremont County and travels one quarter of a mile 
north over the property of Petitioners, George Ty Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow, hereinafter 
termed Nedrow, and then proceeds north a quarter of a mile over property belonging to 
Petitioners, Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard and Clay 
Pickard, hereinafter termed Flying "A" Ranch. After the road leaves the Flying "A" Ranch 
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property on the north side, it travels one-half a mile north over BLM property to property 
belonging to Flying "A" Ranch and continues on north until it reaches the U.S. Forest Service 
property where the road is blocked. There are numerous gates across the road before it 
approaches the block by the U.S. Forest Service at the south edge of its property. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The road designated as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek 
road, ("the Subject Road") is not a public road. 
The county has the power and authority under I. C. 40-202 to prepare a map designating 
the public roads of the County and to cause notice to be given of its intention to adopt the map as 
a map showing the public roads of the county. The procedure requires that first there be notice, 
then public hearings before the map shall be adopted with whatever changes are deemed 
necessary. 
The act of designating the road as a public road does not automatically 
make the road a public road. The process by which a county selects a road does 
not automatically serve to adjudicate the public status of a road. I.C. 40-202(1). 
There are specific ways in which a public highway may be created. I.C. 40-203(3) 
provides in part: 
Highways, laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this section 
(by acquiring real property and then adopting a resolution establishing an interest in the 
property as a highway), by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used for 
a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the 
expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of commissioners, are 
highways. 
The only testimony at the public hearings regarding the Subject Road was from 
Petitioners, David Tuk Nedrow and George Ty Nedrow. Their testimony is contained on page 
16 lines 24-25, page 17-lines 1-25, page 18 lines 1-25, page 19 lines 1-25, age 20-lines 1-25, 
page 21lines 1-25 and page 22 lines 1-17 (See Attached Exhibit A). As is noted from the 
testimony, there was no testimony that the road was laid out, used for a period of five years and 
had been worked and kept up at the expense ofthe public which fits the criteria ofi.C. 40-
203(3). Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board ofCommissioners ofTeton County, 141 Idaho 855. 
No testimony was elicited from any witnesses regarding continual use of the road for five years 
and that it was worked and kept up at the expense of the public. 
There is no evidence in the record that the road was ever designated as a public road and 
placed on an official map, as provided by law, nor was any evidence adduced that it was created 
by prescription and if it was created by prescription, whether it was abandoned or vacated. It 
appears that this road was declared a public road by the Fremont County Commissioners without 
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obtaining evidence determining if there was a road, how it was created, whether any work was 
done on it at public expense, and if so, was the road ever vacated. Upon examination of the 
record, none of the necessary perquisites were done by Respondents to arrive at the point which 
allowed Respondents to determine that this is a public road. The fact that the Respondents' now 
show the road on the county map as a public road does not make it so absent the proof laid been 
before the commissioners that the road qualified. 
2. THE ROAD IS NOT AN R.S. 2477 
The question was asked during the hearing on the Subject Road whether the road was an 
R.S. 2477 road. The commission chairman indicated he would look into it. There is nothing in 
the record which indicates the commission chairman looked into it or if he did, what the effect 
on the matter was. 
An R.S. 2477 right-of-way is obtained by an "acceptance of a congressional grant of a 
right-of-way for a public highway under this statute." Call v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155. 
The determination may be important ifthere was a belief that there was an established right-of-
way under R.S. 24 77 while the land which now belongs to the Petitioners was in the public 
domain. 
In order to create an R. S. 24 77 right-of-way, "there must be a positive act of acceptance 
by the local government or compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at the time." 
Farrell v. Board of Commissioners of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378. There was no testimony 
given that the road was ever accepted by congressional action while the land was in the public 
domain, designated as such by the local government or that the road complied with the road 
creation statutes in existence at the time. The record is devoid of any finding which would 
support a contention that the road was an R.S. 2477 road. 
3. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DO NOT 
REFLECT FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE SUBJECT ROAD BEING A 
PUBLIC ROAD. 
The Commissioners are required to prove the public status of the disputed road. 
Homestead Farms, Inc., v. Board ofTeton County Commissioners, 141 Idaho 855 Idaho. I.C. 
40-202(1) requires an express finding of fact which made the Subject Road a public road. To 
make the road a public road, there would have to be a finding that: 
1, The highway was laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this 
section (by acquiring real property and then adopting a resolution establishing an interest in the 
property as a highway), by order of a board of commissioners, or, 
2. The highway was used for a period of five (5) years that they have been worked and 
kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of 
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commissioners. 
There is nothing in the record which would make the Subject Road a public road. The 
only finding of fact in the record was that the road was a public roadway absent any reasons. "If 
the road is not properly created as a public highway, its inclusion on an official county highway 
system map does not impose a duty on the property owner to establish it as a public highway." 
Homestead Farms, Inc., !d. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioners respectfully request that the court vacate the 
Official County Road Map as far as it designates the Subject Road as a public road and that 
Petitioners be awarded their attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this 12th day ofFebruary 2013. 
ss 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February 12th, 2013, I served a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing upon: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001 
Facsimile (208) 523-7254 
METHOD OF SERVICE: 
[]Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [x] Facsimile 
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KARL_H. LEWIES, Bar No. 4380 
Fremont Co. Prosecuting Attorney 
RYAN S. DUSTIN, Bar No. 8683 
Deputy Fremont County P.A. 
22 West 1st North 
st. Apthony, Idah,o 83445 
Telephone: (208} 624-4418 
Fax: (208) 624-3404 
ORIGIN 
D''"'T'"'Ir'T SEVEN COURT Coun~~ ~t"F~e~ont State of Idaho 
Filed::~======;--
\ FEB 1 2 2013 
~IE MACE, CLERK 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF J:DAa:O, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC, an Idaho 
Corporation, CLEN ATCHL~Y, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ) 
of Idaho, ) 
Respondents. ) _________________________________ } 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, and 
LANA K. VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state 
of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) _______________________________ ) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
Case No. CV-12-581 
MOTION FOR EXTENTION 
OF TIME (RULE 6(b)) 
COMES NOW, Ryan S. Dustin, Esq., Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
for Fremont County, Idaho, in the above-entitled actions and 
MOTION AND ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
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pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) moves the Court for 
its order enlarging the time to February 25, 2013 to file. a 
memorandum on behalf of the Office of the Fremont County· 
Prosecuting Attorney (the "Office") addressing whether it is 
required and/or permitted under the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho 
Code, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct to represent 
Fremont County, a political subdivision of the state of Idaho, in 
the following pending cases: Case No. CV-12-580 and Case No. CV-12-
581. 
This motion is based on the pleadings and record in the above-
referenced cases, and the affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, Esq., 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney, filed herewith. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 2013. 
Deputy Fremont County P.A. 
MOTION AND ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
+L-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /t7/ day of February, 
2013, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioners 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Id 83405 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
109 N. 2nd W. 
St. Anthony, Id 83445 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Id 83405 
Smith, Legal Secretary 
MOTION AND ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND I'OR THE COUNTY OF ~SEVEN COURT 
cour1tyoT'F'remont State ot Idaho 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION Filed::.=======:;--
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC, an Idaho 
Corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ) 
of Idaho, ) 
Respondents. ) __________________________________ ) 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, and 
LANA K. VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state 
of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) ________________________________ ) 
COUTNY OF FREMONT ) 
) ss 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
FEB 1 2 2013 
.,... ~ "' Case No. CV-1 MACE,CUBRK 
Case No . ~ -:,;1~2:..:-:.;;;059~J.8:..;!; ~1;._,__--;l:.JY't~-:t:";-r.r;-;:i; 
Deputy Clerk 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
KARL H. LEWIES 
I, Karl H. Lewies, having been first duly sworn upon oath, 
state as follows. 
1. I am over the age of 21 years, and am competent to testify 
in this matter. 
1 
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2. I make this statement based on personal knowledge of the 
events testified to herein. 
3. On January 7, 2013, I filed motions to withdraw as counsel 
for Petitioners in Case No. CV-12-580 and Case No. CV-12-
581. 
4. On that same day, January 7, 2013, Blake Hall, Esq., acting 
in his capacity as Fremont County Deputy P.A., filed 
motions to disqualify me as counsel for the Board of County 
Commissioners of Fremont County, in the above-referenced 
cases, citing a future conflict of interest that would 
eventually arise. 
5. On January 14, 2013, I was sworn into office as the elected 
Prosecuting Attorney for Fremont County. 
6. On January 22, 2013, the Court heard oral argument on the 
competing motions to withdraw and to disqualify. 
7. On February 1, 2013 the Court ordered that I be barred from 
representing Petitioners or Respondents in the cases. 
8. In its Order, the Court allowed the Office of the 
Prosecuting Attorney for Fremont County (the "Office") 14 
days to file a motion and briefing addressing, in the 
Court's own words, "Why the Fremont County Prosecutor's 
office should be permitted to represent Fremont County on 
these matters." 
9. At the time of the Court's Order, my deputy prosecuting 
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attorney was Ms. Billie Siddoway, Esq .. 
10. On January 24, 2013, I asked my deputy, Ms. Siddoway 
to prepare a brief for the Court addressing the question 
whether the Office is required and/or permitted to 
represent Fremont County in the pending cases. Ms. 
Siddoway responded by email writing, "I will put something 
together." I left the matter in her hands and had no 
further contact with Ms. Siddoway concerning the matter. 
11. On February 5, 2013, I had my secretary, Pat Smith, 
check the Court filings to confirm that Ms. Siddoway had 
indeed filed her brief. 
had filed nothing. 
However, it become clear that she 
12. On February 6, 2013, I emailed Ms. Siddoway inquiring 
whether she had "filed the brief on 'necessity' for 
appointment of outside counsel in the two road cases in 
which Blake Hall is involved?" 
13. On February 6, 2013, Ms. Siddoway responded by email 
as follows: "I haven't filed the brief. I have a draft, 
but I wanted Pat to send me a copy of the minute entry with 
the judge's exact request so that I can make sure I covered 
everything. I plan to get it on file before close of 
business today." 
14. To my surprise and shock, when I had my secretary 
check the Court filings at 5:00 p.m. on February 6, 2013, 
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we found that Ms. Siddoway had not filed a brief at all, 
instead she filed a Notice of Conflict of Interest. 
15. It is excusable neglect by the Office not to have 
filed a brief. 
16. By failing and/ or refusing to file a brief on the 
Constitutional "necessity" requirement for hiring outside 
counsel, my deputy deprived the Office of the Fremont 
County Prosecuting Attorney and the taxpayers of Fremont 
County who pay taxes for the Office to provide legal 
counsel for Fremont County, of any opportunity to present 
legal argument in support of the statutory duties of a 
prosecuting attorney and the Constitutional "necessity" 
requirement 
counsel. 
for county commissioners to hire outside 
17. On February 10, 2013, I terminated the employment of 
deputy Siddoway; and on February 11, 2013, appointed Ryan 
S. Dustin, Esq., of THOMSEN-STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC, as 
deputy prosecuting attorney. 
18. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Ryan S. Dustin, Esq., is 
willing and able to prepare and file a brief with the Court 
on the Constitutional "necessity" requirement for county 
commissioner to hire outside counsel, but will require 
additional time. 
19. By enlarging time to submit a brief, the Court will be 
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able to avail itself of legal reasoning, argument and 
support, from the Office allowing it to make a well-
informed decision on a matter of widespread public 
importance. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this 12th day of February 2013. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN to before me, a notary public, this 12th day 
of February, 2013. 
·········· . ...-~R\CIA t·· ... 
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Residing at: St. Anthony, ID 
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Page 102 of 408
fi_b. 4 , .;lD 13_ _ __ AT; 
~ , 
c: •oo lltM --a:.~:~J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS~' il)Gn 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
FLYING" A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ) 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY ) Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and ) 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) ORDER ON MOTIONS TO: 
v. ) 
) 1) DISQUALIFY COUNSEL, 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 2) WITHDRAW, AND 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 3) DISMISS INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS. 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) 
______________________________) 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III and ) 
LANA K. VARNEY ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
po 1 itical subdivision of the state ofldaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) 
__________________________ ) 
On November 23, 2012, Karl H. Lewies filed two petitions for judicial review of 
decisions made by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners ("the County"). The petitions 
were filed on behalf of various individuals and one corporation identified in the caption 
("Petitioners"). At the time Mr. Lewies filed these petitions, he was the prosecutor-elect for 
Fremont County, having been duly elected in the general election on November 6, 2012. Mr. 
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Lewies ran unopposed in the general election, having defeated the incumbent Fremont County 
prosecutor in the primary election on May 15, 2012. Mr. Lewies had not yet taken office when 
he filed the petitions; he was sworn in on January 14, 2013. 
On January 2, 2013, Fremont County, through Blake Hall, its then deputy prosecutor, 
filed a motion seeking to disqualify Mr. Lewies from representing Petitioners against the County. 
Mr. Hall also filed a motion for partial dismissal of the individual claims against the 
commissioners. Mr. Lewies then filed a motion to withdraw on January 7, 2013. On January 14, 
2013, after a substitution of counsel was signed, Lynn Rossner appeared on behalf of Petitioners 
Flying" A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard, George Ty 
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow in Case No. CV-12-580. As ofthe date ofthe hearing, no 
other attorney had appeared on behalf of the Petitioners in Case No. CV-12-581. 
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had 
failed to withdraw voluntarily until the County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also 
questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity he had just recently been 
elected to represent on behalf of clients he could no longer represent. Mr. Lewies attributed the 
delay to an oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct was violated. He claimed 
that his clients were operating under time constraints due to the statute of limitations. He agreed 
that he should no longer represent his former clients or the County on these matters in the future. 
Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Mr. Hall to file any motions or argue on behalf of 
the County. Mr. Hall responded by noting that he was still an acting deputy prosecutor for the 
County when he filed his motions and that he is now acting under a contract with the County 
Commissioners. The Court noted that Mr. Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County 
of legal counsel in this matter. Mr. Lewies asserted that his newly appointed deputy prosecutor, 
Billie Siddoway, could take over his representation of the County in this matter. Mr. Hall 
disagreed and asked for attorney fees incurred by the County in filing both motions. 
Mr. Hall also addressed his motion for partial dismissal, arguing that the County 
Commissioners could not be sued "individually." The Court questioned Mr. Lewies and Mr. 
Rossner as to the appropriateness of making claims against elected officials individually in a 
petition for judicial review under I.RC.P. 84. 
After considering the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court ordered as follows: 
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1. Noting its strong disagreement with Mr. Lewies' actions in this matter, the Court 
hereby bars Mr. Lewies from further representing Petitioners or Respondents in these matters. 
2. The motion for partial dismissal of the named County Commissioners as individual 
Respondents is hereby granted. Neither Mr. Lewies nor Mr. Rossner could articulate a factual or 
legal basis for bringing individual claims against the commissioners via a petition for judicial 
review. Future pleadings shall contain a correct caption, removing the words "individually and" 
after each commissioner's name. 
3. The Court concludes that the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in 
filing the motion to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against Mr. Lewies personally, but not 
against his clients, the Petitioners. Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with appropriate 
supporting documents within 14 days. Mr. Lewies will be allowed to appear for purposes of 
contesting the attorney fees only. 
4. The Court concludes that the inclusion of the individual claims against the 
commissioners in the caption was likely an oversight that could have been cleared up without 
filing a motion. Therefore, no fees will be assessed at this time. 
5. If Ms. Siddoway wishes to assert the position that she should be permitted to represent 
Fremont County on these matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing, she 
may file an appropriate motion within 14 days. Mr. Hall will be allowed to respond within 7 
days. 
6. All pending matters (attorneys fees against Mr. Lewies and Ms. Siddoway's eligibility 
to represent the County in this matter) will be taken up on February 26, 2013, at 3:00p.m. 
7. This order is effective immediately; however, the Court is willing to reconsider any 
portion of the order during the hearing on February 26, 2013. 
8. Inasmuch as the Court does not possess the individual addresses of Mr. Lewies' 
unrepresented, former clients in Case No. CV-12-581, he shall provide a copy ofthis order to 
each of them as soon as possible by certified mail, and submit proof of mailing to the Court. 
SO ORDERED thislst day of February, 2013, nunc pro tunc January 22, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was this 
5",... day of February, 2013, sent via US mail to the following individuals: 
Karl H. Lewies 
Billie Siddoway 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorneys Office 
22W.l 51 N. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Blake Hall 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Lynn Rossner 
109 North 2"d West 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
151 W. N. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
By: 
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Lynn Hossner 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State BarNo. 1074 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
, 
Petitioners 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision ofthe State ofldaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and 
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Fremont ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) j 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOSSNER 
Comes now Lynn Hossner, attorney for Petitioners, being first duly sworn, deposes as 
follows: 
1. I have had delivered to me a transcript of the hearings and proceedings in the above 
entitled case. 
2. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" are true and correct copies of the only 
pages of the hearings which deal with the road under contention which commences at 1425 North 
3125 East and travels one quarter of a mile north over the property of Petitioners, George Ty 
Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow, then proceeds north a quarter of a mile over property belonging 
to Petitioners, Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard and Clay 
Pickard. After the road leaves the Flying "A" property on the north side, it travels one-half a 
mile north over BLM property to property belonging to Flying "A" Ranch and continues on north 
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until it reaches the U.S. Forest Service property. The road subject to Judicial Review in the 
proceedings ofthe Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, which cross 
Petitioners' land in Sections 8, 17 and 20, Township 9 North, Range 42 East, Boise Meridian as a 
public road which were designated as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek 
roads. 
2. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the above entitled matter. 
DATED this 12th day ofFebruary 2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Fremont ) 
Lynn Rossner, being first duly sworn, says that he is the attorney for petitioners in the 
above entitled matter, that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof, and as to the 
matters and things therein alleged, affiant believes the same to .pe true. 
_,!>' ~ 
/ ,,z{7 / 
/~ ,/J'J"~/~ 
[)rt)H'Hossne( 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of. February, 2013. 
''"''"""""""' C::::::~ nt 1 o of Q) ~'" ~RIE I> "~ -, , lY J 
,# '\~ ......... It~~ Notary Public for Idaho'"" 
/ .. ···~or -4 ••• ••• <-o '%:, Residing at: Ashton, Idaho 
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1 COMMISSIONER HURT: Imaaine that. 
2 BOB RILEY: One thing abdeu boys, you don't 
3 have to make any mistakes, we made them all in Teton 
4 Valley, so we --
5 THE CLERK: Name and address first. 
6 COMMISSIONER HURT: Name and address, Bob. 
7 BOB RILEY: Bob Riley, 640 South 3rd East, 
8 St. Anthony. When this first started up there, when 
9 they first said we had to put the roads in, good old 
10 Cobblewood and the boys got together and held a 
11 meeting. Now, I didn't know about it so I didn't go 
12 and they closed nine roads. They absolutely closed 
13 off the east side of Teton Valley. The other thing 
14 they did, they closed four of them to the river. You 
15 can't get down to the Teton River. If we got an 
16 access to the water, to the forest, let's keep it. We 
17 need more of it. People need to get to it. What 
18 we've done, we've sold our land, we've blocked their 
19 access, now what the hell do you do? There's no way. 
20 Any time you hit one of those (inaudible), the 
21 answer's no. Let's keep it. I don't care whatever. 
22 If it goes through the river, if it goes through a 
23 creek, if it goes to that forest, let's keep it. 
24 See, we don't have to have a maintained road. 
25 You guys can say it's a trail. That's what they 
13 
1 no gate. It's a mess. I drove up there, I don't 
2 know, this last fall, with a guy that showed them all. 
3 MARLA VIK: Is that that ranch (inaudible)? 
4 BOB REILLY: Yeah. And by the way, probably 
5 through the Stone property, she's not going to object 
6 to that, but she's not going to have it forever. That 
7 road needs to be a County road. It is and it should 
8 be. There's one of those access roads, if you ever 
9 lose them, they won't come back. They own 4,000 acres 
10 sitting right there and they froze up and it ties in 
11 with Fourth of July Creek. That's it. 
12 COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Questions? Go 
13 ahead, you can sit down. He's probably available 
14 after the hearing if you'd like to talk to him. Ty 
15 Nedrow. 
16 TY NEDROW: My name is Ty Nedrow. I live at 
17 1401 North 3125 East, Ashton, Idaho. I am here about 
18 a couple of roads that got put on the map as County 
19 roads, they're actually private roads. They lead to 
20 nowhere. I have on the one road, let me describe --
21 the description of the roads is 1425 North 3125 East 
22 is the corner of both these roads. Neither one of 
23 these roads are on a section line or anything. The 
24 one road going east on 3125 out to 3300 East goes out 
25 through my field, is only a field service road. I 
15 
1 mentioned, keeo the access. Let's walk in, but keep 
2 the right to g( are. I've seen it happen in 
3 Jefferson Counl~Jlrclark County, Bonneville County, 
4 Teton County and we've got a few of them in Fremont 
5 County. We, the people, need to get in there. Let's 
6 do it. 
7 COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Questions for Bob? 
8 MARLA VIK: Bob, is there any that we closed in 
9 this process because --
10 BOB REILLY: I haven't looked. I'll come over 
11 and look at it later. And what I'm saying is a 
12 general thing over a period of time that I've seen all 
13 this happen and it's wrong, it's just wrong. 
14 MARLA VIK: Yeah. 
15 BOB REILLY: Above my farm we had a road that 
16 was put in there in 1903. That was the only way you 
17 could go to Badger Creek into the forest next to the 
18 creek. They ended one over on Dry Ridge. I could run 
19 through them, Marla. We just gave up something -- and 
20 once you give them up they don't come back. There's 
21 no way to get them back. I know that people look at 
22 today, let's look a little further down the road. 
23 The:-e's been some big mistakes made. Vandersloot 
24 closed three of them down there. We're never going to 
25 get them back. You can't drive up there now. There's 
14 
1 have three pivots that cross that road. I have many, 
2 many drunk fishermen that can see the reservoir is on 
3 the far end of that and when the pivots are crossing 
4 the road the only way around them is to drive out 
5 through the field, which is usually soaked, and then 
6 these fishermen come knock on my door in the middle of 
7 the night and want me to pull them back out. Someone 
8 will find a dead fisherman some day. 
9 Okay. There is one road that goes east from 
10 there out through my field, there is one road that 
11 goes north from that, and both of those I have -- the 
12 one road only has one pivot that crosses it. Neither 
13 one of them are on a section line. This was addressed 
14 at a County Commissioner hearing I'm guessing five 
15 years ago. John Hess was one of the Commissioners, 
16 and at that time they were both supposed to have been 
17 taken off the map and they're still on the map listed 
18 as County roads and, as I say, there's always a drunk 
19 fisherman that says I can go through there. I would 
20 like them removed because they go nowhere but to 
21 trouble. 
22 COMMISSIONER HURT: Is that the road that I've 
23 heard called the mail route? 
24 TY NEDROW: That's another issue. People 
25 call -- the one going north, people call that the mail 
16 
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route. I rode that country for mC)ny, many years with 
my grandfather. His older brotl-rnished the 
horses to the stagecoach to use, but that road was 
never used unless it was an empty stage coming back 
from West Yellowstone. It was a shortcut. They 
couldn't pull the hills going up through there with a 
load on, nor was it safe to come down with passengers 
on the stagecoach. Grandpa said that the only time 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
that pivot com~es over across that road. 
COMMis', .ER HURT: Okay. 
TY NEDRO . And both those roads were put in 
like that because the section lines are total swamps 
back there on roadways, there's nowhere -- that's why 
it jogs over a quarter and goes up and then comes back 
over, but anyway. 
COMMISSIONER HURT: On that northbound road, 
9 that they used that is if they was coming back from 9 when that turns off and goes off of your property, 
10 the park empty and had a spare wheel. There are many 10 does that go onto BLM property or--
TY NEDROW: No, it goes onto Clint Ashley's 11 lava rock grates they went over and they broke more 
12 wheels. They usually couldn't even use that road 
13 until August because of the swamp up there. They 
14 called it Hound Creek back then, nowadays they call it 
15 Snow Creek, but there's a crossing when you cross Snow 
16 Creek that is just a swamp until about August they 
17 couldn't even use that road, so many people are 
18 misinformed saying that's the mail route. It was just 
19 a shortcut for somebody that wanted to get to Idaho 
20 Falls in a hurry. That is the road going north. The 
21 one going to the east is not, but they both intersect 
22 at that corner and, like I say, neither one of them 
23 are on a section line. The one going north isn't even 
24 on a quarter line, it's 100 yards off of a quarter 
25 line where it goes up through my field. That's why 
17 
1 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: That's what my question 
2 is, if it says it's 24 77 road. 
3 TY NEDROW: What's a 2477 road? 
4 COMMISSIONER HURT: Those are roads that the 
5 Forest Service was abandoning at one time, or BLM, and 
6 the County stepped up and claimed them as roads at 
7 that time. Can you explain that a little bit better, 
8 Marla? 
9 MARLA VIK: Maybe Joyce can help me with this, 
10 but these were roads that were in place mostly over 
11 public lands and people were trying to close them off 
12 and there was legislation that said if people will 
13 come in and once the terms that they ascertain that 
14 these roads were in existence over public lands at the 
15 time, and they have to do this before 1975, or the 
16 road had to be in existence before 1975 is my 
17 understanding, somewhere in that time frame, and then 
18 someone had to ascertain. You can't take them away 
19 from the public, the Forest Service can't close them, 
20 we can't close them, they have to remain available for 
21 the public to go over. It's not like anything 
22 current, yeah, it ended in '75 and so now (inaudible), 
23 but someone did ascertain (inaudible). 
24 TY NEDROW: We might deal with the one going 
25 over-- the one going to the east, there's no public 
19 
11 
12 property. 
13 COMMISSIONER HURT: Clint Ashley? Is there a 
14 gate there? 
15 TY NEDROW: There is a gate there. There's a 
16 gate at the road of my property, always has been, and 
17 then there's one a quarter mile north before you go 
18 into Clint Ashley's property. 
19 COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Questions? No, no, 
20 no, we'll call you up to talk to you. We have to do 
21 it in order. 
22 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Is it classified RS2477 
23 or--
24 COMMISSIONER HURT: Well, that's what we're 
25 going to have to find out. 
18 
1 property at all out there. It's only private 
2 property. Like I say, I have right-of-ways from 
3 (inaudible) crossing grandfathered in because they've 
4 been crossing for a lot of years, they just-- it 
5 becomes a real problem, though, to fishermen that 
6 can't get to the reservoir from this way. 
7 COMMISSIONER HURT: We have a couple of roads 
8 that are questionable about this RS2477 and we will 
9 look into those and find out. Questions? 
10 TY NEDROW: When would be the best time for me 
11 to check back with you and find out where we are at on 
12 this? 
13 COMMISSIONER HURT: Well, we've got 60 days 
14 after this hearing to make a decision, and I can't say 
15 now, but there may be a time -- we may have to collect 
16 more information. We may have to have another public 
17 hearing, I don't know. 
18 TY NEDROW: The one road going to the east was 
19 at whatever was said and decided by the County 
20 Commissioners five years ago that this was on a 
21 private road and it shouldn't be taken off. If we 
22 have to, I guess we can go back to the minutes on that 
23 deal, but anyway --
24 COMMISSIONER HURT: Well, I've been here for 
25 almost six, so it would have to be -- when John was 
20 
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here? 
TY NEDROW: When John ~.as one of the 
County Commissioners. 
COMMISSIONER HURT: We'll look into that. 
TY NEDROW: And it was basically -- I think 
Weldon Reynolds was on the opposition on the other 
side at that time. He was the road boss and trying to 
make the County road and because it wasn't on a 
section line they said that he couldn't make it a 
County road because it went nowhere. 
COMMISSIONER HURT: Okay. Good. Thanks. 
Okay. Let's go back, Tuk's back there chomping at the 
bit. Come on up, Tuk. Evidently Ty didn't do a good 
14 enoughjob? 
15 TUK NEDROW: My name's Tuk Nedrow. I live at 
16 1404 Cedar Lane. He did okay. The road going east of 
17 the line in question has never had a piece of County 
18 equipment on it. It goes nowhere. People that look 
19 at it, it does end up at the reservoir, they said 
20 there's no access there anymore because that's been 
21 
22 
turned into a private subdivision and there's very few 
people that have access through the subdivision. The 
23 public certainly will not, no matter happens to this 
24 road. 
25 And the road going north has never had any 
21 
1 When I came in to talk to these gentlemen about 
2 14 months ago, we made a proposal to have a bridge 
3 fixed that had been washed out down in the canyon in 
4 the -- or a culvert fixed, it's been washed out down 
5 in Pine Canyon and at that time the proposal's been to 
6 be fixed as long as we had no problems with that being 
7 a public road, which we didn't. 
8 Now, talking tonight, I find out that it's been 
9 changed from a County road to a private road and 
10 apparently I want to relate some more information on 
11 this road, and that is when that property was sold 
12 Keith Robison made no inquiry that that was a private 
13 road. That was a public road that we needed no deeded 
14 right-of-way because that was a public road. 
15 Now, when I was a kid we would see graders on 
16 that road and back in the '50s they would grade all 
17 the way through that through Pine Canyon all the way 
18 over to Spring Creek and Snow Creek, but that's been 
19 eliminated and recently they've just been going down 
20 to the creek there at the bottom of the canyon. A few 
21 years ago that washed out and the County came in and 
22 adjusted the culvert. I think they replaced the 
23 culvert with their loader and with their equipment 
24 they replaced a washout and then they made some other 
25 adjustments I believe. I'm not sure if this one is 
23 
1 County maintenance on it and the thing that was failed 
2 to be mentiof ., that is it's a road that goes to 
3 nowhere. It g61!!'through a quarter mile of our 
4 property and a quarter mile of Mr. Ashley's and it 
5 goes through a half a mile of BLM and then hits the 
6 Forest Service and the Forest Service has had that 
7 road closed for 25 years and I doubt they're going to 
8 open it no matter what the County Commissioners do. 
9 It's been bulldozed since they started bulldozing 
10 them. 
11 So it would be a road to nowhere if you opened 
12 that one, and the road going east through our farm, 
13 it's just our farm and it's never had a piece of 
14 County equipment on it, and it goes nowhere. You 
15 can't get to the river. You do not get river access 
16 (inaudible). 
17 
18 
19 
COMMISSIONER HURT: Thank you. Questions? 
COMMISSIONER MILLER: Nope. 
COMMISSIONER HURT: Thanks. Okay. Back to 
20 this sheet. Lynn Shirley. 
21 LYNN SHIRLEY: My name's Lynn Shirley, 396 West 
22 Moody Road, Rexburg. Commissioners, I want to talk to 
23 you about the Map 5 of 9 that has to do with a road, a 
24 dry road that is a spur that goes down to Pine Creek 
25 and Cold Springs. 
22 
1 locking or just this little locking, but they made it 
2 so those trucks could make it easier to turn over that 
3 culvert, and the County did that, and that's what I 
4 want to emphasize is that the County has maintained 
5 that road and that is a County road. Thank you. 
6 COMMISSIONER HURT: Do you have-- go ahead. 
7 COMMISSIONER MILLER: Lynn, is that road open 
8 to the public beyond Pine Canyon across -- can the 
9 public access that? 
10 LYNN SHIRLEY: Well, see, what's happened is 
11 the -- it's open down to our place, but you go past 
12 our place over into the Wadsworth's and Willies', they 
13 have closed that off. So we had to file for a private 
14 right-of-way through that because of the problems that 
15 they causes us. 
16 COMMISSIONER MILLER: Is that accessible with a 
17 vehicle from the east now? 
18 LYNN SHIRLEY: It's not. 
19 COMMISSIONER MILLER: I didn't think so. 
20 LYNN SHIRLEY: Our access is (inaudible). We 
21 use that east side mainly as just a (inaudible). 
22 COMMISSIONER HURT: So your contention is that 
23 road should remain public? 
24 LYNN SHIRLEY: Yes. 
25 COMMISSIONER HURT: That runs in my mind, 
24 
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Official Road Map of 
Fremont County, Idaho 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
ABBIE MACE 
FREMONT CO RECORDER 
Fee $ -e- f- Deputy 
rf Recorded at Request of 
\l,t!A,Jyn,b>l)t Ct1> CDV'f)M?j od.t'MaJ J) 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Fremont County Board of Commissioners as a requirement of Idaho Code 40-
202. Public information meetings were held on July 20, 2012, July 26, 2012 and July 31, 2012, in the cities of 
Island Park, Ashton and St. Anthony, respectively. A public hearing was held on September 27, 2012 in St. 
Anthony, Idaho. Notice of public hearing was given pursuant to law. 
After due consideration of the testimony presented at the aforementioned public hearings and based upon 
evidence presented, the Fremont County Board of Commissioners find as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Fremont County Commissioners have jurisdiction of all county highways within the boundaries of 
Fremont County. Idaho Code 40-202. 
2. Fremont County is required to adopt a road map pursuant to Idaho Code 40-202. 
3. Each year, Fremont County submits a road inventory map to the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) 
that shows any changes in road jurisdiction and type of road surface. The Idaho Transportation 
Department {lTD) maintains archived copies of the road inventory maps, beginning with the 1961 map. 
4. The Fremont County clerk maintains a record of the Fremont County Board of Commissioners official 
minutes, which contains official action taken by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to accept, 
validate, abandon, or vacate county roads. Said documents have been maintained as required by law. 
5. The Fremont County Public Works Department undertook identifying the County maintained roads and 
rights-of-way to be included on a County road map by researching the archived lTD inventory maps, 
Forest Service and BLM road maps, Fremont County Road & Bridge records, official minutes of the 
Fremont County Board of Commissioners, and all other available resources. 
6. Roads were identified as Fremont County roads based on the following criteria: 
a. The roads are routinely maintained by the Fremont County Road & Bridge Department. 
b. Documentation showed the roads have been maintained in the past by the Fremont County Road 
& Bridge Department. 
c. Current or past employees of the Fremont County Road & Bridge Department testified that they 
had performed authorized maintenance on the road. 
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d. The roads were identified on recorded plats of subdivision as having been dedicated to the 
public. 
e. The roads were shown on government maps (such as Forest Service, BLM, State of Idaho) as 
being public roads. 
f. The roads had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or 
are the sole or essential connection to roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads. 
7. All identified County roads were presented at all three public information hearings and at the public 
hearing. To enhance clarity, the identified County roads were presented on nine (9) maps that showed 
nine (9) different areas of the County. This allowed for showing the roads at a larger scale than could be 
shown on one map. These nine maps were also posted to the Fremont County website for public review. 
The nine (9) maps were first posted on the website on or around July 17, 2012 and were dated July 17, 
2012. 
8. Written comments were received at each of the public information meetings, i.e. the meetings held in 
Island Park, Ashton and St. Anthony. Copies of these comments are presented in Exhibit "A" ofthis 
document. 
9. Following the public information meetings, Fremont County Public Works staff reviewed the comments 
for validity and applicability. The maps were adjusted to comply with comments that proved to be valid 
and applicable. In particular, adjustments that were made included: 
a. River Bend Lane from public to private access (in house correction) Sec 28 & 29 Twp 7 N Rge 
41 E 
b. Cold Springs Road R.S.-2477 trail to private. Sec 13 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E 
10. The maps that were adjusted following the public information meetings were the maps that were 
presented to the public and to the Fremont County Commissioners at the public hearing that was held on 
September 27, 2012 in the Fremont County Annex Building. These maps were dated August 20, 2012. At 
the public hearing, the Fremont County Commissioners took oral and written testimony from all 
interested persons on the area road map presented. 
11. Minutes of the public hearing were taken and placed in the official minutes of the Fremont County Board 
of Commissioners. 
12. The Fremont County Commissioners acknowledge that citizens questioned the public status of certain 
roads at the public hearing. These roads include the following locations: 
a. Cold Springs Rd Sec 13 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E 
b. Old Yellowstone Mail Route Sees 17 & 20 Twp 9 N Rge 42 E 
c. 1425 N east off 3125 E Sec 20 Twp 9 N Rge 42 E 
d. Vernon Rd Sec 6 Twp 8 N Rge 42 E 
e. 2100 E north of 300 N Sec 15 & 16 Twp 7 N Rge 40 E 
f. River Bend Ln Sec 28 & 29 Twp 7 N Rge 41 E (this was an error on our part and had already been 
fixed) 
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and consistent with Idaho statues, rules, codes and requirements, 
the Fremont County Board of Commissioners hereby makes the following conclusions of law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Idaho Code 40-202(6) required the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to publish a map showing 
the general location of all rights-of-way under its jurisdiction. 
2. All notices of the public hearing were published in compliance with Idaho law including Idaho Code 40-
206. 
3. A public hearing was held concerning the adoption of the Official Road Map of Fremont County. At this 
public hearing, due process was afforded to all interested persons. The minutes of said hearing and any 
recording of said hearing are hereby made a part of the record. 
4. The Fremont County Board of County Commissioners reviewed all information and testimony presented 
at the time of the public hearings and due process was allowed to all interested persons. 
5. After considering all of the testimony, information, prior maps, and other evidence presented at the 
aforementioned public hearing, the Fremont County Board of Commissioners approved the map, 
hereafter referred to as Exhibit "B", as presented at the public hearing that includes the following 
adjustments: 
a. Cold Springs Rd private to public Sec 13 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E 
b. Hightop Trl private to public Sec 35 Twp 10 N Rge 41 E 
c. 1425 N going east off corner of 3125 E public to private Sec 20 Twp 9 N Rge 42 E 
d. Vernon Rd past Nedrow residence public to private Sec 6 Twp 8 N Rge 42 E 
6. All accepted and dedicated public roads and rights-of-way in platted subdivisions as duly recorded in the 
Fremont County Recorder's office are deemed to be part of the Official Fremont County Road Map. 
7. All roads identified in Exhibit "B" are determined by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to be 
County roads, either paved, gravel or unimproved (dirt); and are not recorded in the Board of 
Commissioners' official minutes as vacated or abandoned; and are routinely maintained by the County. 
The foregoing is supported by substantial and competent evidence submitted at the public hearing and is 
found to be in the public interest. 
8. Those roads identified in Exhibit "B" as being R.S.-2477 roads are determined by the Fremont County 
Board of County Commissioners as having been asserted under Federal Law R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code 
40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in official records in the Fremont County Public Works office. 
The foregoing is supported by substantial and competent evidence submitted at the public hearing and is 
found to be in the public interest. 
9. All roads found on the Official Fremont County Road Map constitutes public notice that evidence has 
been presented to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners that the road may qualify as a public 
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right-of-way, but has no other legal effect. Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County Road Map 
does not constitute validation or abandonment of any road. 
10. Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County Road Map shall constitute sufficient authority for the 
Fremont County Board of Commissioners to exercise authority and regulation as permitted by statute, 
ordinance, or law. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Fremont County Board of Commissioners 
hereby Order as follows: 
1. The approved road map listed as Exhibit "B", together with all roads in recorded subdivisions previously 
accepted by the Board of Commissioners, and all roads asserted to be R.S.-2477, are hereby adopted as 
the Official Fremont County Road Map. 
2. An Order shall be entered into the official Fremont County Board of Commissioners minutes that the 
approved road map listed as Exhibit "B", together with all roads in recorded subdivisions previously 
accepted by the Board of Commissioners, and all roads asserted to be R.S.-2477, has been adopted as the 
Official Fremont County Road Map. 
3. That the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and this Order together with the approved 
road map listed as Exhibit "B", hereinafter known as the Official Fremont County Road Map, shall be 
recorded in the office of the Fremont County Recorder. 
It is hereby Ordered this 2ih day of December, 2012. 
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
Attest: d\\6 Ae: 
Abbie Mace 
Jordon Stoddard, Commissioner 
Fremont County Clerk 
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Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
NELSON HALLPARRYTIJCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone: (208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorneys for Respondents 
'' .. , 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed::.=======;--
FEB 1 4 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C . TY OF FREMONT 
,, 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
RC. GWAL 1NEY, III and LANA K. 
VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision ofthe state of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
Page I 
Case No. tV-12-580 
Case No. CV-12-581 
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
~003/027 
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COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, 
Ronald '•Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this 
Motion to Strike Motion. This motion is made pursuant to fRuled 6(e)(2) and 7(bX3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and is based upon the pleadings and papers filed in this matter and 
should be granted for the reasons set forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
As this Court is aware, at the January 22, 2013 hearing, Fremont County Prosecutor Karl 
Lewies, after being disqualified from representation in this matter, questioned the authority of 
Fremont Cowtty to hire Mr. Hall and his law fll'Ill in the instant matter. Mr. Lewies represented 
to the Comt that he believed his deputy prosecutor Billie Siddoway could take over 
representation in this matter. On this discrete issue, the Court ordered that "[i]f Ms. Siddoway 
wishes to assert the position that she should be permitted to represent Fremont Cowtty on these 
matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing, she may file an appropriate 
motion within 14 days." (Order on Motions, Filed February 1, 2013, nunc pro tunc January 22, 
2013, p. 3, ,5). On February 5, 2013, Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal 
challenging this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (See Motion for Partial Dismissal, filed 
with the Court on February 5, 2013). On February 6, 2013, deputy prosecutor Billie Siddoway 
filed a Notice of Conflict of Interest regarding the Court's order for briefing on this issue. 
On February 12, 2013, Mr. Lewies, who has already been disqualified in this matter, 
along with a new deputy prosecutor RyanS. Dustin, served via mail a Motion for Extension of 
Time and set a hearing for the morning of February 15, 2013, a day after the this parties receipt 
of the motion. No courtesy copy of the motion was sent via facsimile and Respondents did not 
actually receive the motion to until approximately 4:45p.m. of February 13. 2013. A notice of 
Page2 
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hearing was not actually faxed until approximately 4:07p.m. on February 13, 2013. (Hall Aff., 
Ex. A, B, and C). Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's untimely filings have put Respondents in the 
precarious and prejudicial situation of having to respond to a motion that was not timely served 
pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedwe. 
Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin have failed to provide sufficient notice in violation of Rules 
7(b)(3)(A) and 7(b)(3XE) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly provides that a 
written motion and supporting materials must be received "no later than fourteen (14) days 
before the time specified in the hearing.n Pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3)(E), Respondents' cannot even 
provide a response to the Court in a timely fashion. Furthermore, Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dustin 
have not filed a motion to shorten time in this matter and there is no good cause articulated why 
said motion must be heard on an expedited basis without adequate notice provided to 
Respondents. Given the approximate ont?day notice, counsel is unable to address this issue with 
their clients. This issue is further exacerbated by the fact that Counsel has other commitments, 
responsibilities, and work assignments that prevent them from providing this Court with 
meaningful and adequate response in opposition to the unnecessary filing by Mr. Lewies and Mr. 
Dustin regarding the extension of time in a timely fashion. The instant motion is untimely and 
the Court should strike said motion due to the severe prejudice born by the Respondents for the 
filing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing. Fremont County respectfu1ly requests that this Court enter an 
order striking Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's Motion for Extension of Time as the motion is 
untimely and failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 7(b)(3), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Pagel 
Page 124 of 408
02/14/2013 THU 16:01 FAX ~006/027 
DATED this _d day of February. 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this __L£_ day of February, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
RyanS. Dustin, Esq. 
22 West 1st North 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax (208)624-3404 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Fax (208) 523-9518 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109 N. 2Dd w. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax (208) 624-3783 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
_lk1 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
lY1 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[>4 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
L:\BOH\7525 - Pn:mont County flles\7525.17 Gwaltney\Pie!ldins:>\Dckndant's\Sttike Extension Mollon (Mot) docx 
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Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER. P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone: (208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorney for Respondents 
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. :lY of Fremont State of Idaho 
F 1 4 
Ot~puty Cle:k 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUI{ NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
E.C. GWALTNEY, Ill and LANA K. 
VARNEY. 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, 
Respondents. 
MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME- 1 
Case No. CV-12-580 
Case No. CV-12-581 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
SHORTENING TIME 
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COMES NOW the Respondents, by and through counsel of record, Nelson Hall Parry 
Tucker, P .A., and hereby move the Court for an Order shortening the time period within which 
the hearing required under Idaho Code§ 39-6306 must be held. 
Notice is hereby given that the Respondents plan to appear through their attorneys to 
provide argument and testimony. 
Dated this Lf day of February, 2013. O & 
~ALL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this .../:t:__ day of February, 2013 by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 41h N. , Suite #125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Charles A. Homer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Fax (208) 523-9518 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109N. zmt W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax (208) 624-3783 
MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME- 2 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[)d Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
pq Fax 
[ J Overnight Mail 
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Blake 0. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TIJCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone: (208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorneys for Respondents 
DiS 1 R:CT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
hied::.==============!-
LFEB 1 4 2013 
AB31E MACE, CLERK 
3y: --------:~'""7.'":"-:::::i":::i: Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING .. A" RANCH, INC .• an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK. NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III and LANA K. 
VARNEY. 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, 
Respondents. 
Page 1 
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Case No. CV-12-581 
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
~007/027 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
BLAKE G. HALL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney of record for Respondents and I am familiar with the facts raised 
in the above-referenced Petition. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testify in Court. 
This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Courfs Docket in 
Gwaltney v. Fremont County, Fremont Case No. CV-12-581, I obtained from the Idaho 
Repository website on February 14,2013. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Court's Docket in 
Flying A Ranch v. Fremont County, Fremont Case No. CV ~ 12-580, I obtained from the Idaho 
Repository website on February 14,2013. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the Notice of Hearing 
faxed to me on February 13,2013 at approximately 4:07p.m. bearing the facsimile time stamp. 
5. Despite filing the Motion for Extension of Time on February 12, 2013, Mr. 
Lewies mailed the motion. Mr. Lewies' Motion for Extension of Time was received by my 
office at approximately 4:45p.m. on February 13,2013. 
6. Under these circumstances, and due to prior obligations and the press of other 
matters and responsibilities, COWlsel for Respondents cannot adequately and appropriately 
respond to Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's Motion for Extension of Time prior to the hearing set 
for February 15,2013,2013. 
7. Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin have unfairly prejudiced Respondents through the 
Motion for Extension of Time by depriving Respondents the time required W1der the Idaho Rules 
Page2 
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of Civil Procedure to respond to the motion, and by serving the Motion for Extension of Time in 
a manner that was likely to deprive Respondents of a full opportunity to respond to the Motion. 
8. Given prior commitments, obligations and work load, Respondents and their 
counsel are unfairly prejudiced by Mr. Lewies and Mr. Dustin's failure to comply with Rule 
7(b)(3)(E) with respect to the Motion for Extension ofTime. This motion is particularly 
prejudicial in light of the pending Motion for Partial Dismissal due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction previously filed in this matter and set for hearing on February 22,2013. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETII NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIB_~!a_ AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, this ~y of February, 2013. 
Pagel 
LESLIE GEORGESON 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this -L!J_ day of February, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
RyanS. Dustin, Esq. 
22 West 1st North 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax(208)624-3404 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Fax (208) 523-9518 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109 N. 2nd W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax (208) 624-3783 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
.[;)cl Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[?c] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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Idaho Repository - Case Number Result Page https://www.idcourts.uslrepository/caseNumberResults.do 
1 of2 
Case Number Result Page 
Fremont 
1 Cases Found. 
E. c. Gwaltney# ·eta I:,.-. Fremont County Boa~d tit. County Com..;"a.S.oners, etal. 
Oth Gregory ~ase:CV-2012·0000581 District Flied: 11/23/2012 Subtype: Claler Judge: w. Status: Pending 
ms Moeller 
Defendants: Premont County Board of County Commlaaloners Hurt, Ronald "skip" Miller, 
Leroy 
Plilll'tlff5:Gwaltney, E. C. Vam.,-, Lana K. 
Peh ndllng Date/Time Judge 
earngs: 
Type of Hearing 
02/26/2013 
3 :30 PM Gregory w. Moeller Hearing 
Register Date 
of 
actions: 
11/23/2012 New Case Flied • Other dalms 
Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review or cross 
appeal or cross-petition from commission, board, o~ body to 
11/23/2012 district court Paid by: Gwaltney, E. C. (plaintiff) Receipt 
number: 0005964 Dated: 11/23/2012 Amount: $96.00 
(Credit card) For: Gwaltney, E. c. (plaintiff) 
Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Gwaltney, E. C. 
11/23/2012 (plaintiff) Receipt number: 0005964 Dated: 11/23/2012 
Amount: $3.00 {C11!1dlt card) For: Gwaltney, E. c. (plalntllf) 
11/23/2012 Petition 
11/23/2012 Plaintiff: Gwaltney, E. C. Notice Of Appearance Karl H. Lewles 
1210512012 
Order Governing Procedure On Review-Filed In Chambers 
12·3·2012 
0110212013 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 01/22/2013 02:30PM) Motion 
To Dtsq~o~allfy Counsel 
01/07/2013 Motion To Withdraw 
01/07/2013 Affldevlt Of Karl Lewles 
01/07/2013 Motion To Disqualify Counsel 
01/07/2013 Motion-Partial Mobon To Dismiss 
01/07/2013 Notice Of Hearing 
01/09/2013 Notice Of Hearing 
01109/2013 Certificate Of Mailing-Amended 
01(11/2013 Stipulation 
01(16/2013 Transcript Flied 
01/30/2013 Amdavlt Of Attomev Fees 
0113012013 
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 01/22/2013 02:30 
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I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorney for Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
E.C. GWALTNEY, lli and LANA K. 
VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
NOTICE OF HEARJNO- 1 
Case No. CV-12-580 
Case No. CV-12-581 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 15"' day of February, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., of said 
day. or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Courthouse, in Fremont County, Idaho, 
RespondenC s Motion to Strike Motion for Extension of Time will be brought on for hearing 
before the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller. 
Dated this /~ay of February, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this 4 day of February, 2013 by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4m N. , Suite #125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Charles A. Homer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Fax (208) 523-9518 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109N. 2"d W. 
St. Anthony, 10 83445 
Fax (208) 624-3783 
NOTICE OF HBARINO- 2 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
(>l] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[~Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
FLYING" A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ) 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY ) 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and ) 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) ___________________________) 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III and ) 
LANA K. VARNEY ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) ____________________________ ) 
Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581 
ORDER MODIFYING 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument in Madison County, Idaho, on 
February 15, 2013. The Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, through Karl H. 
Lewies1 and RyanS. Dustin, has moved the Court for an extension oftime to file a brief in this 
matter from February 5, 2013 until February 25, 2013. The Fremont County Commissioners, 
1 The Court reminds counsel that Mr. Lewies has been barred from any participation on this issue by virtue of the 
Court's bench ruling of January 22, 2013. Mr. Lewies cannot now represent the County in a case he earlier filed 
against the County. See Order on Motions (February 1, 2013). 
ORDER MODIFYING BRIEFING SCHEDULE -- Page 1 
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• • 
through Blake Hall, has objected to the motion, asked for an order shortening time, and moved to 
strike. 
The Court having been fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. The motion to shorten time for hearing the Board of Commissioners' objections and 
motions to strike is GRANTED. However, the motion to strike is DENIED. While the Court is 
mindful of the excusable neglect standard generally applicable to such matters, it still reserves 
substantial discretion in modifying its own orders as long as it limits the prejudice to the non-
moving party. The Court has attempted to do that here. 
2. Mr. Dustin's request for an extension until February 25 is DENIED. However, as a 
courtesy to him given his recent entry into this complex matter, he will be allowed until 
February 19,2013 at noon to file a brief concerning the issue of whether the Fremont County 
Deputy Prosecutor can represent the Fremont County Board of Commissioners on these pending 
matters. As a result, the Commissioners' deadline for filing a response is now extended to 
February 25,2013, at 5:00p.m., the day before the scheduled hearing of this matter. 
SO ORDERED this 15th day ofFebruary, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was this 
_1Q_ day of February, 2013, sent via US mail to the following individuals: 
Karl H. Lewies 
Ryan S. Dustin 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
22 W. 15tN. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Blake Hall 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Lynn Hossner 
109 North 2nd West 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
151 W. N. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
B~ 
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KARL H. LEWIES, ISBN: 4380 
Prosecuting Attorney 
RYANS. DUSTIN, ISBN: 8683 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
RICHARD R. FRIESS, ISBN: 7820 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
22 West 1st North 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-4418 
Fax: (208) 624-3404 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed::.=======•-
FEB 1 9 2013 
ABBIE MACE, CLER~ ,.. 
By: -------:::--"""'l!IL~O~ Oepl,IW Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC, an Idaho 
Corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state 
of Idaho, 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, and 
LANA K. VARNEY, 
vs. 
Respondents. 
Petitioners, 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state 
of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
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) 
) 
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) 
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) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
Case No. CV-12-581 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
OF MOTION TO REPRESENT 
FREMONT COUNTY 
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COMES NOW, Fremont County Prosecutor's Office, by and through Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, RyanS. Dustin, Esq., and submits this Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent 
Fremont County in the instant petitions for judicial review. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
After winning the election for Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney, but before being 
sworn into office, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., filed-on November 23, 2012-petitions for judicial 
review of decisions the Fremont County Board of Commissioners made. Then-sitting Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney Blake G. Hall, Esq. became defense counsel. On January 7, 2012, Mr. Hall 
filed a Motion to Disqualify Mr. Lewies as counsel for petitioners before Mr. Lewies was sworn 
into office. On the same day, Mr. Lewies filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for petitioners. 
Relying on Idaho Code § 31-813, the Commissioners hired Mr. Hall in his private 
capacity to continue as defense counsel after he ceased to act as Fremont County Deputy 
Prosecutor. 
DISCUSSION 
Idaho Code § 31-813 states that the board of county commissioners has the power to 
"direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the county is a party in 
interest, and employ counsel to conduct the same, with or without the prosecuting attorney, as 
they may direct." ld. This statute was drafted and adopted before the Idaho Constitution was 
adopted. See Amicus Brief, filed by Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association in Kline v. Power 
County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, attached as "Exhibit A." At the time, Idaho operated under the 
district attorney system whereby each district attorney covered several counties. Under that 
system, it was foreseeable that the district attorney would be occupied in one county and 
physically unavailable to act as legal counsel for another county in the district. With the adoption 
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of the Idaho Constitution, the legislature limited the authority of the board of commissioners to 
hire outside counsel to situations only where doing so was necessary. Article XVIII, Section 6 of 
the Idaho Constitution states that "county commissioners may employ counsel when necessary .. 
. . " In all other circumstances, the county prosecutor is to act as "legal adviser" to the board of 
commissioners and "oppose all claims and accounts against the county when he deems them 
unjust or illegal." I.C. § 31-2607. 
In 1894, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the necessity standard, stating that, "The board 
of county commissioners may, when the necessity exists, employ counsel, but that necessity 
must be apparent, and the action of the board in each case is subject to review by the courts." 
Meller v. Logan County Comm'rs, 4 Idaho 44, 53,35 P. 712,715 (1894). The Court further 
explained the necessity standard two years later. In Conger v. Comm 'rs of Latah County, the 
Court said the commissioners had authority to hire outside counsel "in matters within their 
jurisdiction and control when necessary-for example, when the district attorney could not 
perform such duties by reason of being absent, or when the board must decide upon some 
question before them before they could have time to get the advice of the district attorney 
thereon." 5 Idaho 347, 355, 48 P. 1064, 1066 (1897). Later that same year, the Idaho Legislature 
abandoned the district attorney system in favor of the county prosecutor system, providing all 
counties greater access to legal counsel, thereby raising the necessity standard. See Amicus Brief, 
p. 9. 
Attorneys in Idaho are bound by the rules adopted by the Board of Commissioners of the 
Idaho State Bar under the supervision of the Idaho Supreme Court. I.C. § 3-408. Paragraph 11 of 
the Commentary to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10 states: "where a lawyer represents 
the government after having served clients in private practice, nongonvemmental employment or 
3 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO REPRESENT FREMONT COUNTY 
Page 146 of 408
in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers 
associated with the individually disqualified lawyer." 
In this case, no conflict of interest existed at the time Karl Lewies filed the petitions for 
judicial review. Though he had been elected county prosecutor before filing the petitions, he had 
not yet assumed office. Nevertheless, he set himself on a collision course with his former clients 
had he not withdrawn. Moreover, under the Rules of Professional Conduct, the conflict of 
interest that would have arisen after he took office would not have been imputed to other 
attorneys in his office. Therefore, a conflict of interest would not preclude the deputy prosecuting 
attorney from defending the county in these petitions for judicial review. 
In addition, while the Fremont County Board of Commissioners did not err in relying on 
I.C. § 31-813, they apparently did not consider that the authority granted in that particular statute 
was significantly curtailed by the Idaho Constitution and subsequent case law. Even so, the 
Commissioners acted in good faith, believing that Mr. Lewies had a conflict of interest, which 
was also imputed to his deputy. 
The facts and circumstances of this case are rather unique in that the prosecutor-elect 
represented petitioners against the county after the election but before taking office. 
Nevertheless, Idaho law and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct place the representation of 
the county in these petitions for judicial review in the Fremont County Prosecutor's office. The 
Fremont County Prosecutor's office does not believe the facts of this case rise to the level of 
necessity required by the Idaho Constitution. Furthermore, there was no conflict of interest 
because Mr. Lewies withdrew as petitioners' counsel before taking office; nor was any apparent 
conflict of interest imputed to the deputy prosecutor according to the rules of professional 
conduct. However, in addition to the law and the rules of professional conduct, there are public 
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policy and judicial. economy considerations. Upon further review of all aspects of the unique 
facts peculiar to this particular situation and for the considerations stated, the Fremont County 
Prosecutor's Office withdraws its motion to represent Fremont County in these petitions for 
judicial review. 
DATED this _f1f! day of February, 2013. 
By: ~~,Esq 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this~ day of February, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO REPRESENT 
FREMONT COUNTY to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their 
names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage 
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Id 83405 
FAX: (208) 523-7254 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioners 
Idaho Falls, Id 83405 
FAX: (208)523-9518 
Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
109 N. 2nd W. 
St. Anthony, Id 83445 
FAX: (208) 624-3783 
Honorable Gregory Moeller 
159 E. Main St. 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, Id 83440 
FAX: (208) 356-5425 
[ ] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] Facsimile 
[ ] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] Facsimile 
[ ] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] Facsimile 
[ ] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] Facsimile 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
POWER COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY, F. RANDALL KLINE, 
Petitioner, Respondent, 
v. 
POWER BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, 
VICKI MEADOWS 
RON FUNK 
DELANE ANDERSON 
Respondents, Appellants. 
SUPREME COURT 
DOCKET NO. 40112-2012 
AMICUS BRIEF 
HONORABLE DAVID C. NYE, District Judge, Presiding 
F. RANDALL KLINE 
Power County Prosecuting 
Attorney 
543 Bannock Avenue 
American Falls, Idaho 83211 
Petitioner/Respondent 
M. JAY MEYERS, and 
THOMAS D. SMITH 
Meyers Law Office, PLLC 
P.O.Box474 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
Co-Counsel for 
Respondents/Appellants 
DAN T. BLOCKSOM 
Canyon County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office 
Civil Division 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Idaho Prosecuting Attorney's 
Association 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The nature of this case is not in dispute. Petitioner/Respondent, F. Randall Kline 
("Kline"), the Power County Prosecuting Attorney, filed two petitions seeking judicial review of 
actions taken by the Respondents/ Appellants, the Power County Board of Commissioners 
(''PBOCC"). The petitions were filed in the Dis1rict Court of the Sixth Judicial Dis1rict of Power 
County, the Honorable David C. Nye presiding. 
IT. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The course of the proceedings is as accurately stated in the briefs filed by PBOCC and 
Kline. 
ID. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts as jointly articulated by both PBOCC and Kline are correct, but the following 
brings attention to a few additional details. 
Before Kline filled the vacancy as Prosecuting Attorney, Paul Laggis ("Laggis") served 
as the elected Prosecuting Attorney. During his term, PBOCC got involved with the Gateway 
West Project, a joint venture between Rocky Mountain Power and Idaho Power Company. (R. 
Vol. ll, p. 186). According to the record, Laggis apparently had a potential conflict of interest 
with this project, and so PBOCC employed outside counsel, Douglas J. Balfour, Chartered 
(''Balfour'') for representation regarding this project. Id. The record reflects no other conflict of 
interest regarding the other projects for which PBOCC hired Balfour. 
ISSUE PR£SENTED ON APPEAL 
1. What constitutes adequate necessity to justify a board of county commissioners' 
decision to hire outside counsel? 
AMICUS BRIEF DOCKET NO. 40112-2012 
Pagel of14 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LEVEL OF NECESSITY REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY HIRING 
OUTSIDE COUSEL WELL EXCEEDS MERE CONVENIENCE OR 
PERSONAL PREFERENCE. 
A. The relevant statutes on their face are ambiguous, and thus the Court 
must look beyond the plain language. 
When the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, the Court can consider more than 
just the statute. "If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction it is ambiguous." State v. Yzagui"e, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 
(2007); citing Carner v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 
658 (2006). The Yzagui"e Court stated as follows: 
An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it 
to mean. [citations omitted]. To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines 
not only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed 
interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. 
144 Idaho at 475, 163 P.3d at 1187. See also Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d 
524, 526 (2009); Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398-99, 111 P.3d 73, 
83-84 (2005); Kelso & Irwin, P .A. v. State Insur. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 
(2000). 
Both the constitutional and statutory language at issue in this case are ambiguous, and 
thus a proper decision requires a close look at the legislative history. The most ambiguous 
language comes from Article XVITI, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, which states that 
"[t]county commissioners may employ counsel when necessary .... " [emphasis added], but does 
not fwther define ''necessary." Furthermore, Idaho Code ("I.C.") § 31-2607 establishes the 
prosecutor as the county commissioners' legal advisor as follows: 
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The prosecuting attorney is the legal adviser of the board of commissioners; he 
must attend their meetings when required, and must attend and oppose all claims 
and accounts against the county when he deems them unjust or illegal. 
To add to the confusion, LC. § 31-813 states the following: 
To direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the county 
is a party in interest, and employ counsel to conduct the same, with or without the 
prosecuting attorney, as they may direct. 
This statute does not mention anything about necessity, and seems to grant a board of county 
commissioners (''BOCC") unchecked authority to hire outside counsel. Neither the constitution 
nor the state statutes clarify the level of ''necessity'' required for BOCCs to justify hiring outside 
counsel. This ambiguity therefore requires a look at the legislative history of the office of the 
County Prosecutor. 
B. The legal history of the constitutional and statutory provisions 
regarding county prosecuting attorneys demonstrates that BOCCs 
must have a dire need to hire outside counseL 
Enacted before the Idaho constitution convention, the statute which granted the BOCC 
authority to hire outside counsel did not specify any necessity standard. The successor of 
Revised Statute (''R.S.'') § 1759, I.C. § 31-813 as quoted above, grants commissioners the power 
to employ counsel "[t]o direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the 
county is a party in interest . . . with or without the prosecuting attorney ... " No other check 
appeared to be in place. 
The proceedings of the Idaho constitution convention in 1889 demonstrated that BOCCs 
were to hire outside counsel only when not doing so would have catastrophic results. The 1889 
convention resulted in a district attorney system with no county prosecutors. The delegates' 
primary consideration in eliminating county prosecutors was cost cutting. Throughout the 
convention, the delegates emphasized that "[t]he principle all through is to get the cheapest 
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county government we can and be efficient ... " Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional 
Convention of Idaho 1889, Hart ed. Vol. II, at 1809. In criticizing the proposed alternative 
district attorney system, Delegate Beatty voiced the concern that the BOCCs would hire counsel 
whenever they wanted to, and that the BOCCs might do so on a contingency fee basis, resulting 
in attorney fees that would outweigh the cost of having county prosecutors. ld. at 1821, 1823-24. 
Delegate Reid countered this argwnent, stating that BOCCs rarely needed legal help, and that 
commissioners would be smart enough to hire affordable counsel. Id. at 1821-22. His opposition 
to creating the office of county prosecutor was based on his fundamental stance of keeping down 
government costs, and thus not creating any new offices. Id. at 1830. 
The 1889 convention contemplated that BOCCs could hire outside counsel in dire 
circumstances. The exchange between delegates regarding the circumstances under which 
outside counsel would be justified was as follows: 
Mr. Reid .... If the county has an important suit or has important legal business, 
the commissioners ought to be allowed to go into the market and get the best legal 
talent; and if they do not have the business they do not have to have to have [sic] 
the counsel. 
Mr. Beatty. Suppose an important murder case has to be prosecuted before the 
committing magistrate? 
Mr. Reid. There is the district attorney who is already paid by the state to do that. 
Mr. Beatty. But he is off in some other county. 
Mr. Reid .... I have seen this very system, and if it be necessary, the chairman of 
the board is always on hand, and upon application to him, when he sees public 
justice is about to fall, he can employ a man. 
[emphasis added]. Id. at 1821. As demonstrated by their exchange, the delegates contemplated 
commissioners hiring outside counsel either when the district attorney was physically 
unavailable, or when public justice was about to fail. Delegate Reid further suggested that 
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commissioners should be allowed to obtain the best legal talent for important legal matters. Id. 
The resulting constitution did not provide any guidance for gauging necessity. The language did, 
however, expressly prohibit commissioners from creating new county offices. 
During its first legislative session in 1890-1891, the Idaho Legislature firmly established 
the district attorney as the BOCC's lawyer. The Legislature amended R.S. § 2052, the 
predecessor to I.C. § 31-2604, which set forth the duties of the district attorney, such as to 
prosecute or defend all cases when a county of his district is an interested party, and to give 
advice to the BOCC. See Conger v. Commissioners of Latah County, 5 Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064, 
1065-66 (1896). The Legislature also amended R.S. § 2051, the predecessor to I.C. § 31-2603, so 
as to set forth the procedure for appointing a substitute prosecutor when no district attorney 
existed, or the district attorney was absent or had a conflict. See id at 1065. 
Under the district attorney framework, the Idaho Supreme Court set the ''necessity'' 
standard rather high, perhaps to the level of an emergency. In 1894, the Idaho Supreme Court did 
not allow commissioners to hire outside counsel without some showing of necessity. In Meller v. 
Logan County Com 'rs, the Logan BOCC appointed and retained a legal advisor for itself. 4 
Idaho 44, 35 P. 712, 713 (1894). In addition to entering a two year contract with the attorney, the 
Logan BOCC delegated to the outside counsel duties typically performed by the district attorney 
and attorney general. Id. at 713, 715. In making its ruling, the Meller Court considered the intent 
of the makers of the constitution, and stated as follows: 
While we recognize the right of the board of county commissioners, as expressed 
in the constitution, ''to employ counsel when necessary," we do not assent to the 
construction of that provision claimed by the plaintiff in error,-that it gives to the 
boards unbridled license to establish a new office, and to devolve upon an officer 
unknown to the constitution and the statutes the functions and duties which the 
law has already affixed to another officer or office. The board of county 
commissioners may, when the necessity exists, employ counsel, but that 
necessity must be apparent, and the action of the board in each case is subject to 
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review by the courts. To hold otherwise would, as we have already stated, be to 
leave the taxpayers of the state at the mercy of the boards of county 
commissioners, without remedy. 
[emphasis added]. Id at 715. The Court thus required that the BOCC face necessity before hiring 
outside counsel, and affirmed the district court's findings that the BOCC's actions were 
unauthorized, illegal, and void. Id. In ruling on the same facts but different issues on appeal, the 
Idaho Supreme Court in 1896 further elaborated in dicta on its view of necessity: 
The evident purpose and intent, both of the constitution and the statutes, was 
that the counties should be put to no expense on llCCOunt of attomey's services, 
beyond that of district attomey, but having in view the fact that each district was 
oomposed of several counties, an emergency might arise where the interests of 
the county or the people might require other legal services than those of the 
district attorney; and it was in anticipation of, or to meet, such a contingency, that 
the provision above referred to was incorporated in the constitution. 
We think that before the authority given to county commissioners by section 6, 
art. 18, of the constitution can be exercised, the necessity which authorizes it must 
not only be apparent, but the facts creating such necessity must be made a matter 
of record by the board. 
[emphasis added]. Hampton v. Logan County Com'rs, 4 Idaho 646, 43 P. 324, 325-326 (1896). 
The Court did not list either convenience or the district attorney's experience level as a primary 
consideration for determining necessity. 
In April 1896, the Idaho Supreme Court narrowed the authority that BOCCs had to hire 
outside counsel. Conger v. Commissioners of Latah County, 5 Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064 (1896). In 
Conger, the Latah BOCC hired a private attorney to help the district attorney prosecute a crime, 
and then later tried to pay the private attorney. At the time of the Conger decision, the language 
ofthestatuteat subdivision 13, § 1759 oftheRevised Statutes, thepredecessorofi.C. § 31-813, 
suggested that BOCCs had free rein to hire outside counsel whenever they wished: 
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To direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the county 
is a party in interest, and employ counsel to conduct the same, with or without the 
District Attorney, as they may direct. 
This ''free-rein" statute, however, had been enacted before the adoption of the state constitution. 
Article xvm, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution imposed a new restriction on the BOCC's 
authority to employ outside counsel, requiring that the outside counsel be ''necessary." The free-
rein statute also preceded the enactment of statutes regarding district attorneys during the 
Legislature's first session starting in 1890. The Conger Court therefore ruled that the BOCC 
could not employ counsel to assist the district attorney, even under the apparent grant of 
authority in the previously enacted free-rein statute. The Court noted that the Legislature had 
enacted this statute before Idaho adopted its state constitution and enacted the newer district 
attorney statutes. Finding that the older free-rein statute clashed with the new statutes and 
constitution, the Court reasoned that "[i]f there is a conflict, as suggested, the latest expression of 
the legislative will must control." Id. at 1066. The grant of authority to hire outside counsel from 
the previous statute, therefore, was now ''restricted to suits in which the county is a party in 
interest" Id. 
The Conger Court's examples of when outside counsel would be ''necessary'' were 
limited to virtual emergencies. The Court envisioned situations in which the district attorney was 
absent or the BOCC needed legal advice immediately: 
The authority given by said section 6, art. 18, of the constitution, to the county 
commissioners to employ counsel when necessary, was not intended to authorize 
them to employ counsel in matters over which they had no jurisdiction or control, 
but simply authorizes them to employ counsel in matters within their jurisdiction 
and control when necessary,-for example, when the district lltto17JeY could not 
perform such duties by reaon of being absent, or when the board must decide 
upon some question before them before they could have time to get the a [sic] 
advice of the district attomey thereon. 
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ld. Again, Conger's examples do not suggest that the perceived ability and experience level of 
the district attorney, or the BOCC's personal preference, constituted ''necessity." 
The Court's decision in Ravenscraft v. Blaine BOCC did not provide much helpful 
guidance in describing the "necessity" standard, because the reason for outside counsel in 
Ravenscraft was essentially an emergency. 5 Idaho 178, 47 P. 942 (1897). In Ravenscraft, the 
Blaine BOCC hired outside counsel ''for the purpose of determining the validity of the act 
creating said Blaine county." Id. at 943. In the Ravenscraft case, taxpayers sued, claiming that 
the BOCC had no jurisdiction to employ outside counsel because the record did not show 
necessity, and the .attorney general and district attorney should have been relied on instead. Id. at 
943-944. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that because ''the constitutionality of the act 
creating Blaine county was to be litigated, and was litigated, in the highest court in the state,'' the 
facts satisfied the necessity threshold. Id. at 944. 
The burden of demonstrating the necessity for outside counsel does not necessarily fall 
on the BOCC. In Anderson v. Shoshone County, the Shoshone BOCC hired outside counsel to 
perform certain legal services. 6 Idaho 76, 53 P. 105 (1898). Instead of arguing a lack of 
necessity for outside counsel, or excessive fees, the respondent merely argued that the BOCC 
had ignored the district attorney by hiring the private attorney. Id. at 105-106. The district 
attorney himself, however, did not make any objection to the hiring. Id. at 106. Noting the lack 
of opposition from the district attorney, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the BOCC was 
within its authority to hire outside counsel without consulting the district attorney, even though 
doing so would have been "eminently proper ... " I d. 
On the legislative end, in 1897, the Idaho Legislature abandoned the district attorney 
system, and created the office of the county prosecutor. By amending Article V, Section 18, the 
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Legislature created the county prosecutor system, instantly increasing the number of elected 
attorneys available for county commissioners to consult.1 
Even after the county prosecutor system was established, however, the Idaho Supreme 
Court continued to use the necessity standard from the district attorney line of cases. In Barnard 
v. Young, the Power BOCC hired outside counsel to assist the county prosecutor in suits against 
bondsman for not paying certain depository bonds owed to the County. 43 Idaho 382, 251 P. 
1054 (1926). The BOCC hired the outside counsel with a retainer· and a twenty percent 
contingency fee. Id. at 1054. In addition to contesting the contingency fee contract, taxpayers 
contested the necessity for hiring outside counsel. Jd. Instead of going into detail as to the level 
of necessity required, the Court simply concluded that the BOCC's meeting minutes and the 
contract demonstrated the necessity as required under Hampton, Conger, and Ravenscraft, all 
Idaho cases involving district attorneys. 
In fact, the only change, if any, to the necessity standard after the implementation of the 
office of the county prosecutor was a further heightening of that standard. When asked whether 
county commissioners have the ability to retain outside civil counsel on a long-term or 
continuous basis, the Idaho Attorney General ("AG'') centered its answer on the necessity 
standard in Article XVITI, Section 6. Looking first to the definitions in the Webster dictionary 
and Black's Law Dictionary, the AG concluded that ''mere convenience or personal preference 
does not rise to the level of 'necessary' or 'necessity' in this context." 1993 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 
91, fh. 3 (1993). Similar to the Barnard Court, the AG also relied on case law pre-dating the 
switch to the county prosecutor system. The AG observed that the Idaho Supreme Court struck 
down retention of private counsel when the contract was for two years at a fixed salary as in the 
1 Per email from Kristin Ford on October 29, 2012 at the Idaho Legislative Services Office (''LSO'') the LSO does 
not have record of the minutes or discussion that went into this enactment. 
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Meller and Hampton case. Id. at 4. The AG further pointed out that the Court upheld retention of 
private counsel in narrow factual circumstances, such as when the existence of the county was at 
stake (the Ravenscraft case), when the taxpayer did not contest the necessity for outside counsel 
(the Anderson case), and when the retention was ''for a specific legal problem and not on a 
retained or continuous basis" (the Barnard case). Id. In the AG's mind, the increased availability 
of attorneys heightened the ''necessity'' standard: 
The district attorney system was ultimately abandoned by returning to the county 
prosecutor format in 1897 by constitutional amendment. Since the framers 
adopted the "necessity'' language of art. 18, sec 6, expressly with a five member 
district attorney system in mind, it would appear that a board of county 
commissioners would be held to a more exacting ''necessity'' standard since there 
are now forty-four county prosecutors. 
1993 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 91, fu. 3 (1993). The reversion to the county prosecutor format 
therefore did not change anything about the necessity standard, except perhaps ratcheting it even 
higher. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the entire legal history of this statute, the Court should construe the 
''necessity'' standard as requiring a showing of one of two prongs. Specifically, the Court must 
find either (1) the county prosecutor's lack of physical capacity to perform a required task, or (2) 
the failure of public justice. 
Prong One: The County Prosecutor's Lack of Physical Capacity to Perform a Required Task 
The first prong, the county prosecutor's lack of physical capacity to perform a required 
task, finds deep roots in this statute's legal history, and originates from the constitutional 
convention itself. The delegates contemplated that county commissioners could hire outside 
counsel if the district attorney were off in some other county. The Conger Court similarly 
envisioned that outside legal counsel was appropriate when the district attorney was absent or the 
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commissioners needed legal advice immediately. Conger v. Commissioners of Latah County, 5 
Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064, 1066 (1896). The lack of physical capacity required to justify hiring 
outside counsel arguably increased after the transition to the county prosecutor system in 1897. 
See 1993 Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 91, fh. 3 (1993). 
This lack of physical capacity is not to be confused with lack of experience or mental 
capacity. Specifically, the legal history of this statute does not ever envision allowing county 
commissioners to employ outside counsel because the county prosecutor was inexperienced. The 
courts, the Legislature, and the constitutional convention only discuss absence and immediacy, 
not ineptitude, as factors determining necessity for this prong. 
Under this train of reasoning, the existence of a legitimate conflict of interest could 
effectively render the county prosecutor "physically incapable" of working on certain projects on 
the county's behalf. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 effectively prohibits county 
prosecutors from representing their county if such representation involves a concunmt conflict 
of interest When continuing to represent the county would violate a prosecutor's ethical 
obligations, then that constitutes sufficient lack of physical capacity that would justify county 
commissioners hiring outside counsel. Therefore, a written confirmation from the county 
prosecutor to the county commissioners regarding a conflict of interest could reach the necessity 
threshold. 
Fundamental disagreement between the county prosecutor and the board of county 
commissioners could also constitute a physical lack of capacity. Although county prosecutors are 
the legal counsel for the board under I.C. § 31-813 and I.C. § 31-2607, county prosecutors are 
also subject to the rules of professional conduct. According to comment 2 of Idaho Rule of 
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Professional Conduct 1.2,2 if the client and lawyer have a fundamental disagreement, then the 
lawyer may withdraw and/or the client may discharge the lawyer. Similarly, Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.16(b) lists reasons why a lawyer may withdraw from xepxesenting a 
client, such as a fundamental disagreement or criminal conduct by the client. 3 In addition to not 
bringing frivolous claims, see Idaho Ru1es of Professional Conduct 3.1, lawyers are to give 
candid advice to their clients, even if their clients should find such advice distasteful. Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct 2.1, Comment 1. Therefore, when the county prosecutor faces an 
ethical dilemma in his representation of the board, or if the county prosecutor has a fundamental 
2 Idaho Rule ofProfessional Conduct 1.2, Comment [2] 
On occasion. however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the 
client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to 
the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical 
matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be 
inCUlTed and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the 
matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate 
the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be 
resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should 
also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement q such efforts 
tl1'e JIIUI11tliling tmd the lawyer Juzs ll/urultunentlll disflf/1WIIttmt with the client, the lawyer mil)' witlulraw 
from the representlltion. See Rule 1.16(b )( 4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by 
discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3). 
[emphasis added] 
3 Idaho Rule ofProfessional Conduct 1.16(b) 
Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if 
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client; 
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is 
criminal or fraudulent; 
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; 
( 4) the client insists upon tllking tzetion thllt the lfiHI',J1el' considers repugtlllllt or with which the lllwyer hilS ll 
.funtltmaenttll di.wlgreement; 
{5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has 
been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; 
( 6) the representation will result in an umeasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered 
unreasonably difficult by the client; or 
(1) other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
[emphasis added] 
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disagreement with the board, then this situation could also rise to the level of necessity required 
to hire outside counsel. 
Prong Two: The Failure of Public Justice 
The second alternative prong - the failure of public justice - can also trace its 
background to legal precedent and the original constitutional convention. The delegates 
contemplated that the county commissioners could hire outside counsel if they saw that "public 
justice [was] about to fail ... " Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 
Idaho 1889, Hart ed. Vol. ll, at 1820. Similarly, the Hampton Court anticipated that outside 
counsel would be necessary when "an emergency might arise where the interests of the county or 
the people might require other legal services than those of the district attorney ... " Hampton v. 
Logan County Com'rs, 4 Idaho 646, 43 P. 324, 325-326 (1896). Accordingly, the Ravenscraft 
Court allowed the hiring of outside counsel ''for the purpose of determining the validity of the act 
creating said Blaine county." Ravenscroft v. Blaine BOCC, 5 Idaho 178, 47 P. 942, 943 (1897) 
The Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association therefore respectfully requests that the 
Court carefully weigh and consider the full legal history of the county prosecutor system when 
rendering a decision in this matter. IP AA believes that the necessity standard previously 
established by this Court has not been met in this case. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2012. 
UT~ 
Dan T. Blocksom 
Canyon County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this 
reply in support of an award of attorney's fees as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
When considering whether an attorney fee award is "reasonable" the Court should 
examine the factors ofRule 54(e)(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The factors of Rule 
54( e )(3) include: time and labor; difficulty; skill required; prevailing charges; fixed or contingent 
fee; time limitations; amount and result; undesirability of the case; relationship with the client; 
awards in similar cases; costs of automated research; and any other factors. See I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3); see also Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 769, 
86 P.3d 475, 483 (2004). 
Mr. Lewies contends that the contract under which the parties operate should be 
considered. Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(3), examination of the contract between the client and 
attorney is not an enumerated factor. In this case, a statement of account was provided via the 
affidavit of Blake G. Hall providing to the Court the hourly rate billed by Mr. Hall as well as the 
billing entry for the work performed. While the Courts have considered the hourly rate, there is 
no case law that supports the position that the contract should be reviewed. The contract 
between Mr. Hall and the County does not identify a specified hourly rate for the services. The 
rate of$225.00 per hour1 is the standard and customary rate billed by Mr. Hall for his services. 
This rate is reasonable considering his expertise and years of practice. The bottom line in an 
award of attorney fees is reasonableness. See Sun Valley Potato Growers, 139 Idaho 761, 86 
P.3d 475. 
1 It is unreasonable to suggest that Mr. Hall, or any attorney in Idaho, should bill $20.13 per hour 
for their work. 
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In this case, the necessity for the filing of the motion arose not by any action of the 
County but by Mr. Lewies actions that he understood would be a direct conflict of his 
forthcoming role as the Fremont County Prosecutor. The County could not simply sit idly by 
and hope that Mr. Lewies would file a withdrawal with the Court, especially where more than a 
month and a half had elapsed from the date the Petition was filed. The County felt that the 
motion was necessary to ensure its interests would be properly protected.2 
In light of the plain language of Rule 1.16, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct, the 
County's decision to file the disqualification motion was even more apparent. Rule 1.16 
addresses an attorney's obligation to decline or terminate representation in matters. Rule 
1.16( a)( 1) specifically states that a lawyer shall not represent a client if "the representation will 
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law." The commentary provides 
further support for the warranted actions ofthe County in filing the motion to disqualify, "A 
layer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, 
promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion." Mr. Lewies was aware of 
his obligations to his clients and future clients in the County when he undertook a representation 
in conflict of Rules 1.7, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct. (See generally Respondent's 
Motion to Disqualify). Thus, Mr. Lewies intentional representation was in direct violation of an 
ethical rule and Mr. Lewies should never have accepted the representation. By filing the Motion 
to Disqualify, the County was not seeking to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost oflitigation." If any action caused unnecessary delay or needlessly increased 
the cost of litigation, it was Mr. Lewies decision to appear in a case that could not be resolved 
2 Mr. Lewies contention that he is a prevailing party is misplaced. The filing of a motion to withdraw accomplished 
the same relief being requested by the Motion to Disqualify; namely, remove Mr. Lewies from any representation of 
the parties in this matter. As noted, the representation by Mr. Lewies was improper and a direct violation of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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prior to his taking office as the Fremont County Prosecutor. As this Court noted in its Order on 
Motions, the Court " ... questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity he 
had just recently been elected to represent .... " and further noted that," ... its strong 
disagreement with Mr. Lewies actions in this matter .... " (See Order on Motions, pp. 2-3). 
Ultimately, under the considerations ofRule 54(e)(3), the requested fees of$1,770.50 are 
both warranted and reasonable. The fees charged by counsel for the County are in line with, or 
lower, than the "prevailing charges" in Eastern Idaho. The time spent on the motion was not 
excessive and it included a novel issue of disqualification based on a concurrent conflict of 
interest. Mr. Hall is a well-respected and competent attorney that has nearly 35 years of 
experience and an expertise in municipal law. When considering an award of attorneys' fees, the 
contact between a client and attorney is irrelevant to the consideration. As such, the Court 
should grant the request for attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Fremont County respectfully requests that this Court grant the 
request for attorney's fees in the amount of$1,770.50. 
DATED this __L[ day of February, 2013. 
i§f.~U 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this _jJ_ day of February, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Ryan S. Dustin, Esq. 
22 West 1st North 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax (208)624-3404 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Fax (208) 523-9518 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109N. 2nd W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax (208) 624-3783 
D<l Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[~] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
J>G] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
L:\BGH\7525- Fremont County files\7525.17 Gwaltney\Pieadings\Defendant's\Strike Extension Motion (Mot).docx 
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MINUTE ENTRY OF TWO FREMONT COUNTY CASES 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
CV-2012-580- FLYING A RANCH v. FREMON ~~~tPfKFremont State of Idaho 
CV2012-581-GWALTNEY v. FREMONT C N rrts 
FEBRUARY 15, 2013, 10:23 A.M 
JUDGE MOELLER- PRESIDING 
ALL PARTIES APPEARED BY PHONE 
KARL LEWIES- REPRESENTS FREMONT COUNTY 
RYANS DUSTIN- REPRESENTS FREMONT COUNTY 
BLAKE HALL- REPESENTS FREMONT COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
LYNN HOSSNER- REPRESENTS FLYING A RANCH 
GWALTNEY$ DID NOT APPEAR 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME ON EXCUABLE NEGLECT 
10:23 AM INTRODUCTION OF CASE 
FEB 2 1 2013 
ABBIE MA 
GAWALTENEY- AN ATIORNEY HAS NOT APPEARED, BUT CHARLES HOMER MAY BE REPRESENTING 
MS. BILLIE SIDDOWAY, THE DEPUTY PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO THE CASE, HAS BEEN DISCHARGED BY 
MR. LEWIES AND RECENTLY REPLACED BY RYAN DUSTIN 
MR. HOSSNER ASKED TO BE EXCUSED- FLYING A RANCH DOES NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THE 
MATIER S,ET FOR TODAY- EXCUSED BY JUDGE M9ELLER 
PARTIES ADVISED NO COURT REPORTER PRES~N(-WAIVED COURT REPORTER 
RYAN DUSTIN- BEGINS ARGUMENT ON MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF 
BLAKE HALL -INTERUPTS AND ARGUES HIS PENDING MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND TO SHORTEN TIME 
JUDGE NOTES THAT HE INSTRUCTED THE COURT CLERK TO SET THIS FOR A HEARING ASAP IF THE 
MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION WAS NOT STIPULATED TO BY COUNSEL 
JUDGE QUESTIONS COUNSEL ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND ETHICAL RULE 1.7, NOTING THAT THE 
PRIOR DEPUTY HAD CONCLUDED THERE WAS A CONFLICT 
MR. DUSTIN EXLAINS WHY MS. SIDDOWAY FELT THERE WAS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST-SHE HAD 
PREVIOUSLY MET WITH THE FREMONT COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
JUDGE ORDERS: 
(1) THAT AS A PROFESSIONAL COURTESTY TO MR DUSTIN, HE WILL BE ALLOWED UNTIL TUESDAY, 
FEBRUARY 19, 2013 AT NOON TO FILE THE PLEADINGS HE ALLOWED MS SIDDOWAY TO FILE. THE 
EXTENSION IS GRANTED ON THE CONDITION THAT MR. DUSTIN AND MR. LEWIES CONTACT BAR 
COUNSEL TO DISCUSS THE ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED IN THIS CASE. 
(2) TO AVOID PREJUDICE TO THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, THE DEADLINE FOR MR. HALL'S RESPONSE 
IS EXTENDED ~0 MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2013, AT 5:00P.M. (THE DAY BEFORE THE HEARING). 
KARL LEWIES INDICATES THAT THERE IS A PENDING CASE SIMILAR TO THIS IN POWER COUNTY 
ooCU\JSNT 
£CANNSD 
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THE COURT REMINDED COUNSEL THAT IT HAS ALREADY RULED THAT MR LEWIES CANNOT BE INVOLVED 
IN THE MATTER BEYOND RESPONDING TO THE REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES. ANY PARTICIPATION 
FROM THE FREMIONT COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE MUST BE THROUGH MR. DUSTIN. 
JUDGE WANTS TO MAKE SURE THE ATTORNEYS DO NOT COMPROMISE THEMSELVES ETHICALLY AND 
WISHES TO RESOLVE THE REPRESENTATION ISSUES QUICKLY SO THAT IT CAN ADDRESS THE MERITS. 
ON FEBRUARY 26, THE COURT WILL COME UP WITH A RESOLUTION 
MR HALL- RENEWS MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS FOR THE RECORD 
THE COURT NOTES THE OBJECTION, BUT BELIEVES ITS ACTIONS HAVE NOT PREJUDICED THE COUNTY 
BECAUSE IT EXTENDED THEIR DEADLINE AS WELL 
COURT WILL PREPARE THE MINUTE ENTRY ON THIS MATTER 
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IN THE DISTRICT CO 
County of Fremont State of ld 
Filed:;======;---
FEB 2 6 2013 
THESTATE~~~~~~~~~J~ 
QJJ/2--6"80 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESIDING JUDGE: 
DATE: 
LAW AND MOTION 
GREGORY W. MOELLER 
FEBRUARY 26,2013 
ATTORNEYS PRESENT: 
COURT REPORTER: 
CLERK: 
DAVE MARLOW 
DEBORAH MACE 
259 FLYING A VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM. 
GWALTNEY VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMM 
MR RYAN DUSTIN APPEARS ON BEHALF OF FREMONT CO 
MR BLAKE HALL APPEARS ON BEHALF OF BOARD OF COMM. 
ISSUES TODAY WOULD BE WHOM MR DUSTIN WOULD BE 
REPRESENTING. SECOND ON ATTORNEY FEES REF TO MR 
LEWIES. 
THE COURT GOES OVER HISTORY OF THE CASE. 
COMMENTS ON MR DUSTINS BRIEF. 
MR BLAKE AND MR DUSTIN FEELS BRIEF SHOULD RESOLVE 
ISSUE OF CONFLICT. 
302 THE COURT COMMENTS ON ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE 
THE COURT HAS RECEIVED AFF OF FEES FROM MR BLAKE AND 
OBJECTION OF MR LEWIES. 
303 THE COURT WILL ALLOW MR HALL ON ARGUMENT. 
MR HALL REFERS TO PAGE TWO OF DOCUMENT THE COURT 
SUBMITTED. 
305 THE COURT REFERS TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ITS ORDER. 
MR HALL STATES HE HAS FILED MEMORANDUM OF FEES. 
308 THE COURT INQUIRES OF MR LEWIES OBJECTION. COMMENTS 
ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST. MR HALL STATES THE COURT IS NOT 
LIMITED TO RULE. 
310 MR LEWIES ON AGRUMENT. APPRECIATES THE COURTS DESIRE 
TO GET THIS RIGHT. COMMENTS ON 12-117 IN IDAHO CODE. 
313 THE COURT INQUIRES OF MR LEWIES REF FILING. 
REFERS TO PARAGRAPH FOUR OF MR HALLS AFFD. 
SCANNED 
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• I 
344 MRHALLONREBUTTAL 
345 THE COURT WILL TAKE THE MATTERS UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
ASKS AS TO RECORD BEING COMPLETED ON THIS CASE. 
MR HALL WILL SUPPLY THE COURT WITH RECORD. 
MR HOMER HAS NEVER ENTERED AN APPEARANCE. 
THE COURT WOULD LIKE CASES TO BE ON TRACK. 
A NOTICE OF LODGING NEEDS TO BE SENT. 
MR HALL COMMENTS ON TWO SEPARATE CASES. THE COURT HAS 
NOT CONSOLIDATED AT THIS POINT. 
GWALTNEY ARE NOT REPRESENTED AT THIS TIME. 
THE COURT STATES A NOTICE OF LODGING NEEDS SENT TO ALL 
PARTIES. MR HALL IS TO COMMUNICATE TO MR HOMER. 
BRIEF WILL BE DUE IN 35 DAYS. 
MR HALL WILL MAKE MR HOMER A WARE OF ISSUES. 
THE COURT DOES NOT SHOW IN RECORD WHERE MR LEWIES 
PROVIDE NOTICE. MR LEWIES HAS SENT CERT. LETTER. 
THE COURT WILL TAKE UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
MR LEWIES HAS A FEW EXHIBITS. 
352 MR LEWIES WILL OFFER AS AN AUTHORITY. PUBL OF AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOC. ANNOTATED RULE 1.11 
REPOSITORY RECORD. 
THE COURT WILL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
THE COURT WILL TAKE BOTH FILES BACK TO REXBURG. 
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·- DISTRICT SEVEN COURT County of Fremont State of Idaho Filed:r========i--
.. 13 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTill( '1 OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT ~~TiBBIE MACE, CLEF-tK 
y. 0 1 _, ' 
FLYING"A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ) 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY ) Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and ) 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) NOTICE OF LODGING 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, ) \ .,...... ,-- ~ . ' , .. \, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) 
) 
E. C. GWALTNEY, III and ) 
LANA K. VARNEY ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a record of the appealed proceedings in the 
above-captioned matter and the court's record have been lodged with the District Court. 
The parties in this matter have fourteen ( 14) days from the date on which this 
notice is served in which to file with the District Court, in writing, any objections related 
NOTICE OF LODGING -1- DOCUMENT 
£CANN:::D 
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to the contents of the transcript or record. Should there be no objections to the contents 
ofthe transcript or record, the transcript and record shall be deemed settled at the 
expiration of the aforementioned fourteen (14) day period, and the transcript and record 
shall be filed within the District Court within fourteen (14) days of settlement of the 
transcript and record. The briefing schedule will be as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Petitioner's brief shall be filed with this Court within 35 days of the date on 
which notice that the transcript and record have been filed with this Court is 
served; 
Respondents' brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of Petitioner's 
brief; 
Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed within 21 days after service of 
Respondents' brief. 
A courtesy copy of any pleading filed in this matter, including the briefs, 
shall be lodged with the District Court for Madison County, Idaho, 134 E. 
Main, Rexburg, Idaho 83440. 
When all the foregoing conditions have been complied with, Petitioner shall 
schedule a hearing for oral argument in Fremont County on the next 
convenient law and motion day following the expiration of the time limit for 
Petitioner's reply brief. Notice of the hearing date shall be served upon this 
Court and counsel for Respondents. In the event that no hearing is 
scheduled, this Court will assume that the matter has been submitted for 
resolution without oral argument. 
So ordered. 
NOTICE OF LODGING -2-
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Dated this f3~ day of March, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON REVIEW was this IS-H'" day ofMarch, 2013, sent 
via US mail to the following individuals: 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109N. 2ndw. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
151 W. N. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Ryan Dustin. 
Fremont County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
22 W. lstN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
NOTICE OF LODGING -3-
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By: 
..-t1 
DATED this ('3 day of March, 2013. 
NOTICE OF LODGING -4-
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·- ·-FILED IN CiL\\!aERS ,\T R;~X:1L' MADISON COUi~TY, IDAHO. 
Date. M llcc.lo. ~ 4 . Q..O /3 
Time ~0~. 
By c.piAJ ~eo. o tcT1ol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ) 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY ) Case Nos. CV-1117-a& CV-12-581 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and ) 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
) RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) ____________________________ ) 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III arid ) 
LANA K. VARNEY ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ofidaho, ) 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and ) 
in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, individually and in his official ) 
capacity, ) 
Respondents. ) ___________________________) 
SCANNED 
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 23, 2012, attorney Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies") filed two separate petitions 
seeking judicial review of decisions made by the Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
("the Commissioners" or ''the County"). 1 These petitions were filed on behalf of two separate 
groups of petitioners: 
A. Case No. CV -12-580 was filed on behalf of Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard, George Ty 
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow (collectively referred to as "Flying 'A"'); and 
B. Case No. CV-12-581 was filed on behalf ofE.C. Gwaltney, III and Lana K. 
V amey (collectively referred to as "Gwaltney"). 2 
At the time of filing, Lewies was the prosecutor-elect for Fremont County, having been duly 
elected in the general election held November 6, 2012. Lewies had not yet taken office when he 
filed the petitions; he was sworn-in on January 14, 2013. Lewies defeated the incumbent 
Fremont County prosecutor in the primary election on May 15, 2012, and then ran unopposed in 
the general election 
On January 2, 2013, the County, through its then deputy prosecuting attorney, Blake Hall 
("Hall"), set a hearing for a motion to disqualify Lewies from representing the Petitioners and the 
County in these matters. On January 7, 2013, the County filed a motion to disqualify and 
requested attorney fees. In response, Lewies filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for 
Petitioners later that same day. He filed an affidavit acknowledging "a conflict of interest will 
arise in connection with my continued representation of Petitioners in this case."3 Lewies did not 
withdraw his claim to represent the County on these matters. 
On January 11, 2013, the County filed a substitution of counsel, advising the Court that 
the County had retained Hall and his law firm, Nelson, Hall, Parry, & Tucker, P.A., to defend it 
in the cases at issue here. On January 14, 2013, Lewies and Lynn Hossner ("Hossner") 
1 The actions for which Petitioners seek judicial review took place on October 29, 2012. Petition for Judicial 
Review,~ 8 (November 23. 2012) (CV-12-580); and Petition for Judicial Review,~ 8 (November 23, 2012) (CV-12-
581). 
2 The Court notes that although both cases concern public roads designations made by Fremont County, the cases 
have not been consolidated because the facts and issues are dissimilar. However, the issue presented to the Court in 
this decision is identical in both cases. 
3 Affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, p. 2 (January 7, 2013). The Court notes that at oral argument Lewies conceded that due 
to his busy schedule, he had forgotten to withdraw until he received the County's motion. 
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stipulated to the substitution ofHossner for Lewies in representing Flying "A."4 No attorney has 
yet made an appearance for Gwaltney. 
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013 on Hall's motion to disqualify and 
Lewies' motion to withdraw. The Court has previously summarized that hearing as follows: 
The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had failed to withdraw voluntarily until the 
County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also questioned the wisdom and 
ethics of filing actions against an entity he had just recently been elected to 
represent on behalf of clients he could no longer represent. Mr. Lewies attributed 
the delay to an oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct was 
violated. He claimed that his clients were operating under time constraints due to 
the statute of limitations. He agreed that he should no longer represent his former 
clients or the County on these matters in the future. 
Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Mr. Hall to file any motions or argue on 
behalf of the County. Mr. Hall responded by noting that he was still an acting 
deputy prosecutor for the County when he filed his motions and that he is now 
acting under a contract with the County Commissioners. The Court noted that 
Mr. Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County oflegal counsel in this 
matter. Mr. Lewies asserted that his newly appointed deputy prosecutor, Billie 
Siddoway, could take over his representation of the County in this matter. Mr. 
Hall disagreed and asked for attorney fees incurred by the County in filing both 
motions.5 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court barred Lewies from representing either his 
former clients (Petitioners) or his new client (the County) in this matter, thereby effectively 
granting both the motion to disqualify and the motion to withdraw. The Court further concluded: 
... the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in filing the motion 
to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against Mr. Lewies personally, but not 
against his clients, the Petitioners. Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with 
appropriate supporting documents within 14 days. Mr. Lewies will be allowed to 
appear for purposes of contesting the attorney fees only.6 
The Court allowed Lewies' newly appointed deputy, Billie Siddoway ("Siddoway"), 14 days to 
file a brief explaining why the Fremont County Prosecutor's Office should be allowed to 
continue representing the County on these matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' 
choosing.7 
4 Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel (January 14, 2013). 
5 Order on Motions to DisqualifY Counsel, Withdraw, and Dismiss Individual Respondents, p. 2 (February 1, 2013). 
6 /d., p. 3. 
7 !d. 
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Following the hearing, Siddoway filed a Notice of Conflict of Interest on February 6, 
2013.8 She was "terminated" by Lewies four days later. Lewies then appointed Ryan Dustin 
("Dustin") to serve as his new deputy prosecutor on February 11, 2013.9 At a hearing on 
Lewies' motion for an extension of time for briefing, held February 15, 2013, the Court granted 
the extension on the express condition that both Lewies and Dustin visit with counsel from the 
Idaho State Bar ("bar counsel") about the ethical ramifications of Lewies conduct in these 
matters. Shortly after visiting with bar counsel, Dustin filed notice with the Court that his office 
was withdrawing from representation ofthe County on the two petitions. 10 
The County filed a timely affidavit of attorney's fees and Lewies filed an objection. Oral 
argument took place on February 26, 2013, after which the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An abuse of discretion standard is used in reviewing sanctions imposed pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l). Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 
P .2d 993, 1 000 ( 1991) (citing Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 65 8, 660, 651 P .2d 923, 925 
(1982)). The United States Supreme Court has explained that because the trial court is "familiar 
with the issues and litigants, [it] is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the 
pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11." Cooter & 
Gel! v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). 
Likewise, the decision to grant or to deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the 
discretion of the trial court. Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 114 (Ct.App. 
1991 ). All discretionary decisions require the Court to rightly perceive the issue as one of 
discretion, act within the outer boundaries of the discretion allotted, and reach a decision through 
the exercise of reason. Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 
826 (Ct. App. 1987). 
8 Notice of Conflict of Interest (February 6, 2013). 
9 Affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, ~ 17 (February 12, 2013). 
10 Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County (February 19, 2013). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Court has the discretion to award sanctions for "misguided filings" 
and "litigative misconduct" pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l). 
At the conclusion of the January 22, 2013 hearing, the Court invited the County to submit 
an affidavit setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in seeking Lewies' 
disqualification. Although much of the oral argument and briefing has since focused on a 
prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54( e) and I.C. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that 
such an effort is misplaced. 11 The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he reasons for 
which attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are not 
reasons that will support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)." Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 96,803 P.2d 993, 1002 (1991). 
Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the 
provisions ofRule 11 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(a)(l) provides: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney 
shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of record of the state ofldaho, 
in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated before the same 
may be filed .... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that 
the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best 
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading, motion or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he intent of the rule is to grant courts the 
power to impose sanctions for discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct." 
Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 650, 115 P.3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). Rule 11 
has been construed as "a management tool to be used by the district court to weed out, punish 
and deter specific frivolous and other misguided filings." Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 937, 
11 In the event I.R.C.P. 54( e) and I.C. § 12-121 were controlling, the Court notes that the record would support 
findings that the County was the prevailing party and that both petitions were brought and pursued unreasonably. 
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940, 120 P.3d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). To properly impose Rule 11 
sanctions, the Court must not base its decision on acts that are "part of the trial itself," but rather 
it must only consider "the attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers." 
Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). 
Given the totality of the circumstances present in this matter, and for the reasons set forth 
below, the Court concludes that Lewies' filing of these petitions was clearly misguided and his 
failure to immediately withdraw as counsel for both parties amounted to litigative misconduct. 
While such a conclusion logically gives rise to ethical concerns under the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct ("IRPC"), such matters are not questions typically answered by this 
court. 12 Rather, the Court must review this matter pursuant to its "court management" role and 
act using its inherent discretion to ensure that the adjudication of this matter is fair to all sides. 
When considering a motion to disqualify counsel, "[t]he goal of the court should be to shape a 
remedy which will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process." 
Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692,697, 819 P.2d 110, 115 (Ct. App. 1991). 
B. The circumstances presented by these cases justify imposition of 
sanctions under Rule ll(a)(l). 
The Court is mindful of its dual role in protecting the integrity of the judicial process and 
policing litigative misconduct. This is why Rule 11 allows a court to impose sanctions against 
an attorney or parties on the motion of a party or sua sponte. Although discretionary, the Court 
is mindful that "[t]he power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing 
on discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the overall course of a 
lawsuit." Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 23, 773 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct. App. 1989). 
In the cases at bar, Lewies filed two petitions for judicial review against Fremont County 
just 17 days after winning the general election. Inasmuch as he ran unopposed in the general, he 
had essentially known since May 2012 that he would be representing the County in January 
2013. The Court understands Lewies' contention that since he had not yet been sworn-in, no 
12 See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.7 through 1.11. The Court urged Lewies to visit with bar 
counsel about the ethical issues raised by having his deputy represent the County in an action that was initiated by 
Lewies against the County. Shortly after doing so, Dustin filed notice that he and Lewies would acquiesce and 
allow the County to seek independent outside counsel to represent them on this matter. In so doing, the Court notes 
that Dustin and Lewies did not concede they were ethically obligated to take such action, but were doing so for 
"public policy and judicial economy considerations." Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont 
County, p. 5. 
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actual conflict of interest existed. However, even ifLewies' actions did not amount to an ethical 
violation under the IRPC, that is not controlling on the Court's analysis. The Court must still 
consider the questions of whether Lewies' actions adversely affected the integrity of the judicial 
process and/or constituted the type of litigative misconduct governed by Rule 11. 
The Court finds that regardless of the ethical ramifications, Lewies' filing of the petitions 
against a known, future client was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial 
system. Fremont County voters were entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as 
County prosecutor would not be filing new legal actions against the County on behalf of private 
individuals. Similarly, the Commissioners had every reason to be concerned when they were 
sued in both their official and personal capacities by the incoming county attorney. By so doing, 
Lewies initiated a chain of events that any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would 
create mistrust and animosity from everyone involved-greatly undermining public confidence 
in the outcome of both cases. 
It is simply unfathomable to the Court how Lewies could have failed to understand that 
his actions would almost immediately deprive Petitioners of legal counsel since he would have to 
immediately withdraw before he was sworn-in. Likewise, Lewies should have anticipated that 
his actions would deprive his future clients, the County and the Board of Commissioners, of 
representation since they would be understandably uncomfortable having Lewies or his deputies 
defend them in legal matters he initiated against them. Therefore, the Court concludes that 
Lewies' decision to sign and file the petitions was clearly misguided and adversely affected the 
integrity of the judicial process. The Court notes that with the application of wisdom and 
common sense, one could have reasonably predicted that such conduct would meet with the stem 
disapproval of Mr. Lewies' future clients, the County and Commissioners, as well as the Court, 
whose duty it is to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process. 
The Court also finds that the timing of Lewies' filing of the petitions, coupled with his 
subsequent delay in withdrawing as counsel for Petitioners and the County, constitutes the type 
oflitigative misconduct Rule 11 was intended to rectify. Here, Lewies' actions have directly 
delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review because the Court has been required to 
spend over two months dealing with issues related to representation, rather than hearing the 
merits of the petitions. Although Lewies eventually withdrew as counsel for Petitioners before 
he was sworn-in, it was only in response the County's motion to disqualify him. Even then, he 
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only withdrew as counsel for Petitioners-he initially refused to withdraw as counsel for the 
County. Lewies later fired his first deputy, Siddoway, after she filed a notice of conflict with the 
Court. 13 Lewies only changed his mind after he discussed the matter with bar counsel at the 
urging of the Court. Although Flying "A" has now obtained new counsel, Gwaltney is still 
unrepresented. While this appears to be a case of first impression, based upon the undisputed 
record before it, the Court must conclude that Lewies should be subject to Rule 11(a)(l) 
sanctions for failing to exercise "reasonableness under the circumstances ... before signing and 
filing the [petitions]." Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). 
Although contested by Lewies, the Court deems appropriate the decision by the County 
to retain Hall, its former civil deputy, to defend it in these cases Lewies' contentions that the 
County's hiring of Hall and subsequent response to this matter were motivated by an "improper 
purpose" are irrelevant. 14 Despite any animosity between Lewies and the current County 
Commissioners, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the County to remind him of 
his legal and ethical duties before filing the motion for disqualification. Lewies also contends 
the County's motion was premature, since he had not been sworn-in and, therefore, an actual 
conflict did not yet exist. Of course, this ignores the fact that he had not withdrawn as counsel 
for the County prior to the hearing. Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "a 
motion to disqualify opposing counsel should be filed at the onset of the litigation, ... once the 
facts upon which the motion is based have become known." Crown v. Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128 
Idaho 114, 122-23, 910 P.2d 786, 794-95 (Ct. App. 1996). By acting when it did, one week 
before Lewies was sworn-in; the County may have actually prevented Lewies from suffering the 
ethical consequences of failing to withdraw sooner. 
Lewies should have known at the time of filing the petitions that he would unable to see 
either case through to completion -this is undisputed. Even if the Petitioners were acting under 
time constraints, that does not justify Lewies acting in an ethically questionable manner. From 
13 Notice of Conflict of Interest, p. 2. 
14 Affidavit of Karl H. Lewies, ~ 10 (January 31, 2013). The Court disagrees with Lewies' account ofthe 
conversation that took place after the hearing on January 22, 2013, because he appears to imply the Court was 
critical of the County Commissioners and Hall. While the Court acknowledges that it briefly met with Lewies in 
chambers following the January 22, 2013 hearing, the Court merely advised him to avoid allowing a political grudge 
to interfere with his professional judgment. The merits of the cases were not discussed. The Court initiated this 
conversation after consulting Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(D), which provides, in part: "Judges are 
encouraged to bring instances of unprofessional conduct by judges or lawyers to their attention in order to provide 
them opportunities to correct their errors without disciplinary proceedings; ... " 
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the moment Lewies knew of his clients' legal claims against the County, he should have acted 
promptly to assist them in obtaining new counsel to file the petitions. Instead, he filed the 
petitions and set in motion a series of events that would not only result in an imminent conflict of 
interest with Petitioners, but also a conflict of interest with the County. Any existing bad 
feelings between Lewies and the Commissioners would only be escalated by such provocative 
conduct. An objective view of the circumstances suggests that it was unreasonable and 
misguided for Lewies to file an action against a known future client. Such conduct would 
predictably create delay, additional fees, and lack of continuity of representation. In essence, 
Lewies pursued the one course of action that would render him useless to both his current and 
future clients. 
As a result of Lewies' actions, over two months have been wasted sorting through the 
issue of representation. Setting aside considerations of judicial economy, Lewies' failure to 
timely withdraw from the case caused the County to incur attorney fees unnecessarily. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Lewies' actions in signing and filing the petitions and in 
failing to promptly withdraw were "unreasonable," "misguided," and constitute the type of 
"litigative misconduct" which entitles the County to an award of fees pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1). 
Since Lewies' is solely responsible for the tactical and ethical choices made in this matter, 
especially after he withdrew from representing the Petitioners, any fees assessed should be 
awarded against him personally, not against Petitioners. 
C. Reasonableness of the requested fees 
Rule 11(a)(1) permits a court to impose, as a sanction against an attorney, the "reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee." The County is seeking $1,777.50 in attorney fees for 7.9 hours of 
work billed at $225 per hour. Of the 7.9 hours billed, approximately 4.4 hours were for the 
drafting of the motion. An additional3.5 hours were billed for work performed on the day of the 
hearing. 15 Normally, the amount of attorney's fees awarded should be that sum which the trial 
court in its discretion determines to be reasonable. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 
266, 561 P .2d 1299 (1977). The Court notes that it should not blindly accept the amount of fees 
claimed. Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebreaker, 108 Idaho 704,706,701 P.2d 324,326 
15 Affidavit of Attorney's Fees,~ 4 (January 30, 2013). 
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(Ct.App. 1985). Therefore, the Court must independently review the reasonableness of the fees 
requested in this matter. 
The Court has previously concluded that it was both necessary and proper for the County 
to ask Hall to file the motion for disqualification and retain him to represent it on the petitions. 
The time he spent researching and drafting the motion appears reasonable, especially given what 
Lewies' current deputy conceded was the ''unique" nature of the issue presented. 16 If once 
Lewies had filed his motion to withdraw as counsel for Petitioners he had also agreed that the 
prosecutor's office would not continue to represent the County on these cases, the Court would 
have only granted fees for the 4.4 hours of research and drafting. However, due to Lewies' 
insistence that the prosecutor's office should continue to represent the County in defending 
against the two petitions, the motion had to be heard. Therefore, an award of fees for Hall's 
appearance at the hearing and arguing on behalf of the motion is also an appropriate sanction. 
Applying the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3), the Court finds and concludes that this 
matter did require considerable time and labor. The issues presented required significant skill to 
address, given the uniqueness of the issue. The "experience and ability of the attorneys" of Hall 
in this "particular field of law" was high and necessary. The total hours billed appears to be 
reasonable given the amount of work performed and the caliber of the representation. 
At oral argument, Lewies argued without rebuttal that Hall offered his services to the 
County at the rate of$150 per hour in a letter dated November 20, 2012. The County agreed to 
retain him on those terms. 17 The Court finds that this is an appropriate and reasonable rate, 
absent evidence that the County actually paid more than $150 for Hall's services. 18 This is well 
within the range of ''the prevailing charges for like work" in Eastern Idaho and consistent with 
the understanding reached between Hall and the County. In the exercise of its discretion, the 
Court will reduce Hall's requested fee accordingly and concludes that a fee of$1,185.00 is an 
16 Notice of Withdraw~/ of Motion to Represent Fremont County, p. 5 
17 In the letter, Hall offered his fees to the County at the rate of $150 per hour. Acceptance of the offer by the 
County was noted by the signatures of the County Commissioners (Ronald Hurt, LeRoy Miller, and Jordon 
Stoddard) on the attached page. See Letter to Fremont County Board of Commissioners (November 20, 2012). The 
County made no objection the Court's consideration of the letter and offered no rebuttal to the assertion that Hall 
was actually paid no more than $150.00 per hour for his work on this matter. 
18 
At the hearing and in briefing, Lewies argued that as a salaried deputy Hall's fee amounted to only $20.13 per 
hour. This questionable assertion is based on the unsubstantiated assumption that Hall, who was previously paid 
$805.94 per week by the County, was actually working for 40 hours per week for the County. 
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appropriate sanction under Rule 11 (a)( 1) and a reasonable amount of attorney fees under Rule 
54(e)(3). 19 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court is mindful of the animosity that has attended these proceedings; however, it 
remains hopeful that the resolution of this portion of the case will allow the parties to move 
forward constructively on the merits of the pending matters. Although there were serious lapses 
in judgment in how these matters were initiated, much wisdom was evident in the ultimate 
decision by Lewies and Dustin to withdraw their efforts to represent the County in these two 
matters. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby rules as follows: 
A. Lewies' conduct in filing the petitions against the County, failing to 
promptly withdraw as attorney for Petitioners, and initially refusing to allow Hall 
to represent the County on these matters, was clearly misguided and amounted to 
sanctionable misconduct under Rule 11(a)(l), as interpreted by the Idaho 
appellate courts in Campbell and Lester; and 
B. Fremont County's request for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART. 
The County is hereby awarded $1,185.00 in attorney fees against Karl H. Lewies 
personally, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(l) and Rule 54( e). 
SO ORDERED this2j_ty of March, 2013. 
19 7.9 hours@ $150/hour = $1,185. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
2 :Tt4 MEMORANDUM DECISION was this 4 -day of March, 2013, sent via US mail to the 
following individuals: 
Karl H. Lewies 
Ryan Dustin 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
22 W. 1stN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
151 W. N. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109N. 2nd W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
By: 
111 
DATED this 2'1 - day of March, 2013. 
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BERS AT REXBURG, 
UNTY, lDAHO. 
Date. -..L....JL..f=-'...L.:.---41--J-=.;=-...!...-... __ _ 
Time ~=--~~=-~~--r---=---
By 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, et a/, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case Nos. CV-12-580 & CV-12-581 
Petitioners, 
v. ) 
) 
FINAL JUDGMENT ON 
RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
_BO.A@ OF fQJINTYS;QMMISS.JON_!::RS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, eta/, 
1 -- - ------) 
) 
) 
Respondents. ) 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III, eta/, ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) 
) 
v. ' ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the state ofldaho, eta/, ) 
) 
Respondents. ) _____________________________) 
On March 29, 2013, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision re: Rule 11 Sanctions. The 
issues determined by that ruling having been fully adjudicated, and good cause appearing therefore, 
- I'lf IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGEDAND_OECREED thatR.espon,Qent F~ont 
County is granted final judgment against attorney Karl H. Lewies, personally, in the amount~ .... , 
_ ........ ~ n. ~ '"" 
I ........ · 'S'\ 1\ I C / ''• $1,185.00. ...: '\>' ..••••••• c0'•., -~<.. * .·· -,l.V.Ls··. '/·'• ~.:. ........ • • <\) ··~' ::<>:)) ~ ·.-~\ 
:.' ,~:;:,_·........ ~ ~ # 
w·''"'-'<::::;, "'-' ("')o ~ ~ , __ :~ ~) o: • " 
~ ' .. o •,;::s:: ~~ c:::-: c.-::.~ 
f ~~.o ·'-"' ;:...•r,..~., 
,.....__,.._..,.........,_ e t ... ~·· ~ ~.,~ 
'.. :11\ \. ··~'."<::.::.·: 
'•/,ly•. v •• • • .:::.,.·-,: 
SO ORDERED this 4th day of April, 2013. 
•• "'IJ ·····'\l \.~ .... ----------. _ . . •. ,,tam '\:. __ .... 
' ' .,,,,,, ........ 
1 Since Lewies is not a party to this action, it is unnecessary for the ourt to issue a Rule 54(b) certificate. See In re 
Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 578, 733 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[W]e do not believe that the Supreme 
Court intended the certification provision to apply to nonparties, at least where all involvement with the suit has been 
severed.") Although this is not a contempt proceeding, the Court believes the circumstances are analogous to those set 
forth in Reeves. By not issuing a Rule 54(b) certificate, the Court avoids the potential delay Rule 54(b)(2) may impose. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT ON 
RULE 11 SANCTIONS AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION was this 4th day of April, 2013, sent 
via US mail to the following individuals: 
Karl H. Lewies 
Ryan Dustin 
Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
22 W. 1stN~. ---~ 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Board of Commissioners for Fremont County 
c/o County Clerk 
151 W. N. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
109N. 2nd W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
DATED~4"'CZ?~pril,2013 Ad_ B~d&z:> 
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Lynn Hossner 
Attorney at Law 
• 
Idaho State Bar No. 1074 
1 09 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Attorney for Petitioners 
DISTR:CT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed::.========:;--
M ,\ y 2 ')(\1~) A - , __ '"' 
By: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
' Petitioners 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and 
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF 
FINDING OF A PUBLIC ROAD 
Comes now Lynn Hossner, attorney for Petitioners, and moves this court order vacation 
of that certain order entered by Defendants in the above entitled matter which declared a road 
crossing Petitioners' property as a public road. 
This motion is based upon the file of the case, Petitioners' Brief which has been filed in 
the case and the Affidavit of Lynn Hossner filed simultaneously herewith. 
Petitioners seek their attorney fees and costs as prayed for in their original petition filed 
herein. 
Dated April29, 2013. 
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Lynn Rossner 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State Bar No. 1074 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Attorney for Petitioners 
lSTR:CT SEVEN COURT 
ty of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed:~==========r--
MAY - 2 
By:-------::-----:---::::-;--;-Cern :::;! jrk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
, ) 
Petitioners ) 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and 
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Fremont ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN ROSSNER 
FOR DISMISSAL OF ORDER OF 
PUBLIC ROAD 
Comes now Lynn Rossner, attorney for Petitioners, being first duly sworn, deposes as 
follows: 
1. I was given a copy of the court's Order Governing Proceedings, dated February 12, 
2012 on January 14, 2013. The Order gave Petitioners 35 days to file their brief and Respondent 
28 days to respond to Petitioners' brief after service of notice. Shortly thereafter, I was given a 
transcript of the proceedings before the Fremont County Commissioners in the case. 
2. On February 12, 2013, I filed my Brief in Support of Petitioners' Motion to have the 
road designation set aside. I filed a copy with the court and sent a copy to chambers and to Blake 
Hall, Esq., attorney for the defendant. 
3. On February 15, 2013, this court entered its Order Modifying Briefing Order. That 
Order provided that Petitioner must file its brief within 35 days of the date the transcript was 
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filed with the court. I had already filed my brief to the Order should not have affected my filing. 
4. The February 15, 2013 Order Modifying Briefing Order further provided that 
Respondent's brief shall be filed within 28 days after service of Petitioner's brief. 
5. I filed Petitioners' briefn February 12, 2013 so Respondent should have filed its 
response briefby March 13, 2013. 
6. The Order Modifying Briefing filed February 15, may have extended the time for 
Respondent's brief by three days which would have required a Responsive briefby March 16, 
2013. 
7. If the full thirty-five days was to be computed from February 15, 2013, with an 
additional 28 days for Respondent's brief, Respondent should have filed its brief by April 19, 
2013. 
DATED this 25th day of April2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Fremont ) 
Lynn Hossner, being first duly sworn, says that he is the attorney for petitioners in the 
above entitled matter, that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof, and as to the 
matters and things therein alleged, affiant believes th~~ 
,r 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of April 20.~1··· . 
·~\\\\\ltllrllfll.• ~ ! ~\\\ ,,,,/, ~ . . . # n.\~ PH~i.~ ~ . '- "/ ~ .n."'~ •••••••••• .(\ ~ ~~=-;:~~~~T-7=-=---:::;-.:__.=_ __ _ ~ ~~ .. . . ..,. ~ ' ~ J.;. ••• 0 't A.A..,."\ ~- Notary Public for Idaho ~ i + \ '§. Residing at: Ashton, Idaho 
- • •-
1 = C . 11/ I E \ - 0 : .::= omm. Expues: 14 17 ~ \ .oua\.' / o ~ ~ .. t\·.. ..·· ~~ ~ u·;- "•••••••• <:)~ ~ ~ ~1"E 0~ \ ~~ 
"''''''11111111 ,,,,,,,, ... 
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Lynn Rossner 
Attorney at Law 
• 
Idaho State BarNo. 1074 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Attorney for Petitioners 
• 
DISTRICT SEVEN COL'f"H 
unty of Fremont State of Idaho 1/ed: -
~~~ 
ABBIE MACE, CLERK 
By: -----;::::----[:t:}pt:~y C~L=:i!\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
, ) 
Petitioners ) 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and 
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 29th, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of Petitioners' 
Motion for Dismissal and Affidavit of Lynn Rossner to: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-3001 
Facsimile (208) 523-7254 
Honorable Greg Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Facsimile (208) 356-5425 
METHOD OF SERVICE: 
[]Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [x] Facsimil~ 
SCANNED 
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• 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 3 72-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Real Party in Interest- Appellant 
• DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State ot Idaho 
Flied:..::============;--
MAY - 2 2013] 
"A851~cE, -cL:::t~K 
By: - 'I k C:-f:":y '-' er 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY,EMMAATCHLEY,LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY 
MILLER, in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
E.C. GWALTNEY, III and 
LANA K. VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
Case No. CV-12-581 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
SCANNED 
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) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" ) 
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, in his official capacity, ) 
) 
Respondents. ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY ("County"), RONALD "SKIP" HURT, AND 
LEROY MILLER, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ., AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., appeals the above-named respondents to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment on Rule 11 Sanctions, entered in the 
above-entitled action on the day of April4, 2013, District Judge Gregory Moeller presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment described 
in paragraph 1, above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues. 
a. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV -12-
580 violated the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)? 
b. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV -12-
581 violated the signature certification requirements of I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l )? 
c. Whether the court erred by first awarding attorney's fees to the County based on the 
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prevailing party standard, and subsequently without notice to the parties or 
opportunity to object, changing its award of attorney fees into I.R.C.P. sanctions 
imposed on appellant, sua sponte? 
d. Whether the Court abused its discretion by imposing I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) sanctions 
against appellant based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than on the 
signing of the petitions for judicial review: 
1. Because appellant filed petitions for judicial review against a "known future 
client;" 
11. Because appellant did not realize that the "Fremont County voters were 
entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor 
(i.e. appellant) would not be filing new legal actions against the County;" 
111. Because, by filing the petitions, appellant "initiated a chain of events that 
any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and 
animosity from everyone involved; " 
iv. Because of appellant's "timing" relative to filing the petitions; 
v. Because appellant "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for petitioners; 
vi. Because appellant "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents; 
v11. Because appellant "failed to understand that his actions would almost 
immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel;" 
viii. Because "appellant should have anticipated that his actions would deprive 
his fUture clients, the County and the board of commissioners, of 
representation;" and 
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ix. Because the court found appellant's actions "unseemly?" 
e. Whether the Court erred in finding that the appellant "had not withdrawn as counsel 
for the County, " insofar as appellant at no time represented the County in either CV-
12-580 or CV-12-581? 
f. Whether the court erred in finding that appellant's actions "delayed adjudication of 
the petitions for judicial review? " 
g. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate " for the County to have 
retained private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers 
CV-12-580 and CV-12-581, even though the legal question whether the County's 
hiring of private counsel in violation of the Idaho Constitution's "necessity 
requirement" had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the 
Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the court for its 
decision? 
h. Whether the Court erred in finding that appellant was unable to "complete " his 
representation of petitioners? 
1. Whether Judge Gregory Moeller demonstrated bias against appellant by engaging in 
the following actions: 
1. By initiating an ex parte communication with appellant immediately 
following the January 22, 2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting 
appellant into chambers and proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide 
what hill you want to die on." Then, further warning appellant, "This 
conversation never happened; " 
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ii. After issuing warnings to appellant, as described above, then changing his 
ruling awarding attorney's fees to the County based on the prevailing party 
standard into I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) sanctions against appellant, sua sponte, 
without notice or opportunity to object; 
iii. By disregarding appellant's arguments and allegations of unethical conduct 
and improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall, 
Esq.; and 
iv. By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11 
Sanctions against appellant thereby causing damage to appellant's 
professional reputation? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Requested transcripts. 
a. A reporter's transcript is requested. 
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: in [ ]hard copy, [ ] electronic format, [X] both: 
1. The entire January 22, 2013 court hearing (motion to disqualify counsel and 
motion to withdraw); 
n. The entire February 26, 2013, court hearing (objection to attorney's fees); 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Regarding Case No. CV-12-580: 
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012; 
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ii. Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel, filed 1-14-2013; 
iii. Notice of Appearance Lynn Rossner, Esq., filed 1-14-2013; 
tv. Answer to Partial Motion to Dismiss; filed 1-22-2013; 
v. Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition for Review, filed 2-12-
2013; 
v1. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-19-
2013; and 
vii. Notice ofLodging, filed 3-13-2013. 
b. Regarding Case No. CV-12-581: 
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012; 
ii. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-19-
2013; and 
iii. Notice ofLodging, filed 3-13-2013. 
7. Civil Cases Only. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a. Exhibits A and B, attached to the Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition 
for Review, filed 2-12-2013; 
b. Fremont County Official Road Map (2012); and 
c. Letter from Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, to Fremont County Board of County Commissioners, dated November 20, 
2012, and offered as an exhibit during the court hearing held on 2-26-2013. 
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8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the addresses set out below: 
1. Name and address: David Marlow, P.O. Box 1671, Idaho Falls, ID 83403; 
telephone (208) 317-3400. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has been advised that appellant and the reporter, 
David Marlow, have agreed that the fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript 
will be paid once the transcripts are prepared. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served under Rule 20, 
I.A.R. 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Real Party in Interest - Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 2nd day of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names 
either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand 
delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
ATTORNEY ATLAW 
109N. 2ND W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Gregory Moeller, District Judge 
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE 
151 W. 1stN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013. 
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[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
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Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
• 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone: (208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorney for Respondents 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
I 
!Case No. CV-12-580 
! 
! i RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO 
! MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
! 
! 
i 
i 
! 
! 
i 
! 
! 
! 
COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this 
Opposition to Motion for Dismissal as follows: 
SCANNED 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss based on alleged non-compliance with 
the modified filing dates provided by the Court in its Notice of Lodging. On March 13, 2013, 
the Court issued a Notice of Lodging, which identified the relevant dates for responsive briefing 
in this matter. Specifically, the Court's relevant dates were based on a relevant date of April 10, 
2013, which would have been the date wherein the transcript and record would have been 
deemed settled with the Court. From that date, the briefing schedule was calculated. It was 
Respondents' belief that the Petitioner would be filing a modified or augmented brief with the 
Court once the record had been settled. The date by which the Petitioner's brief would have 
been due is May 15, 2013. The Respondents' brief would have been due 28 days following 
service of the Petitioner's brief. 
In this case, given the belief that Petitioners' would file a supplemental brief or statement 
notifying the parties that it's brief had been filed, Respondent's believed that the relevant 
response date would be 28 days after service or June 12, 2013 at the latest. Nevertheless, filed 
concurrently with the instant opposition is Respondents' brief addressing the substantive issues 
raised before the Court. It is well established that the Court should decide a matter on the merits 
and not on a technicality. While Respondents do not believe they have violated the dates 
identified in the Notice of Lodging, considering the Respondents' Brief is filed concurrently 
herewith, there is no prejudice to the Petitioners and the Court should consider and decide this 
matter on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
It is well established under Idaho law that whenever possible, a ruling on the merits of an 
appeal should be rendered. Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978). "[P]rocedural 
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regulations should not be so applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of 
causes upon their substantial merits without delay or prejudice." Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 
121, 247 P.2d 469, 471 (1952). Idaho's rules of civil procedure are to "be liberally construed to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." I.R.C.P. 
1(a). With respect to appeals to the district court, Rule 83(x) provides "these rules shall be 
construed to provide a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all appeals." 
In Bunn v. Bunn, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed a district court's dismissal of 
an appeal from the magistrate division. The dismissal had been entered because of lack of 
diligent prosecution when the appellant failed to timely file a transcript of the magistrate's 
proceedings. Determining that the district court abused its discretion, the Court stated: 
A "determination" of an action within the meaning of [I.R.C.P.] 1 
is meant to be a determination of the controversy on the merits-
not a termination on a procedural technicality which serves 
litigants not at all. A determination entails a finding of the facts 
and an application of the law in order to resolve the legal rights of 
the litigants who hope to resolve their differences in the courts. 
The "liberal construction" of the rules required by Rule 1, while it 
cannot alter compliance which is mandatory and jurisdictional, will 
ordinarily preclude dismissal of an appeal for that which is but 
technical noncompliance. This will be especially so where no 
prejudice is shown by any delay which may have been occasioned. 
Rule 83(s), which governs appeals from magistrate court to district 
court, does not require dismissal for failure of an appellant to 
punctually take any of the required steps; specifically dismissal is 
but a sanction, albeit the ultimate one, for failing to diligently 
process an appeal. Judicial discretion, the exercise of which may 
result in an appeal's dismissal, must be a sound judicial discretion. 
Sound judicial discretion properly exercised will reflect the judicial 
policy of this State developed over many years by case law, and 
lying within the spirit of liberality mandated by Rule 1. 
Id at 712, 587 P.2d at 1247 (emphasis in original). The Bunn court concluded that dismissal for 
noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is discretionary, but "[s]ound judicial 
discretion properly exercised will reflect the judicial policy of this State .... " Jd 
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In the instant matter, Respondents attempted to calendar their responsive briefing 
deadlines based on the Court's Notice of Lodging. Specifically, the Notice stated that the 
briefing schedule would commence fourteen days after the settlement of the record and transcript 
which would have been April 10, 2013-because no objections to the content of the transcript or 
record. From April 10, 2013, the Petitioners' brief was due 35 days following notice that the 
transcript and record was lodged with the Court- or May 15, 2013. Respondents were never 
informed that no supplemental briefing would be filed nor was a notice ever filed with the Court 
that the brief previously filed with the Court would not be altered. Respondents were of the 
belief that either a supplemented brief or a notice that the original brief was being adopted would 
be provided to Respondents. Respondents could not have known that no supplementation would 
be made to Petitioners brief. Without a formal notification that Petitioner's brief was deemed 
filed, Respondents would not have commenced calculating their response date. 
Based on the language of the Notice of Lodging, "Respondents' brief shall be filed within 
28 days after service of Petitioner's brief .... " (Notice of Lodging, p. 2). Without Petitioner's 
brief being served on Respondents' within the time period prescribed by the Notice of Lodging 
or a notice stating that the previously filed brief would not be supplemented, Respondents had no 
way of knowing that no supplementation would be made. The Notice of Lodging would suggest 
that supplementation was permissible because the record had not been settled. It was not until 
the instant motion was filed that Respondents understood that no supplementation to the 
Petitioners' brief would be made. In an effort to comply with the briefing deadlines and avoid 
further delay, Respondents' filed concurrently with the instant opposition their Respondents' 
Brief. Respondents' brief addresses the substantive issues raised by the appeal and allows the 
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Court to made a determination based on factual and substantive issues and not on a mere 
technicality. See Bunn v. Bunn, supra. 
In this case, there is no prejudice on Petitioner allowing Respondents to file their brief. 
In fact, dismissal would be a harsh sanction. In this case, where Respondents believed that a 
filing by Petitioner was required based on the plain language of the Notice of Lodging, there has 
been no violation of the briefing schedule and the Court should accept the filed Respondents' 
Brief and order that Petitioner file a reply brief within 21 days pursuant to the Notice of Lodging. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny Petitioner's 
motion to dismiss and allow the instant appeal to proceed with the filing of a reply brief to the 
Respondents' Brief within 21 days. Consistent with Idaho law, the Court should allow the 
instant matter to be decided on the merits of the case and not on a technicality. Thus, the Court 
should deny Petitioners' motion to dismiss. 
DATED this _I_ day ofMay, 2013. 
Page 5 
Page 211 of 408
"' 1 t -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this _____:z_ day of May, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Rossner 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
JG] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
• 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone: (208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
Attorney for Respondents 
c:srF.:::-:,-;- SE'·'EN COURT 
C'"' oi Fremont State of Idaho 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
COME NOW Respondents, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, 
Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller, by and through counsel of record, and hereby submit this 
Opposition to Petition for Review as follows: 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is a Petition for Judicial Review of the Fremont County Commissioners 
adoption of Ordinance No. 2013.01, which adopted the Official Road Map of Fremont County, 
Idaho. The Ordinance is statutorily required and is designed to designate roads within the 
County as public roads. The Commissioner's review of the Ordinance No. 2013.01 concerned 
all of the roads on the map and their determination was not limited to a specific road. The instant 
Petition for Review concerns a public road that commences at 1425 North 3125 East, in Fremont 
County and travels one quarter of a mile north over the property of Petitioners, George Ty 
Nedrow and David Tuk Nedrow (referred to collectively as "Nedrows"). The same road also 
proceeds north a quarter of a mile over property belonging to Petitioners Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., 
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Picard and Clay Picard (referred to collectively as "Flying 
"A" Ranch"). Ultimately the road reaches U.S. Forest Service land to the south which is blocked 
by a gate. 
Consistent with Idaho law, the Fremont County Commissioners conducted public 
hearings pursuant to authority to ensure the adopted map contained public roads. As required, 
the Commissioners conducted a hearing pursuant to notice and ultimately determined that the 
subject road was a public road. The findings of the Commissioners were consistent with the 
finding that the road was public and their decision was neither arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse 
of discretion. As such, the Court should uphold the decision of the Commissioners and find that 
their determination that the northbound road in dispute is a public R.S. 2477 road and that such 
determination was supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Board of County Commissioners Complied With Idaho Code § 40-202(1 ). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 40-202, Fremont County has an obligation to publish a 
map showing the general location of all highways and rights-of-ways within the County. Prior to 
2013, Fremont County had not adopted an official map designating highways and public rights-
of-way. A "highway" is defined as 
[R]oads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or established for the 
public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. Highways shall 
include necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, 
embankments, retaining walls, bridges, tunnels, grade separation 
structures, roadside improvements, adjacent lands or interests 
lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, 
works or fixtures incidental to the preservation or improvement of 
the highways. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order 
of a board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a 
period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and 
kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by 
order of a board of commissioners, are highways. 
I.C. 40-109(5). The definition of a highway is broad. When initially adopting the official 
highway map, the County Commissions are required to "cause a map to be prepared showing the 
general location of each highway and public right-of-way in their jurisdiction ... " I.C. § 40-
202(1)(a). Once the map has been prepared, the Commissioners "shall cause notice to be given 
of intention to adopt the map as the official map of that system, and shall specify the time and 
place at which all interested persons may be heard." I.C. § 40-202(1)(a). Upon appropriate 
public notice, the Commissioners are required to "adopt the map, with any changes or revisions 
considered by them to be advisable in the public interest, as the official map of the respective 
highway system." I.C. ~ 40-202(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
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In the instant matter, the official road map at issue does not specifically address a single 
road but was the initial adoption of the official map. Because the initial map was being prepared, 
the requirements of Idaho Code § 40-202(1) apply. In this case, there is no dispute that a map 
was prepared showing the general location of each highway and public right-of-way. Notice of a 
public information meeting was disseminated to the public requesting their review of the map 
and public comment. (R., p. 1 ). Three meeting dates were provided to the public to appear and 
comment on the proposed map. (R., p. 1 ). Various individuals provided comments and concerns 
about the map, which was considered by the Commissioners. (R., pp. 2-16). On August 20, 
2012, the Fremont County Commission held a meeting allowing the public to comment on the 
Road Highway map. (R., p. 17). There were some comments on the public nature of some roads 
and changes to the map were made pursuant to a full Commission vote. (R., p. 18). The official 
minutes also reflect that a public hearing on the Official County Highway Map would be held on 
September 27, 2012. (R., p. 18). Notice of the public hearing was also provided. (R., pp. 21-
22). Multiple citizens appeared at the September 27, 2012 hearing and provided comment to the 
Board of Commissioners. Approximately 15 citizens provided commentary at the hearing. (R., 
pp. 26-29). Written commentary was also received and read into the official record. (R., pp. 30-
51, 53 (pp. 46-51)). 
In an October 15, 2012, County Commissioners work meeting, the public comments were 
discussed and a determination was made regarding the status of the roads. During that meeting, 
the Commissioners adopted some changes via a unanimous vote. (R., p. 58). Following public 
hearing, the Commissioners voted to adopt Fremont County Ordinance 2013-01, the Official 
Road Map for Fremont County, Idaho. Commissioner Miller and Hurt voted "yes" for the 
Ordinance while Commissioner Stoddard voted "no." (R., p. 64). Ordinance 2013-01 
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specifically stated that an official map of the County is required, that a map was prepared and 
that the "Board of County Commissioners deems it to be in the best interest of Fremont County, 
Idaho to adopt an Official Road Map for Fremont County, Idaho. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-
202, the County complied with each of the express requirements to adopt a formal road map. 
Specifically, a map was prepared, public notice was provided, public commentary was heard and 
considered and ultimately the Commissioners adopted the official map that was in the best 
interest of the county. All of the requirements for adopting the official road map where met. 
In this matter, the petition is not appropriate because the challenge is specific to a single 
road and not the entire Official Road Map of Fremont County. The County Commissioners 
action did not involve a specific road but rather was the initial adoption of the road map. And as 
addressed above, they complied with the express statutory requirements of Idaho Code§ 40-202. 
Thus, the Court should dismiss the Petition. 
B. The Board Of County Commissioners' Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
Satisfied The Requirements Of Idaho Code § 40-208(7). 
Despite clear compliance with the requirements of Idaho Code § 40-202, the 
Commissioners' findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are not: 
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; 
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) Affected by other error of law; 
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and 
substantial information on the whole record; or 
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion 
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
I.C. § 40-208(7). Petitioner cannot identify any findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions 
that violate this standard. 
RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO RETITION FOR REVIEW- Page 5 
Page 217 of 408
When adopting the official map of Fremont County, the Commissioners issued Finding 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law Re: Official Road Map of Fremont County Idaho. (R., pp. 72-
75). The Commissioners address the statutory requirement for the map and the facts that support 
their conclusions. Specifically, the Commissioners state that the Fremont County Public Works 
Department identified the road and right-of-ways that were included on a County road map and 
researched lTD inventory maps, Forest Service and BLM road maps. (R., p. 72, ~ 5). The Roads 
that were deemed to be Fremont County roads satisfied the following criteria: 
a. The roads are routinely maintained by the Fremont County Road & 
Bridge Department. 
b. Documentation showed the roads have been maintained in the past by 
the Fremont County Road & Bridge Department. 
c. Current or past employees of the Fremont County Road & Bridge 
Department testified that they had performed authorized maintenance 
on the road. 
d. The roads were identified on recorded plats of subdivision as having 
been dedicated to the public. 
e. The roads were shown on government maps (such as Forest Service, 
BLM, State of Idaho) as being public roads. 
f. The roads had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and 
Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or are the sole or essential 
connection to roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads. 
(R., pp. 72-73, ~ 6 (emphasis added)). The Commissioners adopted these facts and applied them 
when making their Conclusions of Law. 
It is important to recognize that the Commissioners did address Petitioners' comments at 
the hearing during an October 15, 2012 work meeting. (SeeR., p. 59, CD recording: Discussion 
commencing at 5:09 through 9:53). The Commissioners did consider the Nedrow's comments 
and agreed that the East-West bound road should be closed. There is no challenge to the 
County's determination on this issue. Rather, the specific challenge is that the northbound road 
should be closed. When the Commissioners specifically reviewed this stretch of road, it was 
determined that the road was an R.S. 2477 road. In specifically considering the road, the 
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Commissioners reviewed an old Shell Oil map from approximately 1957 that identified the road 
as the access to Federal BLM land. As an R.S. 2477 road, the Commissioners are prohibited 
from closing the road. In their Conclusions of Law, when addressing the roads that were 
identified as R. S. 24 77 roads, the Commissions concluded: 
Those roads identified in Exhibit "B" as being R.S.-2477 roads are 
determined by the Fremont County Board of County 
Commissioners as having been asserted under Federal Law R.S. 
2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified 
in official roads in the Fremont County Public Works office. The 
foregoing is supported by substantial and competent evidence 
submitted at the public hearing and is found to be in the public 
interest. 
(R., p. 74, ~ 8). Ultimately, the Commissioners decision of maintaining the disputed road as 
open is supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Commissioners specifically 
declared that maintaining the road as open was in the public interest. Moreover, their decision of 
maintaining the northbound road as open was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion 
because there was a clear and articulated basis for maintaining the road as open. Where this 
Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the Board on questions of fact, the Court should 
uphold the Board of County Commissioners' decision to declare the road in question as public 
R.S. 2477 road. See Homestead Farms v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofTeton County, 141 Idaho 855, 858, 
119 p .3d 630, 633 (2005). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents' respectfully request that the Court uphold its 
decision to maintain the Old Yellowstone Mail Route and Snow Creek road as a public road. 
Respondents specifically request that the Court find that the Commissioners complied with the 
express requirements of Idaho Code § 40-202(1) in adopting an initial official map and that the 
roads included on the Official Road Map of Fremont County Idaho are public roads and that 
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.. , ' .. 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the inclusion of the roads, including the 
road in question, as public roads in Fremont County, Idaho. 
DATED this L day of May, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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this _L_ day of May, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Hossner 
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St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
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I.S.B. Nos. 2434 & 7484 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL 
Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record in the above-captioned matter for 
Respondents. I am over the age of eighteen and am competent to testify. This affidavit is based 
upon my personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. 
SCANNED 
Page 1 
Page 221 of 408
2. That on or about March 13, 2013, Respondents received the Court's Notice of 
Lodging. That the relevant response dates were calendared. 
3. Based on the Court's order, where no objections to the content of the transcript or 
record was made, that the record would be deemed settled on April 10, 2013. The briefing 
schedule was provided from that date. 
4. Based on the Notice of Lodging, it was Respondents understanding that 
Petitioner's brief was to be filed within 35 days of the date wherein the transcript and record 
were filed with the Court- or May 15, 2013. 
5. Respondents believed that Petitioner would either file a supplemental brief with 
the Court or would file a notice stating that the previously filed "Memorandum in Support of 
Petitioners' Petition for Review," which was filed well in advance of the Notice of Lodging, 
would not be supplemented. Respondents had no reason to believe that Petitioner would not 
supplement their brief based on the new filing dates. 
6. It was not until April 30, 2013 that Respondents received any notification that 
Petitioners had no intent to supplement their brief through the filing of the Motion to Dismiss. 
Based on that notice, Respondents brief would be due 28 days later, or May 28, 2013. 
7. To avoid further delay in the resolution of this matter, Respondents have filed the 
Respondents' Brief concurrently with the instant Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 
\ \ 
\\ 
\ \ 
\ \ 
Page2 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said 
State, this_ day of May, 2013. 
No~ 
Residing at: .J Ah ~, ziJ a~I06 
My commission expires: _...t.,__/=2.~6/l._l_...lf ____ _ 
7 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this~ day of May, 2013, by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Rossner 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
[~ailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
L:\BGH\7525- Fremont County files\7525.18 Flying A Ranch\Pleadings\Defendant's\Dismiss (Hall Aft).docx 
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Beck 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
supremecourtdocuments@idcourts.net 
~·------DiSTF\iCT s~v~~i:--:::·:-. 
County of Fremont Sta.te ci l:;ailo 
Filed: ~=========::=Ji __ 
Thursday, May 09, 2013 01:19 PM ABBIE MACE, CLERK 
khlewies@gmail.com; DMARLOW337@AOL.C MI;tP.bie Mace· Beck Harri f 
bghall@nhptlaw.net; gmoeller@co.madison.id. Deputy Clerk 
40987 LEWIES v. BD OF CNTY COMM. FOR FREMONT CNTY (CV2012-580,2012-581) 
40987 CC.pdf; 40987 NOA.pdf 
FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL. CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT DUE 7-15-13 **01-
22-13 HEARING; 2-26-13 HEARING**. SEE ATTACHMENT(S). Please Note: All notices from the Supreme 
Court will be served via email to the district court clerk, the court reporter, the district judge, and counsel of 
record. The Court's email notices to counsel will be sent to the current email address of record according to the 
Idaho State Bar. If you would like others to receive additional electronic notices of the proceedings in this 
appeal please call the Supreme Court Clerk's Office at 334-2210. Prose without a valid email address will be 
served notice via U.S. Mail. Please review the Clerk's Certificate for any errors, if Clerk's Certificate is 
attached. 
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. ~ .W lHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
ZuiJ HAy -l A B~; ~HE STATE OF IDAHO, WAND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
Ft .. "A" RANOt, I:NC., an lclahO CWft~ QiUltt 
AJ~UY, EMMA ATO!li.EY,lAURA P4CWD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TV NEDROW, and DAVID TUK 
NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
and 
KARl H. LEWIES, 
Real Party in Interest-Appellant, 
v. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity, and 
LEROY MILLER, in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
E.C. GWALTNEY, Ill and LANA K. VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of ldatlo, 
RONALD "SKI PH HURT, in his official capacity, and 
L.iaoY MJ,U.ER, in his official capacity, 
Case No. CV-2012..0000580 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Suoreme Court No f/IJtliJ . 
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FREMONT COUNTY. 
HONORABLE JUDGE GREGORY W. MOELLER PRESIDING 
CASE NUMBER FROM COURT: 
ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: 
APPEALED BY: 
APPEALED AGAINST: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: 
CV-2012-0000580 
Final Judgment on Rule 11 Sanctions 
Lynn Hossner, Charles A. Homer 
Blake Hall 
Karl H. Lewies, Real Party in Interest 
Board of County Commissioners, eta I 
May 2, 2013 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAl FilED: N/A 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
APPELLATE FEE PAID: YES 
RESPONDENT OR CROss-RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD FILED: 
N/A 
TRANSCRIPT FILED: 
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED? YES 
DISTRICT COURT REPORTER: DAVID MARLOW 
Dated this 3rd day of May, 2013 
ABBIE MACE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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r DISTRICT SEVEN COURT County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed:~=====::;--Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 41h N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
ZOIJ flAY -1 A 8: 3q 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Real Party in Interest- Appellant 
MAY - 2 2013 
ABSH(~:,ce. CLERK 
Br.--------~~--~~~~ Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENrH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state of RONALD~~~KJP" 
:MILLER, in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
E.C. GWAL1NEY, ill and 
LANA K. VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
Case No. CV-12-581 
Suoreme C.oun No!:iOf/$7 . 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
.......... l
', ¥..J''"" 
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) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" ) 
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY ) 
MILLER, in his official capacity, ) 
) 
R~n&m~. > 
TO: TilE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY ("County''), RONALD ''SKIP'' HURT, AND 
LEROY MILLER, AND THE PARTY'S,,AffORNE.:Y'i' ~~:-¥'HALL, ESQ.;-AND'fHE--' 
CLERK OF TIIE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TIIAT: 
l. The above-named appellant, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., appeals the above-named ~~ 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment on Rule II Sanctions, entered in the 
above-entitled action on the day of April4, 2013, District Judge Gregory Moeller presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment described 
in paragraph l, above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues. 
a. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV-12-
580 violated the signature certification requirements ofi.R.C.P. ll(a)(1)? 
b. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by appellant in case number CV-12-
581violated the signature certification requirements ofi.R.C.P. ll(a)(l)? 
c. Whether the court erred by first awarding attorney's fees to the C01mty based on the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2 
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prevailing party standard, and subsequently without notice to the parties or 
opportunity to object, changing its award of attorney fees into I.RC.P. sanctions 
imposed on appellant, sua sponte? 
d. Whether the Court abused its discretion by imposing I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) sanctions 
against appellant based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than on the 
signing of the petitions for judicial review: 
i. Because appellant filed petitions for judicial review against a "known future 
client;" 
ii. Because appellant <lid not realize that the "Fremont County voters were 
entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor 
(i.e. appellant) would not be filing new legal actions against the County/, 
iii. Because, by filing the petitions, appellant "illilitlted-a ,chtJiii ofevents that 
any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and 
animosity from everyone involved; , 
iv. Because of appellant's "timing" relative to filing the petitions; 
. . . ........... ······--·····~· v. BecayseaweJlant '' delayedin.w..iLhlirmfiflg as counsel" for petitionem; 
vi. Because appellant "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents; 
vii. Because appellant ''failed to understand that his actions would almost 
immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel; " 
viii. Because "appellant should have anticipated that his actions would deprive 
his future clients, the County and the board of commissioners, of 
representation;" and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3 
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ix. Because the court found appellant's actions "unseemly?" 
e. Whether the Court erred in finding that the appellant "had not withdrawn as counsel 
for the County, " insofar as appellant at no time represented the County in either CV-
12-580 or CV..;12-581? 
f. Whether the court erred in finding that appellant's actions .. delayed adjudication of 
the petitions for judicial review?" 
g. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have 
retained private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers 
CV-12-580 and CV-12-581, even though the legal question whether the County's 
hiring of private counsel in violation of the Idaho Constitution's "necessity 
requirement" had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the 
Prosecuting Attorney, and therefete; was not a questkta·.r.smnted to the court for its 
decision? 
h. Whether the Court erred in finding that appellant was unable to "complete, his 
representation of petitioners? 
_ ~----·------~.L Wbetherltvlae CJmaory Mqellc tfrmoostretrd m. apimt ap,pdhmt py mpgins in 
the following actions: 
1. By initiating an ex parte communication with appellant immediately 
following the January 22, 2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting 
appellant into chambers and proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide 
what hill you want to die on. " Then. further warning appellant, "This 
conversation never happened; " 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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ii. After issuing warnings to appellant, as described above, then changing his 
ruling awarding attorney's fees to the Cmmty based on the prevailing party 
standard into I.R.C.P. ll(aXl) sanctions against appellant, sua sponte, 
without notice or opportwrity to object; 
iii. By disregarding appellant's argwnents and allegations of unethical conduct 
. and improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall, 
Esq.; and 
iv. By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11 
4'' ''"' "'Y"""h'"' 
Sanctions against appellant thereby causing damage to appellant's 
professional reputation? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5 :RJ n---'. . • . eq~~~pts. 
a A reporter's transcript is requested. 
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: in [ ]hard copy, [ ] electronic fonnat, [X] both: 
i. The entire Januaty 22, 2013 court h~ ~otion to di!J.•~!fy counsel an~~mm 
motion to withdraw); 
ii. The entire February 26, 2013, court hearing (objection to attorney's fees); 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Regarding Case No. CV-12-580: 
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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ii. Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel, filed 1-14-2013; 
iii. Notice of Appearance Lynn Hossner, Esq., filed 1-14-2013; 
iv. Answer to Partial Motion to Dismiss; filed 1-22-2013; 
v. Memorandmn In Support of Petitioners' Petition for Review, filed 2-12-
2013; 
vi. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-19-
2013; and 
vii. Notice of Lodging, filed 3-13-2013. 
b. Regarding Case No. CV-12-581: 
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012; 
ii. Motion of Withdrawal of Motion to Represent Fremont County, filed 2-19-
2013;and 
iii. Notice of Lodging, filed 3-13-2013. 
7. Civil Cases Only. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a Exhibits A and B, att.acl!~~L!Q the Memorand~ In S1;1PP2rt of Petitioners' Petition"""" 
for Review, filed 2-12-2013; 
b. Fremont County Official Road Map (2012); and 
c. Letter from Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, to Fremont County Board of County Commissioners, dated November 20, 
2012, and offered as an exhibit during the court hearing held on 2-26-2013. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 6 
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8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the addresses set out below: 
i. Name and address: David Marlow, P.O. Box 1671, Idaho Falls, ID 83403; 
telephone (208) 317-3400. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has been advised that appellant and the reporter, 
David Marlow, have agreed that the fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript 
will be paid once the transcripts are prepared. 
c. That the eStimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served under Rule 20, 
I.A.R. 
DATED this 2nd day ofMay, 2013. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Real Party in Interest- AppeU~n,_t ______ _ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 7 
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CERTmCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certi.(y that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 2nd day ofMay, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names 
either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon, or by hand 
delivering. or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TIJCKER 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
LynnHossner~ Esq.----· - -
ATIORNEY ATLAW 
l09N.2NDW. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
HOWEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Gregory Moeller, District Judge 
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE 
151 W.1stN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 8 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
. ··· -· [X] u.s~ Mail· - -· ·: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ]Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
I~,J~· 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
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Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 4380 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite #125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
T: (208) 372-1700 
F: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Real Party in Interest- Appellant 
DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed:r=========::::;--
1 MAY I 3 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
Petitioners, 
and 
KARL H. LEWIES, 
Real Party in Interest-Appellant 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state ofldaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, in his official capacity, and LEROY 
MILLER, in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, BOARD OF COUNTY 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT COUNTY ("County"), RONALD "SKIP" HURT, AND 
LEROY MILLER, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEY, BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ., AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, Karl H. Lewies, Esq., ("Lewies") appeals the above-named 
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment on Rule 11 Sanctions, 
entered in the above-entitled action on the day of April 4, 2013, District Judge Gregory 
Moeller presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment described 
in paragraph 1, above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(1), Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
3. Preliminary Statement oflssues. 
a. Whether the Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) sanctions 
against Lewies based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of 
Rule 11 's signature certification requirements: 
i. Because Lewies filed the petition for judicial review against a "known 
future client; " 
ii. Because Lewies did not realize that the "Fremont County voters were 
entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor 
(i.e. Lewies) would not be filing new legal actions against the County;" 
iii. Because, by filing the petition, Lewies "initiated a chain of events that any 
reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and 
animosity from everyone involved; " 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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IV. Because ofLewies' "timing" relative to filing the petition; 
v. Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for petitioners; 
vi. Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents; 
vn. Because Lewies "failed to understand that his actions would almost 
immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel;" 
viii. Because "Lewies should have anticipated that his actions would deprive his 
future clients, the County and the board of commissioners, of 
representation;" and 
IX. Because the court found Lewies' actions "unseemly." 
b. Whether the petition for judicial review filed by Lewies in case number CV-12-580 
violated the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)? 
c. Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel for 
the County" insofar as Lewies never represented the County in case number CV -12-
580 in the first instance? 
d. Whether the court erred in finding that Lewies' actions "delayed adjudication of the 
petition for judicial review? " 
e. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have 
retained private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case number 
CV-12-580 even though the legal question whether the County's hiring of private 
counsel in violation of the Idaho Constitution's "necessity requirement" had been 
voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, and 
therefore, was not a question presented to the court for its decision? 
f. Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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representation of petitioners? 
g. Whether Judge Gregory Moeller demonstrated bias or prejudice against Lewies by 
engaging in the following actions: 
i. By initiating an ex parte communication with Lewies immediately following 
the January 22, 2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting Lewies into 
chambers and proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide what hill you 
want to die on. " Then, further warning Lewies, "This conversation never 
happened; " 
n. After issuing warnings to Lewies, as described above, then changing his 
award of attorney's fees to the County based on the prevailing party standard 
under I.C. § 12-117 into I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) sanctions against Lewies sua 
sponte; 
iii. By disregarding Lewies' arguments and allegations of unethical conduct and 
improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq.; 
and 
iv. By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11 
Sanctions against Lewies thereby causing damage to Lewies' professional 
reputation? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Requested transcripts. 
a. A reporter's transcript is requested. 
b. The Lewies requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: in [ ]hard copy, [ ] electronic format, [X] both: 
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1. The entire January 22, 2013 court hearing (motion to disqualify counsel and 
motion to withdraw); 
ii. The entire February 26,2013, court hearing (objection to attorney's fees); 
6. Lewies requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition to 
those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Regarding Case No. CV -12-580: 
i. Order Governing Procedure on Review, filed in chambers 12-3-2012; 
n. Motion to Disqualify Counsel, filed 01-07-2013; 
iii. Motion to Withdraw, filed 01-07-2013; 
iv. Affidavit ofKarl H. Lewies, filed 01-07-2013; 
v. Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel, filed 01-14-2013; 
vi. Notice of Appearance Lynn Rossner, Esq., filed 01-14-2013; 
vn. Answer to Partial Motion to Dismiss; filed 01-22-2013; 
viii. Objection to Attorney's Fees, filed 01-31-2013; 
ix. Order on Motions; filed 02-04-2013; 
x. Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition for Review, filed 02-12-
2013; 
xi. Notice of Withdrawal ofMotion to Represent Fremont County, filed 02-19-
2013; 
xii. Notice ofLodging, filed 03-13-2013; 
xiii. Memorandum Decision Re: Rule 11 Sanctions, filed 03-29-2013; 
xiv. Judgment- Final Judgment On Rule 11 Sanctions; filed 04-04-2013; 
xv. Motion for Dismissal of Finding of a Public Road; filed 05-02-2013; 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
Page 239 of 408
xvi. Affidavit of Lynn Rossner, Esq. for Dismissal of Order of Public Road, filed 
05-02-2013. 
7. Civil Cases Only. Lewies requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a. Exhibits A and B, attached to the Memorandum In Support of Petitioners' Petition 
for Review, filed 02-12-2013; 
b. Fremont County Official Road Map (2012); and 
c. Letter from Blake G. Hall, Fremont County Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, to Fremont County Board of County Commissioners, dated November 20, 
2012, and offered as an exhibit during the court hearing held on 02-26-2013. 
8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the addresses set out below: 
i. Name and address: David Marlow, P.O. Box 1671, Idaho Falls, ID 83403; 
telephone (208) 317-3400. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has been advised that Lewies and the reporter, 
David Marlow, have agreed that the fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript 
will be paid once the transcripts are prepared. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served under Rule 20, 
I.A.R. 
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DATED this 13th day ofMay, 2013. 
;c::r/_/~ 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. Y 
Real Party in Interest - Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Rexburg, Idaho; that on the 13th day of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses 
below their names either by depositing said document in the U.S. Mail with correct postage thereon, 
or by hand delivering, or by transmitting by facsimile, as set forth below: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
ATTORNEY ATLAW 
109N. 2ND W. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Gregory Moeller, District Judge 
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE 
151 W. l 5tN. 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
DATED this 13th day of May, 2013. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 8 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVIDTUK NEDROW, ) 
' ) 
Petitioners ) 
vs 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, RONALD 
"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity and 
LEROY MILLER in his official capacity, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-12-580 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANTS 
Comes now Lynn Rossner, attorney for Petitioners, and in response to Defendants' 
Memorandum in opposition to Petitioners' Petition For Judicial Review of the proceedings of the 
Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, hereinafter termed "the Board," 
hereby submits the following. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants claim the roads in question are R.S. 2477 roads and are thereby public roads. 
Defendants made their determination with no evidence at the hearings or in the transcript of the 
proceedings that indicates the roads in question were 1) established prior to the removal of the 
land from the public domain, 2) that the roads were established in Idaho by use as such for five 
years. 3) that it was shown that the local government accepted the roads from the federal 
government while the lands were in the public domain. 
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ARGUMENT. 
The Supreme Court of the State ofldaho has held that the county, in a road validation 
proceeding, must have substantial and competent evidence before a road is classified as a 
public road. Clifford Gali v. Idaho Countv, 146 Idaho 155. (Idaho 2008), 191 P3rd 234; Sopatvk 
v. Lemhi Countv, 151 Idaho 809 (Idaho 2011), 264 P3rd 916; Farrell v. Board of Commissioners 
of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378 (Idaho 2002), 64 P3rd, 311. The requirement for designation of 
an R.S. 2477 road are as follows: 
1) If the right of a party is affected, a decision of the board must be supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
2) The road must have been established prior to the lands removal from the public 
domain. 
3) Roads may also be established in Idaho by use as such for five years. Kirk v. Schultz, 
63 Idaho 278, 284. The use must be regular public use and not casual or desultory use. Kirk, 63 
Idaho at 282-283. 
4) To be classified an R.S. 2477 road, it must be shown that the local government 
accepted the road from the federal government. 
Revised Statute 24 77 is found in Section 8 of the Mining Law of 1866 which granted 
states and territories unrestricted rights-of-way over federal lands that had no existing 
reservations or private entities. The Idaho case of Farrell v. Board of Commissioners of Lemhi 
County, 138 Idaho 378 (Idaho 2002), 64 P3rd, 311 is the leading case on R.S. 2477 roads in 
Idaho and I quote. "The federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads provided that the right of way for 
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." 
43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866) (repealed 1976). To be valid it must be shown that the local 
government accepted the road from the federal government. This Court explained in Kirk v. 
Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 119 P .2d 266, 268 (1941 ), that in order for there to be an acceptance of a 
congressional grant of a right-of-way for a public highway under this statute, "there must be 
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either use by the public for such a period of time, and under such conditions as to establish a 
highway under the laws of this State; or there must be some positive act or acts on the part of the 
proper public authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with respect to the 
particular highway in question." Under R.S. 2477 a public road maybe created under the state 
road creation statute or where there is a positive act of acceptance by the local government. The 
Kirk case is not explicit as to whether the second approach is independent of the state statute or if 
both ofthe two requirements for R.S. 2477 roads are reiterations of the requirements as already 
found in the state statute. The difference is important since the second method requiring any 
"positive act" is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state road creation statute. 
Considering the language in Kirk it appears that there are two separate methods and that a 
positive act of acceptance need not be coextensive with the road creation statute." 
In the Farrell case, the court held an "R.S. 2477" road was created because "The Board of 
County Commissioners' minutes stated in 1901 that "be it resolved by the Board that the 
dedication of same [Indian Creek Road] be and the same is hereby accepted, and it is hereby 
ordered that said above described road be added to and made a part of Road District No. I and 
said road with plat as presented be recorded as provided by law. The petition from the miners is 
pasted in the old leather-bound County book, and the minutes are there as well. There was a 
clear manifestation of an intent to accept the road." 
No evidence was presented in the case at bar that Fremont County ever did a "positive 
act" to accept the road before it passed Ordinance No. 203.01 on October 29, 2012. Likewise, 
there was no evidence presented that "there was use by the public for such a period of time, and 
under such conditions as to establish a highway under the laws of this State." Also, there was no 
evidence that the road was ever maintained by Fremont County, and in fact, at page 27 of the 
transcript of testimony at the public hearings. Tuk Nedrow testified "The road going north on his 
property has never had any county equipment on it either. These roads go through their farms 
and stated that these roads do not lead to anything." 
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There was no evidence presented which established that the roads in question were in 
existence prior to the time over which the road traveled became private property. The hearing 
exhibits which were relied upon consisted of 1) A Fremont County Official Road Map dated 
2012. 2) A West Rattlesnake FB38 map dated July 11, 2001. 3) An exhibit marked as Exhibit 
"A" which is an undated map showing sections, townships and ranges with no reference to roads. 
4) A document which is entitled "REQUEST FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND ASSERTION 
OF RIGHTS OF WAY UNDER FEDERAL LAW R.S. 2477 AND IDAHO CODE SECTION 
40-204A which purports to identify R.S. 2477 roads in Fremont County, Idaho. That exhibit 
refers to three maps dated between 1951 and 1993. The exhibit states "The above referenced 
right of way have been public from the time of construction and first use." (There is no 
indication of the time of construction and first use contained in the document). Further, the 
Exhibit goes on to state that "No R.S. 2477 right of way, route, or site with the route to it in this 
affidavit shall be considered in any manner as any form of proof of a right of way through any 
private lands at the date and time of recording this affidavit in county records or elsewhere." 
This Exhibit was recorded with the Fremont County Recorder on March 6, 2007. 5) Exhibit "B" 
is an undated map showing various roads in Township 10 North, Range 41, E.,B.M. 
There is no indication in the Exhibits as to when the roads or trails were established, 
whether the lands were private at the time the roads and trails were established and whether there 
was any action which acknowledged these roads or trails as R.S. 2477 roads while the lands were 
public lands. 
I 
THE OLD YELLOWSTONE MAIL ROUTE ROAD AND SNOW CREEK ROAD 
The county map showing the roads which were proposed to be accepted as public roads, 
is an undated map attached as an exhibit to the transcript of the proceedings. The map contains a 
road which has been designated by various witnesses as "the Old Yellowstone Mail Route Road 
and Snow Creek road, ("the Subject Road"). This road travels through property belonging to 
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Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard and Nedrow. The Subject road starts four miles West of 
Ashton, Idaho and one mile north. The road commences on the north side of an existing Fremont 
county Road at 1425 North 3125 East and travels North through the NW1/4SW1/4 of Section 
20, Township 9 N., R. 42 E.,B.M which belongs to Nedrows. The "REQUEST FOR 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND ASSERTION OF RIGHTS OF WAY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
R.S. 2477 AND IDAHO CODE SECTION 40-204A, hereinafter referred to as REQUEST, does 
not identify any road traveling through the NW114SW1/4 of Section 20, Township 9 N., R. 42 
E.,B.M which belongs to Petitioners, Nedrow. (See para. 247, p. 20, REQUEST). The 
Defendants' declared this section of the Old Yellowstone Mail Route as a public road. There 
was no evidence presented at any of the hearings that this particular stretch of road was in 
existence prior to 1976, that it was a highway as required by R.S. 24 77, that this particular stretch 
of road was a traveled road or that there was an acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority as 
required by Farrell prior to its passage over private property. 
The road continues North through the SW1/4SW1/4 of Section 20, Township 9 North, 
Range 42 E.B.M. which belongs to Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard. The road than proceeds 
North through the NW1/4NW114 of Section 20, Township 9 North, Range 42 E.,B.M. and thence 
North through the Sl/2SW1/4 Section 17, Township 9 North, Range 42 E.,B.M. which belongs 
to the United States government. The road then proceeds North along the West Section line of 
the Wll/2NW1/4 of Section 17, Township 9 North, Range 42, E.B.M., thence North through the 
Wl/2SE1/4 of Section 8, Township 9 North, Range 42, E.,B.M which also belongs to 
Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard. 
The REQUEST, which is part ofthe transcript, indicated that there was a "highway" 
through the Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard property described above. There is no 
identification of this road as being in existence prior to the above described property becoming 
private property or before 1976 when R.S.2477 was repealed. There was no evidence presented 
that it was a traveled road or that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority 
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as required by Farrell to make it an R.S. 2477 road. 
After the road leaves the Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard property on the North, it 
continues North through Sections 8 and 5 of Township 9 North, Range 42 E.,B.M., which 
belongs to Harrigfeld. The U.S. Forest has the road blocked from the point where it enters its 
property on the North section line of the Harrigfeld property. The REQUEST does not describe 
an R.S. 2477 road as traveling through Sections 8 and five of Township 9 N., R. 42 E.,B.M 
which belongs to Harrigfelds. (See para. 24 7, p. 20, REQUEST). There is no identification of 
this road as being in existence prior to the property being in private hands or before 1976 when 
R.S. 2477 was repealed. No evidence was presented that this particular stretch was a traveled 
road or that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority as required by 
Farrell. 
Defendants acknowledge that the U.S. Forest Service has blocked the road between its 
property and the Harrigfeld property. If the road through the Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard, 
Nedrow property is an R.S. 2477 road, there is no access from the North through the U.S. 
Government property or the Harrigfeld property nor from the South through the Nedrow 
property. Thus, if it is a public road, it is isolated with no access. Clearly there never was an 
intention to create a public road under R.S. 2477 with no access to it either from the North or 
South. Without evidence that the road was established prior to 1976 across the Nedrow, 
Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard property, and was, that it was "used by the public for such a 
period of time, and under such conditions as to establish a highway under the laws of this State, 
or there was some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public authorities which clearly 
manifested an intention to accept such grant with respect to the particular highway in question." 
Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 119 P.2d 266, 268 (1941 ), the road cannot be a public road under 
R.S.2477. 
There is no evidence that the road was created by a common law dedication or that there 
was a filing and recording of a plat or map to indicate the intent on the part of the owner to make 
Page 6 of 8 
Page 249 of 408
a donation to the public. There is no evidenced that the property was purchased by specific 
reference to a plat which indicated the road was public. 
II 
UNNAMED TRAIL LOCATED IN SECTION 15, T. 9 N. R. 42 E.,B.M. 
The county map which outlined the roads which were proposed to be accepted as public 
roads is undated. The map contains a road, which is described as located in Section 15, 
Township 9 N., Range 42 E.,B.M. and is described as Number 247 on the REQUEST. The road 
described is wholly contained within property belonging to Atchley/Flying "A" Ranch/Pickard. 
There was no testimony presented as to whether or not this road was a traveled road for 
five years and became a public road because of that fact. Further, there was no evidence 
presented that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance by an authority as required by 
Farrell to make it an R.S. 2477 road. Thus, the road could not be classified a public road under 
either legal requirement nor was substantial and competent evidence presented. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard is clear. As stated in Clifford Gali v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155. (Idaho 
2008), 191 P3rd 234; Sopatvk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809 (Idaho 2011), 264 P3rd 916; 
Farrell v. Board of Commissioners ofLemhi County, 138 Idaho 378 (Idaho 2002), 64 P3rd, 311, 
in order to meet the requirements of an R.S. 2477 road Fremont County must determine: 
1) If the right of a party is affected, a decision of the board must be supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
2) The roads must have been established prior to the lands removal from the public 
domain. 
3) If the Roads were established in Idaho by use as such for five years, Kirk v. Schultz, 
63 Idaho 278, 284, the use must be regular public use and not casual or desultory use. Kirk. 
4) There was no evidence presented, let alone the evidence being substantial and 
competent, that either of the two roads were in existence prior to the above described property 
Page 7 of 8 
Page 250 of 408
becoming private property or before 1976 when R.S.2477 was repealed. 
5) There was no evidence presented that there was some acknowledgment or acceptance 
by an authority as required by Farrell to make the roads R.S. 2477 roads. 
Because of the lack of substantial and competent evidence of compliance with the law, 
the defendants' decision must be overturned. 
upon: 
DATED this 16th day of May 2013. 
LYNNH SNER 
Attorney for Petitioners -' 
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[ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [ x ] Facsimile / / _4 
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t ----- -·-"" 
ORDER CONDOLIDATING APPEALS 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40987-2013 
(41132-2013) 
Fremont County No. 2012-580 
(2012-581) 
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It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of 
judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 40987 and appeal No. 41132 shall be 
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 40987, but all documents filed shall bear 
both docket numbers. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S 
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with a 
copy of this Order. It is noted that the Reporter's Transcripts requested in the consolidated cases 
have previously been prepared and filed with the District Court. 
DATED this 25TH day of June 2013. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
District Court Judge 
For the Supreme Court 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC. An Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) 
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NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) 
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LYNN ROSSNER 
Attorney at Law 
• 
Idaho State Bar No. 107 4 
1 09 North 2nd West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Attorney for Petitioners 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC. An Idaho corporation ) 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA ) Case No. CV-12-580 
PICKARD, CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TY ) 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) ON PETITONERS' APPEAL 
Petitioners, ) 
VS. ) 
) 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" ) 
HURT, in his official capacity and LEROY MILLER ) 
in his official capacity, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
TO: The Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt, 
Leroy Miller and their attorney of record, Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Petitioners will bring up for hearing their Notice of Appeal on 
August 27, 2013 at 3:000:p.m. at the Fremont County Courthouse, St. Anthony, Idaho. 
Dated this 3rd day of August 2013. ~
Ly ossn r 
SCANNeD 
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"SKIP" HURT, in his official capacity, and ) 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Fremont 
HONORABLE GREGORY W. MOELLER, District Judge, Presiding 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC 
343 E. 4th N., Suite 125 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: (208) 372-1700 
Facsimile: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Attorney for Real Party in Interest- Appellant 
W. Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
109 N. 2nd West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Telephone: (208) 624-3782 
Facsimile: (208) 624-3783 
Attorney for Petitioners - Flying A Ranch, et. al. 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL, ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 522-3003 
Facsimile: (208) 656-7108 
bgh@hasattorneys.com 
Attorney for Respondents 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorney for Petitioners- Gwaltney, et. al. 
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The Real Party In Interest - Appellant, Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies"), submits this brief in 
support ofhis appeal from the final decision of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
in and for Fremont County (the "Court"). 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
The Court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Lewies, sua sponte, because the presiding judge 
found it "unseemly" that Lewies, as a prosecuting attorney- elect for Fremont County, would 
file petitions for judicial review against the board of county commissioners for Fremont County 
("Commissioners"), a known future client. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 23-25; p. 5, lines1-2; p. 5,lines 
23-25; p. 6, lines 22-23; p. 9, lines 8-9; and R. 182 at 188.) Although Judge Moeller found no 
ethical or legal violations (R. 182 at 188), he believed Lewies had filed the petitions because of a 
"political grudge"1 against the Commissioners. As the Court itself said to Lewies, "This may 
sound like a rhetorical question, but it really isn't a rhetorical question. What were you thinking 
filing these Petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were elected to be Fremont 
County Prosecuting Attorney?" (Transcript p. 4, lines 23-25; and p. 5, lines 1-2) 
B. Statement of Facts 
On November 20, 2012, Lewies was contacted by a private client, Mr. Clen Atchley, 
owner of Flying "A" Ranch, who requested Lewies' assistance on an urgent legal matter. Mr. 
1 See R.182 at 189, footnote 14, where Judge Moeller writes that, "the Court merely advised [Lewies] to avoid 
allowing a political grudge (emphasis added) to interfere with his professional judgment." 
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Atchley explained that the Commissioners had recently adopted an official county road map (the 
"Map") depicting a private ranch road owned by Atchley, and others, as a Fremont County 
public road. (R. 65). In reviewing the Map, Lewies discovered that another private road 
belonging to family friend, Mr. Eugene Gwaltney, III, was also depicted as a Fremont County 
public road. (R. 65). Atchley and Gwaltney, respectively, requested Lewies file petitions for 
judicial review to preserve and protect their legal rights; and Lewies agreed to do so, with the 
caveat that he would have to withdraw from representing Atchley and Gwaltney soon after filing 
their petitions because he was the prosecuting attorney - elect for Fremont County and would be 
sworn-in to office as Fremont County's prosecuting attorney in mid-January, 2013 thereby 
giving rise to an actual conflict of interest on that date. Lewies accepted the limited 
representation (R. 65) and on November 23, 2012, filed two petitions for judicial review 
concerning the Map, one for Flying "A" Ranch, et. a!. (R. 8) and the other for Gwaltney, et. a!. 
(R. 256). On December 5, 2012, presiding district judge, Gregory W. Moeller, issued his Orders 
Governing Procedure on Review. (R. 15 and R. 263). 
On January 7, 2013, in his final week as deputy prosecuting attorney for Fremont 
County,2 Blake G. Hall, Esq. ("Hall"), filed motions to disqualify Lewies3 (R. 18 and R. 271); 
2 Blake G. Hall, Esq., was serving his final week as deputy prosecuting attorney for Joette C. Lookabaugh, Esq., the 
lame-duck Fremont County prosecuting attorney who had recently lost her bid for re-election to Lewies, her political 
opponent, by a margin of 65% to 35%. As District Judge Gregory W. Moeller, himself, stated, "[A]nd, again, I 
understand that there's been acts of pettiness between these parties on other matters at other times, but there needs 
to come a time when that ends and I'm going to do what I can to see that it ends in this case ... " (Transcript p. 34, 
lines 15-19). 
3 Lewies argued that, "I believe that Blake Hall filed his motion to disqualify me for an improper purpose, to 
harass me." (R.64 at 65, ~ 10). As evidence of this, Lewies pointed out to the Court that, "Mr. Hall failed to make 
any good faith effort to corifer or attempt to confer with me" before filing his motions to disqualifY. "And Your 
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and also on that same day, Lewies filed motions to withdraw from representation in both cases. 
(R. 32 and R. 266). On January 14, 2013, pursuant to a stipulation for substitution of counsel, 
W. Lynn Rossner, Esq., substituted for Lewies as petitioners' counsel in Case No. CV-12-580. 
(R. 42). On January 22, 2013, the Court conducted a hearing on Hall's motions to disqualify 
Lewies and also on Lewies' motions to withdraw. Initially, the Court "allowed Mr. Lewies to 
withdraw" (Transcript p. 24, lines 12-13 ); but later reversed itself, instead ruling that it, "bars 
Mr. Lewies from further representing Petitioners or Respondents" (R. 1 06, ~ 1 ); but then, even 
later, it its Memorandum Decision took a different and most unusual posture that it had, 
"effectively grant[ed] both the motion to disqualify and the motion to withdraw." (R. 184). The 
Court also ordered Lewies to personally pay $1,185.00 in attorney's fees for Hall's work on the 
motions to disqualify. (R. 182 at 191). 
On January 30, 2013, Hall filed his affidavit of attorney's fees (R. 50) and the next day 
Lewies filed his objection to attorney's fees. (R. 54). On February 26, 2013, the Court 
conducted a hearing on its award of attorney's fees. (Transcript, p. 40). On March 29, 2013, the 
Court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: Rule 11 Sanctions ("Memorandum Decision"). (R. 
182). On April4, 2013, the Court entered its final judgment re: Rule 11 sanctions ("Judgment"). 
(R. 194). On May 2, 2013, Lewies filed a notice of appeal (R. 200); and on May 13,2013 Lewies 
Honor, this would have saved you all this hassle if [Hall] picked up the phone and said, 'Hey, Karl, looks like 
you've got a conflict on the horizon there, what are you going to do, are you going to hang onto those private clients 
and try to play both sides of this game?' I'd say absolutely not. In fact, I've made it clear to my clients on the day I 
accepted representation I'm going to have to withdraw ... Jf that call had been made, Your Honor, and under the 
Rule I I of the Rules of Civil Procedure that sort of a reasonable inquiry is to be made before filing Motions. I mean, 
you know, you have to inquire ... there is a standard for a reasonable inquiry before filing documents, Rule 11. " 
(Transcript p. 61, lines 15-25; p. 64, lines 18-21; and p.65, lines 7-8). 
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filed an amended notice of appeal in CV-12-580 (R. 236) and a notice of appeal in CV-12-581. 
(R. 325). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l) sanctions against 
Lewies based on the following extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of Rule 11 's signature 
certification requirements: 
(a.) Because Lewies filed the petition for judicial review against a "known future 
client;" 
(b.) Because Lewies did not realize that the "Fremont County voters were entitled 
to expect that the person they had just elected as County prosecutor (i.e. Lewies) would 
not be filing new legal actions against the County; " 
(c.) Because, by filing the petition, Lewies "initiated a chain of events that any 
reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity 
from everyone involved; " 
(d.) Because ofLewies' "timing" relative to filing the petition; 
(e.) Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for petitioners; 
(f.) Because Lewies "delayed in withdrawing as counsel" for respondents; 
(g.) Because Lewies ''failed to understand that his actions would almost 
immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel; 
(h.) Because "Lewies should have anticipated that his actions would deprive his 
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST- APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 10 
Page 265 of 408
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
fUture clients, the County and the board of commissioners, of representation;" and 
(i.) Because the court found Lewies' actions "unseemly." 
2. Whether the petitions for judicial review filed by Lewies in either case number CV-12-
580 or CV-12-581violated the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)? 
3. Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel for the 
County" insofar as Lewies never represented the County in either case number CV-12-580 or CV-
12-581in the first instance? 
4. Whether the court erred in finding that Lewies' actions "delayed adjudication of the 
petitions for judicial review? " 
5. Whether the Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have retained 
private legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-
581 even though the legal question whether the County's hiring of private counsel in violation of 
the Idaho Constitution's "necessity requirement" had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the 
Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the court for its 
decision? 
6. Whether the Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his 
representation of petitioners? 
7. Whether Judge Gregory W. Moeller demonstrated bias or prejudice against Lewies by 
engaging in the following actions: 
(a.) By initiating an ex parte communication with Lewies immediately following the 
January 22,2013 court hearing in this matter by inviting Lewies into chambers and 
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proceeding to warn him, "You have to decide what hill you want to die on." Then, 
further warning Lewies, "This conversation never happened; " 
(b.) After issuing warnings to Lewies, as described above, then changing his award 
of attorney's fees to the County based on the prevailing party standard under I. C. § 
12-117 into I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) sanctions against Lewies sua sponte; 
(c.) By disregarding Lewies' arguments and allegations of unethical conduct and 
improper purposes engaged in by the County's counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq.; and 
(d.) By issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision Regarding Rule 11 
Sanctions against Lewies thereby causing damage to Lewies' professional reputation? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Scope of Review on Appeal. 
The abuse of discretion standard is used to review the award of sanctions under I.R.C.P. 
11(a)(1). Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Company, 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 
993 (Idaho 1990). The sequence of inquiry is: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley v. 
Idaho Power, supra, (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
Idaho's adoption of amended Rule 11, containing language identical to the Federal Rule, 
presumably carries with it the interpretation placed upon that language by the federal courts. 
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Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,785 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1990). Both amended rules require 
that pleadings, motions and other papers meet certain criteria, and failure to comply may result in 
the imposition of sanctions. I.R.C.P. 11, as amended, provides in pertinent part: 
(a)(1) Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions. Every pleading, 
motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 
one (1) licensed attorney of record ofthe state ofldaho, in the attorney's individual name, 
whose address shall be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state the 
party's address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings 
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or 
other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. (emphasis added) If a 
pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a 
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
A trial court's decision to impose sanctions under Rule 11 is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 
(1990). As to fact findings, the trial court abuses its discretion when its findings are clearly 
erroneous. Ibid. As to questions of law, the trial court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets 
or misapplies the law. Id. 
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Federal court decisions regarding Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 hold that the "bad faith" standard is 
no longer applicable. Rather, the federal courts apply an objective standard of "reasonableness 
under the circumstances." Durrant v. Christensen, supra, (citations omitted). In Zaldivar v. City 
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
subjective bad faith in not an element to be proved under Rule 11, but sanctions shall be assessed 
if the pleading is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation. In Eastway 
Construction Com. v. City ofNew York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.1985) the circuit court of appeals 
held that "the language of Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on 
each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is 
signed ... A showing of subjective bad faith is no longer required to trigger the sanctions imposed 
by the rule." Durrant, supra, (citing Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 
1986), and Eastway Construction Com. v. City ofNew York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.1985)). 
In light of the federal decisions interpreting language that is identical to that contained in 
the Idaho version of Rule 11, the Idaho Supreme Court held that reasonableness under the 
circumstances, and a duty to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing an action, is the 
appropriate standard to apply. A showing of subjective bad faith is no longer necessary for the 
imposition of sanctions. Durrant, supra. 
B. The Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l) sanctions against Lewies 
based on extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of Rule 11 signature certification requirements. 
The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings. CO Intern. Co. Inc. v. Rochem Intern. 
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Inc., USA, 659 FJd 53, 62, (1st Cir. 2011). Rule 11 does not apply to misconduct unrelated to 
signed motions, pleadings or other papers. See, e.g., Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 245 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[N]o matter how vexatious 
or disruptive counsel's conduct was during trial, Rule 11 cannot reach such misconduct. "); 
Lawrence v. Richman Group of CT LLC, 620 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Rule 11 does 
not ... authorize sanctions for merely frustrating conduct."). Rule 11 does not apply to attorney 
conduct that does not involve the filing or other presentation of a paper to the court. Ibid. It is not 
an all-purpose tool for regulating party or lawyer conduct. See Lawrence v. Richman Group of CT 
LLC, supra. Whether a lawyer has satisfied Rule 11 is measured on an objective basis. See 
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 111 S.Ct. 922, 
112 L.Ed. 2d 1140 (1991). 
In Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Company, supra, citing Durrant v. 
Christensen, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that in interpreting Rule 11 the federal courts have 
focused on "an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability 
of a pleading before it is signed." The Idaho Supreme Court held that, "reasonableness under the 
circumstances, and a duty to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing an action, is the appropriate 
standard to apply." Ibid. 
In the instant case, the Court provided a litany of reasons (R. 182 at 188) why it imposed 
Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies, however, as the discussion below reveals, each and every reason 
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dealt with extraneous conduct,4 rather than the actual petitions themselves and whether they 
comported with the signature certification requirements of Rule 11. 
First, the Court reasoned that, " ... Lewies 'filing of the petitions against a known, future 
client was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system." (R. 182 at 188). Judge 
Moeller made it very clear that he strongly disagreed (R. 106, ~ 1) with Lewies' decision to accept 
representation of private clients and proceed to file petitions for judicial review on their behalf 
against the Commissioners given that Lewies would be sworn-in as Fremont County prosecuting 
attorney about two months after filing the petitions, and would therefore, become the legal advisor 
for the Commissioners. However, even if Judge Moeller disagreed with Lewies' actions, he cited 
no legal authority whatsoever in his Memorandum Decision that would prohibit Lewies, or any 
other attorney for that matter, from filing a legal action against a known future client.5 Certainly, 
Rule 11 contains no such "known future client" prohibition. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 
on such grounds, the Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its 
discretion. 
Second, the Court reasoned that, "Fremont County voters were entitled to expect that the 
4 The extraneous conduct that Judge Moeller concerned himself with centered around his unfounded and highly 
subjective belief that Lewies' motives for filing the petitions were improper and somehow related to a "political 
grudge" against the Commissioners. (See, e.g., R. 182 at 189, fn. 14) 
5 Indeed, at the direction of Judge Moeller, Lewies contacted Idaho State Bar counsel, Brad Andrews, to obtain his 
opinion on the whether a prosecutor-elect violates the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, if he files a lawsuit 
against the board of county commissioners that he will be representing in the future. Mr. Andrews informed Lewies 
that the "bright-line" test for determining whether a conflict of interest existed was the date on which the prosecutor-
elect was officially sworn-in. Mr. Andrews reasoned that, until the prosecutor-elect is sworn-in, he does not 
represent the county commissioners. (See, Transcript p. 52, lines 21-25; p. 53, lines 1-21; and p. 54, lines 1-7) 
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person they had just elected as County prosecutor (i.e. Lewies) would not be filing new legal actions 
against the County." (R. 182 at 188). However, even if the Court from its vantage point in 
neighboring Madison County, had special insights into what Fremont County voters were expecting 
from their prosecutor-elect,6 and even if Judge Moeller personally and strongly disagreed with 
Lewies' actions, he cited no legal authority that requires a prosecutor-elect to satisfy voters' 
expectations (let alone satisfy the Court's own subjective notions of such voter expectations). 
Certainly, Rule 11 contains no such "voter satisfaction" requirement. By sanctioning Lewies under 
Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and in doing so, abused its 
discretion. 
Third, the Court reasoned that Lewies, "initiated a chain of events that any reasonable 
attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity from everyone involved " (R. 
182 at 188). However, even if the Court had been correct that Lewies created "mistrust and 
animosity from everyone involved" by filing the petitions, it cited no legal authority that obligated 
Lewies to refrain from creating such subjective emotional states. Certainly, Rule 11 imposes no 
such "emotionally-based" requirement. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the 
Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion. 
6 In fact, voters greatly appreciated Lewies' earlier efforts to reign-in the Commissioners when they illegally 
approved a controversial gravel pit in the county. Lewies sued the Commissioners in Fremont County Case No. 
CV-2011-215 alleging, inter alia, bias, conflicts of interest, and ex parte communications. Judge Gregory W. 
Moeller issued his decision in the case just two weeks before the 2012 primary election for prosecuting attorney 
(and it was widely publicized in the area press) finding for Lewies' clients and writing that the Commissioners, 
" ... created an atmosphere that erodes public confidence in the justice of the proceedings below ... the Court must 
conclude that due process demands a higher level of fairness, impartiality, and transparency than the record below 
demonstrates." Lewies' campaign slogan was "RESTORE PUBLIC TRUST," and voters elected him by a landslide 
margin. For the Court now to say voters expected Lewies would not sue the same Commissioners he had 
successfully sued before does not reflect actual voting results. Actual voting results supported Lewies' legal action 
against the Commissioners in the gravel pit matter. 
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Fourth, the Court reasoned that, "The court also finds that the timing of Lewies 'filing of the 
petitions, coupled with his subsequent delay in withdrawing as counsel for petitioners and the 
county, constitutes the type oflitigative misconduct Rule 11 was intended to rectifY." (R. 182 at 188) 
However, even if Lewies had timed his filings, and even if he delayed in seeking to withdraw as 
counsel for petitioners, the Court cited no legal authority that prohibited Lewies from timing his 
filings or requiring his earlier withdrawal. Certainly, there is nothing in Rule 11 that prohibited 
Lewies from "timing" his filings, and nothing that governs when Lewies was required to seek 
withdrawal from representation. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court 
either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion. 
Fifth, the Court reasoned that Lewies, ''failed to understand that his actions would almost 
immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel." (R. 182 at 188) 7 However, even ifthe Court had 
been correct regarding what Lewies understood, or failed to understand, it cited no legal or ethical 
violation by Lewies. Certainly, nothing in Rule 11 required Lewies to understand that his actions 
may deprive his clients of legal counsel. By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the 
Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion. 
Sixth, the Court reasoned that, "Lewies should have anticipated that his actions would 
7 The Court's premise that Lewies' filing of the petitions for judicial review would "immediately deprive his clients 
of legal counsel" is false. Indeed, petitioners Flying "A" Ranch, et. al., obtained substitute counsel, W. Lynn 
Rossner, Esq., on January 14, 2013; and the petitioners Gwaltney, et. a!., obtained substitute counsel, Charles A. 
Homer, Esq., sometime before February 26, 2013, according to representations made to the Court by Hall. (See, 
Transcript, p. 77, lines 2-9 (MR. HALL: "!can represent to the Court that Mr. Homer did contact me and said that 
he anticipated representing his client [Gwaltney, et. a!.} in the future, but was still in the process of reviewing the 
record and so forth and had said that based upon his very initial impression, that he thought there might be a way to 
dismiss the petition and resolve the matter in some other fashion."); p. 79, lines 23-25; p. 80, lines 1-2; and p. 81, 
lines 1-2). On June 11, 2013, Homer filed his notice of appearance on behalf of petitioners Gwaltney, et. al. (R. 
355) 
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deprive his future clients, the County and the board of commissioners, of representation." (R. 182 at 
188).8 However, even if the Court had been correct regarding what Lewies should have anticipated, 
it cited no legal or ethical violations. Certainly, Rule 11 contains no "anticipation requirement." 
By sanctioning Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court misinterpreted or misapplied the 
law, and by doing so, abused its discretion. 
Finally, and seemingly most importantly to presiding Judge Moeller, the Court found 
Lewies' actions "unseemly." (Transcript p. 6, lines 22-23; and p. 9, lines 8-9).9 10 However, even if 
the Court was correct that something about Lewies' decision to file the petitions was unseemly, it 
cited no legal or ethical violations by Lewies. Seemliness, or good taste, carmot be judicially 
I 
I determined by application of any objective standard. Afterall, like good art, good taste is a highly 
I subjective matter. Certainly, Rule 11 does not require that papers be "seemly." By sanctioning 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Lewies under Rule 11 on such grounds, the Court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, and 
by doing so, abused its discretion. 
In summary, the Court applied a "subjective bad faith" test to Lewies' extraneous conduct, 
rather than applying the appropriate legal analysis - an objective standard - to the petitions 
themselves. The Court subjectively concluded that Lewies was motivated to file the petitions due to 
8 The Court's premise that Lewies' filing of the petitions for judicial review would "deprive his future clients, the 
County and the board of commissioners, of representation" is false. The County and the board of commissioners 
were from the outset, and at all relevant times during the pendency of the petitions, ably represented by Blake G. 
Hall, Esq. (Transcript p. 1, lines 22-24). 
9 THE COURT: "[T]his just doesn't seem, for lack of a better word, seemly to the Court ... " (Transcript p. 9, lines 8-
9). 
10 "Seemly" is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (51h Ed., 2011), as 
"conforming to standards of conduct and good taste; of pleasing appearance." 
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a political grudge - a bad faith motive; and that it was "interfering with Lewies' professional 
judgment." (R. 189, fn. 14) However, the "bad faith" standard is no longer applicable. Rather, 
courts apply an objective standard of "reasonableness under the circumstances" Durrant v. 
Christensen, supra, (citations omitted). The Court should have examined Rule 11 sanctions 
in light of the foregoing federal and state authorities and determined whether Lewies made a proper 
investigation upon reasonable inquiry into the factual basis and legal basis for the petitions. See, 
e.g., Durrant, supra. The Court's imposition of sanctions without finding a lack of reasonable 
inquiry was not an adequate analysis under Rule 11. Hanf v. Svringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 
816 P.2d 320 (1991). Without such a determination, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. Ibid 
C. The petitions filed by Lewies in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 did not violate 
the signature certification requirements ofl.R.C.P. 11(a)(l). 
A Rule 11 violation occurs at the time the offending paper is signed and submitted to the 
court. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Com., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed. 2d 359 
(1990). A good explanation of Rule 11 's signature certification requirements is found in an article 
entitled, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 -A Closer Look, by Judge William Schwarzer, 
United States District Judge, Northern District of California. In that article, Judge Schwarzer wrote 
the following: 
The certification which results from the attorney's signature of the paper is directed 
at the three substantive prongs of the rule: its factual basis, its legal basis, and its 
legitimate purpose .... With respect to the first prong, the signature certifies that the 
lawyer 'has read the [paper]***that to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact***' If the rule is to 
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have meaning, those facts must consist of admissible evidence or at least be 
calculated to lead to such evidence. They need not be undisputed or indisputable but 
they must be sufficiently substantial to support a reasonable belief in the existence of 
a factual basis for the paper. Suspicion, rumor or surmise will not do. 
104 F.R.D. 181, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 
Shwarzer, William W., (1985). 
With respect to the second prong of Rule 11- its legal basis- Judge Schwarzer wrote, 
"where an action is patently unmeritorious as a matter of law, sanctions are 
appropriate ... To test compliance with the rule, as some courts have done, by 
reference to whether bad faith has been shown is inconsistent with its text and 
purpose ... Reasonable belief that a paper is 'warranted by law' should therefore be 
treated as an objective standard turning on the facts and circumstances of the case, 
not on the attorney's state of mind." 
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11, supra. 
Judge Schwarzer's analysis continued as follows, 
"The first two prongs of the rule ... are directed at the merits: in substance they are 
aimed at frivolous papers. The third prong is directed at papers which, though not 
necessarily frivolous, are found to be interposed for an improper purpose ... .In 
considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the court need 
not delve into the attorney's subjective intent .. .If a court were to entertain inquiries 
into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially harmful 
consequences, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chilling 
advocacy ... Finally, a bad faith test would make courts more reluctant to impose 
sanctions for fear of stigmatizing a lawyer by a bad faith finding .. .If a reasonably 
clear legal justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no 
improper purpose can be found and sanctions are inappropriate." 
Ibid. 
In the instant case, the Court's subjective bad faith analysis was as follows: 
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"Lewies' filing of the petitions against a known future client was a significant 
offense against the integrity of the judicial system. Fremont County voters were 
entitled to expect that the person they had just elected as county prosecutor would 
not be filing new legal actions against the county on behalf of private 
individuals ... By so doing, Lewies initiated a chain of events that any reasonable 
attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity from everyone 
involved- greatly undermining public confidence in the outcome of both cases ... .It 
is simply unfathomable to the Court how Lewies could have failed to understand 
that his actions would almost immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel since 
he would have to immediately withdraw before he was sworn-in. Likewise, Lewies 
should have anticipated that his actions would deprive his future clients, the county 
and the board of commissioners, of representation since they would be 
understandably uncomfortable having Lewies or his deputies defend them in legal 
matters he initiated against them. Therefore, the Court concludes that Lewies' 
decision to sign and file the petitions was clearly misguided and adversely affected 
the integrity of the judicial process." 
(R. 182 at 188). 
The Court undertook no objective inquiry into whether Lewies "made a proper investigation 
upon reasonable inquiry." Durrant, supra. It did not inquire into any of the three prongs of Rule 11: 
it did not inquire into the factual basis of the petitions; it did not inquire into the legal basis of the 
petitions; and it did not inquire into whether the petitions were filed for any objective improper 
purposes. See, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11, supra. Accordingly, the Court's 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. Hanf v. Svringa Realty, supra. 
D. Attorney's fees as Rule 11 sanctions. 
Rule 11 is a sanctions statute and not a fee shifting provision. Fee awards under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 11 are limited to fees "directly resulting from the violation." See Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. 
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KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2006). A court must be careful to trace fees to the violation 
and not include in the sanction fees that the party incurred with respect to matters not in violation of 
Rule 11. Ibid. Like the federal rule, Idaho's Rule 11 limits sanctions to those reasonable expenses 
incurred "because of' the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper. 11 
In the instant case, however, the Court awarded attorney's fees to Fremont County not 
because of Lewies' filing petitions in violation of Rule 11, but for hours its counsel, Hall, spent 
working on motions to disqualify Lewies. As presiding Judge Moeller, stated, 
"The Court also believes that Mr. Hall, who was acting as a Deputy Prosecutor at the 
time he filed it, was justified in bringing the Motion to DisqualifY (emphasis added), 
that he shouldn't have had to file that Motion, but it was necessitated by Mr. Lewies 
failing to recuse himself or -how would we properly put it - withdraw from the case 
in a timely manner. So, therefore, the Court finds that the County does have a right 
to seek attorney's fees." 
(Transcript p. 32, lines 22-25,· and p. 33, lines 1-4) 
By ordering Lewies to pay attorney's fees as a sanction under Rule 11 for time Hall spent on 
motions to disqualify Lewies alleging conflicts-of-interest under I.R.P.C. 1.7 (not "because of" any 
violation of Rule 11 's signature certification requirements),12 the Court either misinterpreted or 
misapplied the law, and by doing so, abused its discretion. The Court's award of attorney's fees as 
a sanction against Lewies for violating Rule 11 cannot be sustained. 
II I.R.C.P. 11 
12 The motions to disqualify filed by Hall against Lewies alleged no Rule 11 violations whatsoever, only a future 
conflict-of-interest. The motions were not filed "because of' any Rule 11 violation. (R. 18). 
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E. The Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel tor the County" 
because Lewies never represented the County in either case number CV-12-580 or CV-12-581. 
In imposing Rule 11 sanctions, the Court stated," ... the Court concludes that Lewies' filing 
of these petitions was clearly misguided and failure to withdraw as counsel for both parties 
amounted to litigative misconduct." (R. 182 at 187). The Court also stated, "[Lewies] initially 
refused to withdraw as counsel for the County." (R. 182 at 189). 
The undisputed facts are, however, that Lewies never represented the county in either of the 
cases. From the moment the petitions were filed, and at all relevant times thereafter, Hall 
represented the county and the Court was fully aware of such representation, as the following 
exchange shows: 
THE COURT: Then we have Mr. Blake Hall present, who has appeared on behalf 
of Fremont County Commissioners. 
(Transcript, p. 1, lines 22-24). 
*** 
MR. LEWIES: I won't be representing the county at all. I don't intend to represent 
Fremont County on these, or the petitioners. I'll just stay clear out of all of it is my 
idea. 
THE COURT: So you basically concurred with the motion that was filed by Mr. 
Hall then, that pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct, you can't represent the 
county? 
MR. LEWIES: I would agree that that's true. 
(Transcript, p. 3, lines 18-25; and p. 4, line 1). 
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Then, during its February 26, 2013 hearing, the Court again indicated on the record that it 
fully understood that Mr. Hall, and not Mr. Lewies, was representing Fremont County, as follows: 
THE COURT: We have Mr. Lewies appearing on behalf of himself on an attorney's 
fees issue, and we have Mr. Blake Hall appearing on behalf of the Fremont County 
Commissioners, who have retained him on some issues related to these cases. 
(Transcript, p. 40, lines 19-23.) 
From the outset, the Court possessed full knowledge that Hall, not Lewies, was representing 
Fremont County. Accordingly, it was a plain factual error for the Court to conclude that Lewies 
"initially refused to withdraw as counsel for the County," inasmuch as he never represented the 
County at any time. As such, the Court abused its discretion. 
F. The court erred in finding that Lewies' actions "delaved adjudication o[the petitions (or 
judicial review. " 
In imposing Rule 11 sanctions, the Court reasoned, "Here, Lewies' actions have directly 
delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review because the Court has been required to 
spend over two months dealing with issues related to representation, rather than hearing the merits 
of the petitions." 13 (R. 182 at 188). 
However, the record is clear. Lewies did not, and in fact, could not have caused any delay 
because unless and until the transcript and record of proceedings was settled under I.R. C.P. 84G), 
13 It should noted that the Court wanted to "get to the merits" of the petitions. This admission by the Court is proof 
positive that the petitions were factually based, had legal basis, and were not filed for improper purposes. If the 
Court wanted to get to the merits, then it abused its discretion by ruling that the petitions violated Rule 11 's 
signature certification requirements. If the petitions violated Rule 11, then the Court should have dismissed them. 
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and then lodged under I.R.C.P. 84(k), the Court could not possibly have proceeded to hear the 
merits. In fact, by virtue of the Court's own Orders Governing Procedure on Appeal14 (R. 15 and R. 
263) petitioners' briefs were due "within 35 days of the date on which notice that the transcript and 
record have been filed ... " Three months later, the Notice of Lodging of the record was filed15 
(R.178), thus triggering the 35 day time period in which petitioners' had to file their briefs 
(accordingly, petitioners' briefs were due April 17, 2013). Respondent's then had 28 days after 
service of petitioners' briefs to file their briefs (accordingly, respondent's briefs were due on May 
15, 2013). Finally, petitioners' reply briefs were due 21 days after service of respondent's briefs 
(accordingly, petitioners' reply briefs were due on June 5, 2013). So, the Court could not have 
proceeded to hear the merits until sometime after June 5, 2013. By contrast, Lewies sought 
permission to withdraw a full five months before that date. 16 
It was not Lewies' actions that delayed the Court in getting to the merits, rather, it was the 
Court's own handling of the competing motions to withdraw and to disqualify that caused delay. 17 
14 Orders Governing Procedure on Appeal were filed on December 3, 2012. 
15 Notice of Lodging for both cases was filed on March 13, 2013. 
16 Lewies' motions to withdraw were filed on January 7, 2013. 
17 The Court should have found that no actual case or controversy existed since Hall's motions to disqualify, and 
Lewies' motions to withdraw, were filed on the same day. The Court could easily have granted Lewies' motions to 
withdraw and denied Hall's motions to disqualify. Lewies would have been out of the cases on January 7th, and that 
would have quickly resolved the matter. As Lewies argued to the Court, "Now, Mr. Hall's motion to disqualify then 
became moot, and that's a legal doctrine, on the same day it was filed because I filed my own motion to withdraw. 
Now, what's the reason to press on with a motion to disqualify when the attorney you're seeking to disqualify has 
said wait a minute, I want out of it, I want to withdraw? Isn't the motion to disqualify moot? I would argue yes." 
(Transcript p. 67, lines 22-25; and p.68, lines 1-4) Instead, the Court chose to conduct a hearing on the competing 
motions on January 22, 2013. Then, it awarded attorney's fees to Hall for having to file his motions to disqualify 
Lewies. Then, the Court conducted another hearing on attorney's fees on February 26, 2013. Then, it converted its 
award of attorneys fees into Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies, sua sponte, in its Memorandum Decision issued on 
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G. The Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have retained private 
legal counsel, Blake G. HalL Esq., to represent it in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 
because the legal question whether the County's hiring of private counsel in violation ofthe Idaho 
Constitution's necessity requirement had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the 
Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the Court for its decision. 
In Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984), the Idaho 
Supreme Court recognized that while the elements of an actual or justiciable controversy are not 
subject to a mechanical standard, the United States Supreme Court aptly summarized the pivotal 
elements of a justiciable controversy in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 
S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). 
"A 'controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial 
determination .... A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or 
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot.. .. 
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties 
having adverse legal interests.... It must be a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical 
state of facts." 
300 U.S. at 240-41, 57 S.Ct. at 464 (citations omitted). See also Sanchez v. City of 
Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322,481 P.2d 401 (1971); Cummings Construction Co. v. School 
District No.9, 242 Or. 106,408 P.2d 80 (1965). 
We believe this federal standard provides a concise guideline for our analysis, and therefore, 
we will apply these criteria in conjunction with pertinent Idaho case law cited infra. Harris v. Cassia 
March 29, 2013, nearly three full months after Lewies filed his motions to withdraw. 
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County, supra. 
In the case at bar, the Court improperly decided a question that was not before it. In its 
Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled that, "Although contested by Lewies, the Court deems 
appropriate the decision by the county to retain Hall, its former civil deputy, to defend it in these 
cases." (R.182 at 189) However, just a month earlier, during its February 26, 2013 hearing on the 
petitions, the Court represented to the parties that the question whether Hall had been properly hired 
by Fremont County had been withdrawn by the prosecuting attorney's office, and as such, the Court 
was relieved from having to decide a "very tough question. "18 The exchange was as follows: 
THE COURT: On the first issue, the Court notes that on February 19th of 2012 
[2013], Mr. Dustin filed a document with the Court informing it that his office was 
withdrawing and allowing Mr. Hall to represent Fremont County on these matters, 
representing the Board of County Commissioners on both the Flying A Ranch case 
and on the Gwaltney case. The Court sees that as a good development. It's going to 
get us straight to the merits19 instead of worrying about who's representing who. 
And as I read Mr. Dustin's Notice, I think that brings that issue to an end. Are 
there any matters related to that that we need to still address? (Emphasis added). 
MR. DUSTIN: Not unless the Court has any questions, Your Honor. 
MR. HALL: We don't believe that there's anything further, Your Honor, I think 
that resolves the matter. 
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. I would let Mr. Dustin know, I did read your 
document very carefully. I think it contains some very good legal analysis and I 
think certainly the Court would have had a very tough question before it if I'd had 
18 This is the phrase Judge Moeller used to describe the legal question raised by the Office of the Fremont County 
Prosecuting Attorney concerning whether the Commissioners' decision to retain Hall, as private counsel, satisfied 
the "necessity requirement" under Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Idaho Constitution. 
19 Once again, the Court is found undercutting its own position on Rule II sanctions. Why was the Court so anxious 
to "get straight to the merits" if the petitions violated Rule II 's certification requirement? 
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to rule on that. I think ultimately, though, you made a wise decision. I think some 
things, as with all things in life, we sometimes have to decide what hill we want to 
die on and I'm not sure that's the hill any of us wanted to die on, so I am glad we got 
that issue behind us. (Emphasis added) 
(Transcript p. 41, lines 6-14; and p. 42, lines 1-3) 
If, as Judge Moeller himself stated, "/think certainly the Court would have had a very tough 
question before it if I'd had to rule on that, " then on what grounds did he proceed to rule on the 
withdrawn question? Although the question whether "necessity" existed for the Commissioners' 
hiring of Hall was certainly an important legal question for the Office of the Fremont County 
Prosecuting Attomey,20 and the people of Fremont County, it was rendered moot when deputy 
prosecuting attorney, Dustin, filed his notice informing the Court that his office had decided to 
withdraw the question. (R. 145) The parties, and presiding Judge Moeller, all agreed on the record 
that the matter had been resolved. No case or controversy existed. The question was no longer 
justiciable. 
The Court rendered an opinion on a highly sensitive, but nevertheless, moot issue. Greater 
judicial restraint may have been the better course in light of the recent controversies surrounding the 
case of Kline v. Power County Board of Commissioners, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 40112-
2012. 
20 As the elected prosecuting attorney for Fremont County, Lewies explained to the Court that, "I have a duty under 
the Idaho Code to prosecute and defend all cases in which my client, Fremont County, not the Board of 
Commissioners but the County, is a party. I thought I had an ethical obligation to assert my duties to represent and 
defend the County in these matters." (Transcript p. 60, lines 3-8) 
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H. The Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his representation of 
petitioners. 
The Court ruled that, "Lewies should have known at the time of filing the petitions that he 
would be unable to see either case through to completion -this is undisputed." (R. 182 at 189) 
"Completed," as explained by the Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct, means when the 
"agreed-upon assistance has been concluded." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.16, Comment 1. 
In the instant case, before ever accepting representation of petitioners, Lewies explained to 
Flying "A" Ranch, et. a!. and Gwaltney, et. a!., that since he was going to be officially sworn-in as 
Fremont County's prosecuting attorney in mid-January 2013, he would have to withdraw from 
representing them at that time. Lewies went on to explain that in consideration of the rapidly 
approaching statutory deadline for filing petitions for judicial review, he could proceed to file 
petitions to preserve legal rights, but would have to withdraw relatively soon thereafter. (Transcript 
p. 56, lines 17-25; p.57, lines 1-5) Both sets of clients agreed to Lewies' limited representation. (R. 
64 at 65, ~~ 4 and 5) 
If the Court believed that "complete" means that Lewies had to see the petitions through to 
ultimate conclusion, including any appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court, then it had a mistaken 
understanding of the term. Attorneys and their clients are free to agree between and among 
themselves for limited representation; representation that will be deemed "complete" at some 
juncture short of final judgment on appeal. 
Further, unless and until an actual case or controversy was presented to the Court on the 
question whether Lewies had completed his limited representation of petitioners, the Court should 
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have refrained from issuing an opinion on the matter. For the Court to have rendered its opinion on 
a legal question that was not before it, was improper. The opinion was rendered without the Court 
hearing evidence on the issue and without allowing Lewies to present oral argument. The Court 
ruled without any factual basis, or alternatively, it ruled based on plain factual error regarding the 
true nature ofLewies' agreed-upon limited representation. 
Accordingly, the Court abused its discretion. 
I. Judge Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies by engaging in the 
following actions: 
a.) Ex parte communication. 
Canon 3(7) provides in relevant part, that, "A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex 
parte communications ... " except where authorized by law. 21 
In the instant case, immediately following the Court's January 22, 2013 hearing on the 
petitions, Judge Moeller invited Lewies into his chambers and proceeded to explain that he was 
aware there was some bad blood between Lewies and Hall;22 that he wanted it to end; and that he 
was going to see to it that it "ends in this case.'m Judge Moeller warned Lewies, "You have to 
21 I.C.J.C. Canon 3(7). 
22 The bad blood stemmed from the 2012 primary election campaign for Fremont County prosecuting attorney where 
Lewies defeated Hall's boss, prosecuting attorney Joette Lookabaugh, by a landslide margin of65% to 35%. 
23 Judge Moeller said in open court, "And this whole process that we're going through, I think illustrates the folly of 
beginning this case the way it was begun because basically we're spinning our wheels on issues that aren't serving 
either the Respondents or the Petitioners in this case and, again, I understand that there's been acts of pettiness 
between these parties on other matters at other times, but there needs to come a time when that ends and I'm 
going to do what I can to see that it ends in this case (emphasis added) because I think there are important issues 
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I Judge Moeller issued another warning to him, saying, "This conversation never happened "(Ibid.) 
Indeed, in his Memorandum Decision, Judge Moeller admits that an ex parte 
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communication with Lewies took place in his chambers, and further admits that, "the Court merely 
advised [Lewies] to avoid allowing a political grudge to inteifere with his professional 
judgment." (R. 189, fn. 14) Although Judge Moeller maintains, "The Court initiated this 
conversation after consulting Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(D), which provides, in 
part: 'Judges are encouraged to bring instances of unprofessional conduct by judges or lawyers to 
their attention in order to provide them opportunities to correct their errors without disciplinary 
proceedings; .... ,"'the fact is he did not identify any specific instance of unprofessional conduct 
and he identified no violation of the Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct. Rather, he warned 
Lewies to end what he subjectively believed was a "political grudge."25 Judge Moeller 
admittedly believed Lewies was "provoking"26 the Commissioners by filing the petitions. Yet, 
all throughout the proceedings, Judge Moeller repeatedly acknowledged the importance of the 
merits of the petitions by saying the following things: 
that Mr. Gwaltney and Varney and Flying A Ranch and Fremont County have in this case and they're being 
completely covered by the smoke of these other issues. " (See, e.g., Transcript p. 34, lines 1 0-22) 
24 Judge Moeller used the exact same phraseology when addressing deputy prosecuting attorney, Mr. Dustin, as 
follows: "I think ultimately, though, you made a wise decision. I think some things, as with all things in life, we 
sometimes have to decide what hill we want to die on and I'm not sure that's the hill any of us wanted to die on, so 
I am glad we got that issue behind us." (See, e.g., Transcript p. 42, lines 3-8) 
25 R. 182 at 189, footnote 14. 
26 Judge Moeller wrote in his Memorandum Decision that, "Any existing bad feelings between Lewies and the 
Commissioners would only be escalated by such provocative conduct. " (R. 182 at 190) 
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"So let's take up the representation issues first before we proceed to the merits of 
the other issues before the Court ... " (Transcript p. 2, lines 8-1 0) 
*** 
"I think there are important issues that Mr. Gwaltney and Varney and Flying "A" 
Ranch and Fremont County have in this case and they're being completely 
covered by the smoke of these other issues." (Transcript p. 34, lines 19-22) 
*** 
"On the first issue, the Court notes that on February 19th of 2012, Mr. Dustin has 
filed a document with the Court informing it that his office was withdrawing and 
allowing Mr. Hall to represent Fremont County on these matters, representing the 
Board of County Commissioners on both the Flying "A" Ranch case and on the 
Gwaltney case. The Court sees that as a good development. It's going to let us get 
straight to the merits instead of worrying about who's representing who." 
(Transcript p. 41, lines 5-14) 
*** 
"Here, Lewies' actions have directly delayed adjudication of the petitions for 
judicial review because the Court has been required to spend over two months 
dealing with issues related to representation, rather than hearing the merits of 
the petitions." (R. 182 at 188). 
Judge Moeller's open acknowledgement that the petitions contained "important issues" 
cannot be reconciled with his ex parte warning to Lewies not to let a "political grudge" interfere 
with his professional judgment and to end his provocative conduct. If the petitions contained 
important issues, and if Judge Moeller wanted to "get straight to the merits," then his ex parte 
warning for Lewies to "decide what hill you want to die on" (i.e. end his political grudge against 
the Commissioners) showed bias or prejudice against Lewies. 
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Why did Judge Moeller feel it necessary to warn Lewies to "end it" if the petitions had 
merit? 
b.) Converting an award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions, sua sponte. 
The Court demonstrated bias or prejudice27 against Lewies by engaging in the following 
sequence of actions: First, it awarded attorney's fees to the County for having to bring motions to 
disqualify Lewies?8 Second, Judge Moeller initiated an ex parte communication with Lewies by 
inviting him into chambers and proceeding to warn him about "deciding what hill he wanted to die 
on." Third, the Court, sua sponte, converted its earlier award of attorney's fees to the County on 
grounds that it had to file motions to disqualify Lewies, into Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies. 
What caused the Court to convert a routine award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions? 
The Court never explained its reasoning on this point. The only intervening event between the initial 
award of attorney's fees and the conversion into Rule 11 sanctions, was the Court's ex parte 
warning to Lewies to decide what hill to die on. Afterall, as the Court in the instant case 
acknowledged, "The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he reasons for which attorneys 
fees may be awarded pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) are not reasons that will 
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l )." (R. 182 at 186) 
27 I.C.J.C. Canon 3(B)(6). 
28 "The Court also believes that Mr. Hall, who was acting as a Deputy Prosecutor at the time he filed it, was justified 
in bringing the Motion to Disqualify, that he shouldn't have had to file that Motion, but it was necessitated by Mr. 
Lewies failing to recuse himself or -- how would we properly put it -- withdraw from the case in a timely manner. 
So, therefore, the Court fmds that the County does have a right to seek attorney's fees." (Transcript p. 32, lines 21-
25; and p. 33, lines 1-4) Accordingly, in its Order on Motions, the Court ruled that, " ... the County is entitled to 
recover its attorney fees incurred in filing the motion to withdraw [disqualify]." (R. 1 06, ~ 3) 
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It reasonably appears, then, that because Lewies did not heed the Court's warning to end his 
"political grudge" and his "provocative conduct," the Court decided to make good on its threat: It 
converted a routine award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions against Lewes and issued a 
scathing Memorandum Decision (R. 182) 29 denouncing Lewies for, committing a "serious offense 
against the judicial system" and other grave misdeeds. In other words, the Court caused Lewies to 
"die on that hill." 
c.) Disregarding allegations of Hall's unethical and improper conduct.. 
First, the Court wholly disregarded Lewies' argument that Hall should have conducted a 
reasonable inquiry into the facts prior to filing motions to disqualify Lewies. In Court, Lewies 
argued as follows, 
MR. LEWIES: Furthermore, before filing his Motion to Disqualify me, Mr. Hall 
failed to make any good faith effort to confer or attempt to confer with me. 
And, Your Honor, this would have saved you all this hassle if he'd picked up the 
phone and said, hey, Karl, looks like you've got a conflict on the horizon there, 
what are you going to do, are you going to hang onto those private clients and try 
to play both sides of this game? I'd say absolutely not. In fact, I've made it clear to 
my client on the day I accepted representation I'm going to have to withdraw. 
(Transcript p. 61, lines 15-25) 
*** 
MR. LEWIES: All I wanted to say here is that if Mr. Hall as an attorney for Fremont 
County had called me a private attorney and said, hey, private attorney, once you 
become a public attorney are you planning to continue to represent the private 
parties? If that call had been made, Your Honor, and under Rule 11 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure that sort of a reasonable inquiry is to be made before filing Motions. 
29 Substantial portions of Judge Moeller's Memorandum Decision were published in two major Eastern Idaho 
newspapers: the Idaho Falls Post-Register and the Rexburg Standard-Journal. As a result of those publications, 
Lewies' professional reputation and personal standing in his community have suffered damages. 
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I mean, you know, you have to inquire. 
THE COURT: Well, I know the Rules for Discovery have a meet and confer 
requirement. Is there a meet and confer -- I understand your argument that perhaps 
Mr. Lee (sic) should have called you first and asked you, are you going to withdraw 
or not? 
MR. LEWIES: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I think that's a valid argument, but there isn't a legal requirement for a 
meet and confer on an issue like this, is there? 
MR. LEWIES: I'm not saying a meet and confer, but there is a standard for a 
reasonable inquiry before filing documents, Rule 11. 
THE COURT: So Counsel had an obligation to call you and say you can't be serious 
about this? 
MR. LEWIES: Huh? I'm sorry? 
THE COURT: So Counsel had an obligation to call you and say are you going to do 
something to withdraw or not? Is that-- I understand that you're suggesting he should 
have done that and I think that's a fair argument-
MR. LEWIES: I think that would have been reasonable -
(Transcript p. 64, lines 13-25; and p. 65, lines 1-18) 
Why didn't the Court address Hall's alleged violation of Rule 11? Why didn't it even 
mention it in its Memorandum Decision? 
Second, the Court disregarded Lewies' claim that Hall violated I.R.P.C. 1.11, as follows: 
MR. LEWIES: However, the truth ofthe matter, Your Honor, is that on or 
about November 20, 2012, while still employed as Fremont County's Deputy 
Prosecutor and in apparent violation of Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
J.JJ(d)(2)(2) that prohibits attorneys who are currently serving as public employees 
from ... negotiating for private employment with any person who is involved as a 
party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially .... 
Mr. Hall offered in writing to Fremont County on Fremont County letterhead 
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and signed in his capacity as, quote, Chief Civil Prosecuting Attorney-Chief Civil 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, he offered to, quote, contract with the County at a 
discounted rate of$150 per hour for my time. And here's a copy of that letter if you 
want to see it. 
So he was negotiating private employment with his own client. ... 
(Transcript p. 69, lines 24-25; and p. 70, lines 1-18) 
Why didn't the Court make mention of Hall's alleged violation of Idaho's ethics rules by 
negotiating for his private employment with his own public client, Fremont County? Was not that 
conduct worth mentioning in its Memorandum Decision? 
Finally, the Court disregarded Lewies' claim that Hall violated I.R.P.C. 3.3, as follows: 
MR. LEWIES: The point I really want to make is he's not billing $225 as he said in 
his sworn Affidavit, he's billing $150. And there it is in his own writing. Maybe he 
didn't think I'd discover that. Now, in his reply brief, Mr. Hall represents to the Court 
that. .. the contract between Mr. Hall and the County does not identify a specified 
hourly rate for services, but we now know the truth of the matter. Mr. Hall himself 
has specified the rate in the contract he proposed with the County, and that specified 
rate is $150 per hour. It appears to me, Your Honor, that Mr. Hall's run afoul of yet 
another ethical rule, and that would be Rule 3.3 that provides, quote, a lawyer shall 
not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal. He says he's billing $225, 
that's not the case, he got a contract for $150. 
(Transcript p. 70, lines 19-25; and p. 71, lines 1-10) 
MR. LEWIES: Now, finally, Your Honor, it appears to me that Mr. Hall's engaged 
in an effort to deliberately overbill me here. Assuming Mr. Hall billed his eight 
hours, total of eight hours here, at his contracted rate of $150 an hour, that would 
have been $1,200, but in his sworn Affidavit he claims eight hours at $225 an hour, 
that's $75 an hour more than his own contracted rate. So he's claiming $1,777.50, 
that's an overbilling of $575, Your Honor, that I think is a knowing and deliberate 
overbilling and I, frankly, think dishonest conduct. 
(Transcript p. 74, lines 1-11) 
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Why did the Court wholly disregard each and every one ofLewies' allegations of unethical 
conduct by Hall? Were the allegations unfounded? The Court did not say so. It made not even the 
slightest mention of any of the allegations in its Memorandum Decision. But it wrote at length 
publically condemning Lewies for all sorts of serious offenses against the integrity of the judicial 
system. 
Based on these facts, it reasonably appears that the Court was biased or prejudiced against 
Lewies, and as such, was not and acting fairly and impartially towards him. 
d.) Issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision denouncing Lewies. 
Canon 3(B)(5) provides that, "A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to .. .lawyers 
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity ... "30 
However, in seeming disregard of Canon 3, Judge Moeller seemed to go out of his way to 
write a blistering decision that was not only highly critical of Lewies' decision to file petitions for 
judicial review against the Commissioners, it also denounced Lewies personally. As published in 
both local area newspapers, the Idaho Falls Post-Register and the Rexburg Standard-Journal, Judge 
Moeller wrote the following about Lewies: "Lewies' filing of the petitions against a known future 
client was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system;" "Lewies irritated a chain 
of events that any reasonable attorney should have anticipated would create mistrust and animosity 
from everyone involved- greatly undermining public confidence in the outcome of both cases;" "It 
30 I.C.J.C. Canon 3(B)(5). 
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is simply unfathomable to the Court how Lewies could have failed to understand that his actions 
would almost immediately deprive petitioners of legal counsel;" "Likewise, Lewies should have 
anticipated that his actions would deprive his future clients, the County and the Board of 
Commissioners of representation; "Lewies' decision to sign and file the petitions was clearly 
misguided and adversely affected the integrity of the judicial process;" With the application of 
wisdom and common sense, one could have reasonably predicted that such conduct would meet 
with the stem disapproval of Mr. Lewies' future clients, the County and Commissioners, as well as 
the Court, whose duty it is to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process." (R. 182, Memorandum 
Decision) 
Since publication of Judge Moeller's decision in the area newspapers, Lewies has suffered 
damage to his professional reputation and personal standing in the community. Can it be said that 
Judge Moeller's decision was dignified and courteous? 
Since the decision went public, several area attorneys have approached Lewies deriding him 
about, "How much Judge Moeller likes you." As a direct result of his decision, there is now a 
belief among members of the local area bar, that Judge Moeller has a personal dislike ofLewies. 
Judge Moeller's withering public denunciation of Lewies was undeserving under the 
circumstances and did not serve the people of Eastern Idaho well. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that the lower Court 
failed to conduct an adequate analysis under Rule 11 before imposing sanctions on Lewies, and 
therefore, such sanctions cannot be sustained. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that 
the petitions filed by Lewies did not violate Rule 11 signature certification requirements; that the 
lower Court's imposition of attorney's fees as a Rule 11 sanction was improper and cannot be 
sustained; that the lower Court erred in finding that Lewies (a) had not withdrawn as counsel for 
the county; (b) delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review; (c) deeming it 
appropriate for the Commissioners to have retained Hall as private counsel; (d) finding that 
Lewies was unable to complete his representation of petitioners; and that presiding Judge 
Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies. 
Submitted this 21st day of August, 2013 
;G::rr/.~ 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Real Party in Interest - Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a two true and correct copies ofthe foregoing REAL PARTY 
IN INTEREST - APPELLANT'S BRIEF has this 21st day of August, 2013, been served upon 
the individuals listed below by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, with proper postage 
thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Hon. Gregory W. Moeller 
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE 
151 W. 15tN. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL, ANGELL, STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
W. Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
109 N. 2nd West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDI IA-nD S~~ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO COUNTY OFF Me:lN 
DISTRICT COURT .:,':: L------~r::-~~· 
IIW:--.J:;;t:;{..~~~· 
TYPE OF HEARING: LAW AND MOTION 
GREGORY W. MOELLER PRESIDING JUDGE: 
DATE: 
ATTORNEYS PRESENT: 
~BGUST 27,2013 
\.:.J 12.- 58D 
COURT REPORTER: 
CLERK: 
DAVE MARLOW 
DEBORAH MACE 
304 FLYING A RANCH ETAL VS FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS. 
MR STARNS IS PRESENT FOR RESPONDANTS 
MR ROSSNER IS PRESENT FOR PETITIONER. 
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED ALL BRIEFS. 
305 MR HOSSNER ON MOTION. TIMELY FILING. ASKS THE COURT 
TO ENTER A JUDGMENT. THE COURT COMMENTS ON ORDER 
GOVERNING PROCEDURE AND THE COURT DID ORDER AN 
ORDER MODIFYING BRIEFING SCHEDULE. 
THE COURT COMMENTS ON UNDERSTANDING OF RESPONDANTS 
POSITION. 
MR HOSSNER COMMENTS ON FILING HIS BRIEF IN FEBRUARY. 
MR ROSSNER STATES HE DID NOT GET MODIFIED ORDER. 
307 MR STARNS ON ARGUMENT. STATES THE COURTS ORDER WAS 
CLEAR. COMMENTS ON MATTERS NEEDING RESOLVED ON THE 
MERITS. COMMENTS ON IRCP 1. 
STATES NO PREJUDICE DID OCCUR. 
310 THE COURT COMMENTS ON BOTH PARTIES ACTED IN GOOD FAITH 
THE COURT FEELS A MIS UNDERSTANDING DID OCCUR. 
THE COURT COMMENTS ON RULE 84. DOES NOT FEEL ANY BAD 
FAITH OCCURRED. 
WILL DENY MOTION AND WILL DECIDE CASE ON THE MERITS. 
WILL MOVE TO ORAL ARGUMENT. 
313 MRHOSSNER WILL PROCEED FIRST. 
MR HOSSNER MAY HAVE 30 MINUTES FOR AGRUMENT. 
COMMENTS ON IC42-02. MR HOSSNER COMMENTS ON MAP. 
SCANNED 
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THE COURT DOES NOT FEEL IT HAS A FULL RECORD. DOES NOT 
HAVE MAP. 
324 THE COURT ASKS AS TO SUPREMACY LAW ISSUE. MR HOSSNER 
RESPONDS. 
329 THE COURT EXPRESSES CONCERN AS TO FINDINGS OF FACTS 
PAGE 73,74. DOES NOT SEE EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANCIAL AND 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. ASKS MR HOSSNER IF HE IS A WARE OF 
SOMETHING IN THE RECORD THE COURT IS MISSING. MR HOSSNER 
STATES NONE IS IN RECORD. 
333 COMMENTS ON RS ROAD. STEPS TAKEN TO DETERMINE THAT WERE 
NOT TAKEN BY COMMISSIONERS. HAS TAKEN AWAY SUSBSTANTIAL 
RIGHTS OF THE LAND OWNER. 
MR ROSSNER ASKS FOR THIS MATTER TO BE DISMISSED. 
336 THE COURT ASKS MR ROSSNER AS TO BEING SPECIFIC TO ALL 
FINDINGS OR JUST MR ROSSNER'S CLIENT. 
337 MR STARNS WANTS TO STRESS THIS IS NOT A ROAD VALIDATION 
PROCEEDING. COMMENTS ON 42-4A. HOW DOES THE COUNTY 
ADOPT AN OFFICIAL MAP. 
HAS TO HAVE PREPARATION OF THE MAP. COMPLIED WITH 40-402 
THE COURT ASKS AS TO EAST WEST ROAD DESIGNATION, BUT 
NORTH ROAD WAS THE ROAD IN CONTRA VERSY. MR STARNS DOES 
NOT THINK THAT IS ACCURATE. ASKS AGAIN AS TO NORTH ROAD 
NOT BEING ON THE MAP. 
MR STARNS FEELS THAT IT WAS. 
PETITIONERS WERE A WARE AND DID SHOW UP FOR HEARING AND 
KNEW WHAT THEY WERE ARGUING. 
342 THE COURT COMMENTS ON FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, REFERS 
TO PAGE 73. IS ROAD IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 12B. 
ASKS WHERE THEN WAS ROAD IDENT. IN 12B ADDRESSED. MR 
STARNS STATES IN PARAGRAPH 8. MR STARNS DOES NOT FEEL 
WHAT THE COURT IS ASKING HAS BEEN MADE PART OF THE 
RECORD. 
ADOPTION OF AN OFFICIAL MAP PROCEEDING IS DIFF THAN 
ROAD VALIDATION PROCEEDING. 
345 THE COURT ASKS AS TO PREJUDICE. MR STARNS COMMENTS ON 
4202. FEELS MR HOSSNER HAS MIS READ. 
MR STARNS REF. TO PARAGRAPH 3. IS IMPORTANT. COMMENTS 
ON 40-4201. NOTHING IN THE RECORD WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING 
THAT COMM DID NOT COMPLY. 
358 MR HOSSNER STATES THE COMMISSIONERS MISSED THE MARK 
MUST SET OUT PUBLIC ROADS ON THE MAP. THE COURT ASKS 
MR HOSSNER IF IT IS NOT A PUBLIC ROAD WHAT IS IT. MR HOSSNER 
STATES IT IS A TRAIL. 
MR HOSSNER REFERS TO THE NEXT TO THE LAST PAGE OF HIS 
BRIEF. REFERS TO SECTION 15,9AND 42. 
406 THE COURT WILL TAKE THE MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT 
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THE COURT DOES NOT FEEL IT HAS BEEN PRESENTED WITH A 
FULL COPY OF THE RECORD. ASKS MR STARNS TO LEAVE HIS 
COPY OF THE RECORD. 
PAGE 72 IS START OF RECORD EX. B. CLERK TO FIND ORIGINALS 
OR MAKE COPIES 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
and 
KARL H. LEWIES, 
vs. 
Real Party in Interest -
Appellant 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually 
and in his official capacity, and LEROY 
MILLER, individually and in his official 
capacity, 
Respondents. 
E. C. GWALTNEY, III AND LANA K. 
VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
v 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40987-
2013 (41132-2013) 
Case No. CV-2012-580 
(CV2012-581) 
.-. ·; .•.: ... ·. '< ... _ ... · 
,: .• ~ ("'I i~-:::~a 
..,.. .... . .. -- -. ·- --~'"_ ... _ i I .. --. . . ~-----~ 
1.· I seP 1 9 2013 I 
I 
__ 9,; J 
• . I 
. ··-·· _j 
SCANNED 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40987-
2013 (41132-2013) 
Case No. CV-2012-580 
Petitioners, (CV2012-581) 
and 
KARL H. LEWIES, 
vs. 
Real Party in Interest-
Appellant 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision ofthe state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually 
and in his official capacity, and LEROY 
MILLER, individually and in his official 
capacity, 
Respondents. 
E. C. GWALTNEY, III AND LANA K. 
VARNEY, 
Petitioners, 
v 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
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subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually 
and in his official capacity, and LEROY 
MILLER, individually and in his official 
capacity, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Fremont 
Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge, Presiding. 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
KARL H. LEWIES, PLLC. 
343 E 4th N, Suite 125 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Telephone: (208) 372-1700 
Facsimile: (208) 372-1701 
khlewies@gmail.com 
Attorney for Real Party in Interest-
Appellant 
W. Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
ATTORNEY ATLAW 
109 N 2nd West 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 23, 2012, attorney Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies") filed two 
separate petitions seeking judicial review of decisions made by the Board of 
Commissioners for Fremont County ("the Commissioners" or "the County"). 1 (R. 
8-14). These petitions were filed on behalf of two separate groups of petitioners 
(referred to collectively as the "Petitions"): 
A. Case No. CV-12-580 was filed on behalf of 
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Clen 
Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay 
Pickard , George Ty Nedrow, and David Tuk 
Nedrow (collectively referred to as "Flying 'A' 
Ranch"); and 
B. Case No. CV-12-581 was filed on behalf ofE.C. 
Gwaltney, ill and Lana K.Varney (collectively 
referred to as "Gwaltney"). 
Both Petitions named Fremont County and two of the County Commissioners 
(Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller) in both their official and individual 
capacities. Lewies defeated the incumbent Fremont County prosecutor in the 
primary election on May 15, 2012, and then ran unopposed in the general election. 
At the time of filing, Lewies was the prosecutor-elect for Fremont County, having 
1 Lewies filed two separate petitions for judicial review: Petition for Judicial 
Review (November 23, 2012) (CV-12-580); and Petition for Judicial Review 
(November 23, 2012) (CV-12-581). Only the Petition for Judicial Review for 
CV-12-580 is included in the record. (SeeR. 8-14). 
1 
Page 307 of 408
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
been duly elected in the general election held November 6, 2012. Lewies had not 
yet taken office when he filed the petitions; he was sworn-in on January 14, 2013. 
On January 2, 2013, the County, through its then deputy prosecuting 
attorney, at the insistence of the County Commissioners, set a hearing for a 
motion to disqualify Lewies from representing the Petitioners and the County in 
these matters. On January 7, 2013, the County filed a motion to disqualify and 
requested attorney fees. A motion for partial dismissal was likewise filed seeking 
to dismiss each of the named County Commissioners in their individual 
capacities. In response to the motion to disqualify, Lewies filed a motion to 
withdraw as counsel for Petitioners later that day. Lewies filed an affidavit 
acknowledging, "a conflict of interest will arise in connection with my continued 
representation of Petitioners in this case." (R. 31 ).2 While recognizing the 
inherent conflict of interest in representing the Petitioners, Lewies did not 
withdraw his claim to represent the County on these matters. 
On January 11, 2013, the County filed a substitution of counsel, advising 
the district court that the County had retained the law firm of Nelson Hall Parry 
Tucker, P .A. to defend it in aforementioned Petitioners for Judicial Review given 
the inherent conflict of interest Lewies had from his prior representation of 
2 At oral argument Lewies conceded that he had forgotten to withdraw and was 
reminded of this obligation upon the County's filing ofthe motion to disqualify. 
2 
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Petitioners. On January 14, 2013, Lewies and Lynn Hossner ("Hossner") 
stipulated to the substitution of Hossner for Lewies in representing Flying "A" 
Ranch. (R. 42-43). Hossner continues to represent Flying "A" Ranch in the 
proceedings. 
Oral argument took place on January 22, 2013 on the County's motion to 
disqualify and Lewies' motion to withdraw. A motion for partial dismissal of the 
two County Commissioners individually named was also taken up at the hearing. 
The Court dismissed the individually named Commissioners. The district court 
has previously summarized that hearing as follows: 
The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had failed to withdraw voluntarily 
until the County had filed its motion to disqualify him. It also 
questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity 
he had just recently been elected to represent on behalf of clients 
he could no longer represent. Mr. Lewies attributed the delay to an 
oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct was 
violated. He claimed that his clients were operating under time 
constraints due to the statute of limitations. He agreed that he 
should no longer represent his former clients or the County on 
these matters in the future. 
(R. 104-1 07). Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, 
P .A. to file any motions or argue on behalf of the County. At the oral argument, 
counsel for the County noted that he was an acting deputy prosecutor for the 
County when the motions were filed and that his firm was now acting under a 
contract with the County Commissioners. The district court took care to 
3 
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emphasize that Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County of legal 
counsel in this matter. Lewies contended, under objection, however, that his 
newly appointed deputy prosecutor, Billie Siddoway, could take over Lewies' 
representation of the County on these discrete matters. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court barred Lewies from 
representing either his former clients (Petitioners) or his new client (the County) 
in the identified matters, thereby effectively granting both the motion to disqualifY 
and the motion to withdraw. The Court further concluded: 
... the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in 
filing the motion to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against 
Mr. Lewies personally, but not against his clients, the Petitioners. 
Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with appropriate supporting 
documents within 14 days. Mr. Lewies will be allowed to appear 
for purposes of contesting the attorney fees only. 
(R. 1 06). The Court further permitted Lewies' newly appointed deputy, Billie 
Siddoway ("Siddoway"), 14 days to file a brief explaining why the Fremont 
County Prosecutor's Office should be allowed to continue representing the County 
on these matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing. (R. 
106). 
Consistent with the district court's order, Siddoway filed a Notice of 
Conflict of Interest on February 6, 2013. (R. 71-73). Siddoway was "terminated" 
by Lewies four days later for filing the Notice of Conflict of Interest against his 
4 
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wishes, despite Lewies being barred from representation of either Petitioners or 
the County. (R. 100-103). Lewies then appointed Ryan Dustin ("Dustin") to 
serve as his deputy prosecutor on February 11, 2013. Lewies then filed a motion 
for extension of time, under objection from the County, for briefing the issue of 
Lewies' deputy prosecuting attorney being permitted to represent the County. A 
hearing on the motion was held on February 15, 2013. At the hearing, the district 
court granted the extension on the express condition that both Lewies and Dustin 
visit with counsel from the Idaho State Bar ("Bar Counsel") about the ethical 
ramifications of Lewies conduct in these matters. Shortly after the hearing, Dustin 
filed a notice with the district court that his office was withdrawing from 
representation of the County on the two petitions. (R. 145-149). 
The County subsequently filed a timely affidavit of attorney's fees and 
Lewies filed an objection. Oral argument took place on February 26, 2013. The 
district court subsequently issued its Memorandum Decision re: Sanctions 
("Memorandum Decision") on March 29, 2013. The district court ruled that 
Lewies had violated rule 11(a)(l), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure and that Fremont 
County was entitled to an attorney fee award in the amount of $1,185.00 against 
Lewies personally. The instant appeal was subsequently filed by Lewies. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Rule 11 Sanctions are Left to the Sound Discretion of the Court 
Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 can only be used where a filing 
violates the signature requirements ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(1). 
However, Lewies' reading of Rule ll(a)(l) is misplaced and fails to consider the 
Idaho Supreme Court's express language allowing Rule 11 to be awarded as a 
sanction for "misguided filings" and "litigative misconduct." 
Rule 11, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 
one (1) licensed attorney of record of the state of 
Idaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose 
address shall be stated before the same may be filed. 
A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state 
the party's address. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings 
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or party has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of 
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
6 
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promptly after the omission is called to the attention 
of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or 
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties 
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, "[t]he intent ofthe rule is to grant 
courts the power to impose sanctions for discrete pleadin& abuses or other 
tvoes ofliti&ative misconduct." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 650, 115 
P .3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). Rule 11 is appropriately used as a 
"management tool to be used by the district court to weed out, punish and deter 
specific frivolous and other mis&uided fllin&s." Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 
937, 940, 120 P.3d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Campbell v. Kildew, 141 
Idaho 640, 650, 115 P.3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). A Rule 11 sanction 
is appropriately imposed where the district court is considering only the 
"attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers." Riggins 
v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). Thus, Idaho law is 
clear that Rule 11 is not simply limited to sanction an attorney who signs a 
frivolous or unmeritorious pleading. Rather, Rule 11 can permissively be used to 
7 
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sanction an attorney for "litigative misconduct" or for the filing of "misguided 
filings." 
Initially, Judge Moeller, recognized that the imposition of sanctions was 
subject to an abuse of discretion standard. (R. 185). Specifically, the district 
court recognized that it acted within its discretion where it "considers whether it 
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and 
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." See Lamar Corp. v. City 
ofTwin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40, 981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999). (R. 185). 
Accordingly, where Judge Moeller recognized the issue of Rule 11 sanctions as 
discretionary, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and reached a decision 
through the exercise of reason, the Rule 11 sanction against Lewies should be 
upheld. In this case, it is clear from the plain language of the Memorandum 
Decision, and discussed more fully below, that Judge Moeller did not abuse his 
discretion when imposing Rule 11 sanctions. 
The Memorandum Decision meticulously addresses the procedural history 
that precipitated the lower courts decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Guiding 
the lower court's reasoning behind imposing sanctions on Lewies was the well-
8 
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established Idaho law that Rule 11 may be used as a management tool to 
addressed litigative misconduct and misguided filings. 
Lewies focuses on seven phrases from the Memorandum Decision3, that 
were taken out of context and fail to consider the court's reasoning in toto. A 
reading of the Memorandum Decision where Lewies pulls his specific quotes was 
crafted with the "totality of the circumstances" of the litigation in mind. (R. 187). 
While the Court noted his concerns about Lewies conduct, he unequivocally 
stated in reference to his comments on the advisability of filing the petitions, 
"such matters are not questions typically answered by this court." (R. 187). 
Rather, as the court clearly recognized, its sanctioning authority was reviewed 
"pursuant to its 'court management' role and act using its inherent discretion to 
ensure that the adjudication is fair to all sides." (R. 187). 
The court further recognized that ethical rules were not a consideration in 
sanctioning Lewies, and the court viewed Lewies conduct in the broad picture of 
the "integrity of the judicial process." (R. 188). It was with this consideration 
that the district court found that the integrity of the judicial process (litigative 
misconduct) was harmed by Lewies failure to identify the significant conflict 
issues that would inevitable be created by Lewies' filings: 
3 The seven quotes focused on are specifically identified in Appellant's Brief 
between pages 16 and 19. 
9 
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The Court finds that regardless of the ethical 
ramifications, Lewies' filings of the petitions 
against a known, future client was a significant 
offense against the integrity of the judicial system. 
Fremont County voters were entitled to expect that 
the person they had just elected as County 
prosecutor would not be filing new legal actions 
against the County on behalf of private individuals. 
Similarly, the Commissioners had every reason to 
be concerned when they were sued in both their 
official and personal capacities by the incoming 
county attorney. By so doing, Lewies initiated a 
chain of events that any reasonable attorney should 
have anticipated would create mistrust and 
animosity from everyone involved-greatly 
undermining public confidence in the outcome of 
both cases. 
(R. 188 (emphasis in original)). 
Ultimately, the district court correctly concluded "Lewies' decision to sign and 
file the petitions was clearly misguided and adversely affected the integrity of the 
judicial process." (R. 188). The district court again noted that it was its duty to 
"safeguard the integrity of the judicial process" and was the very "type of 
litigative misconduct Rule 11 was intended to rectify." (R. 188). The district 
court continued, "Lewies should have known at the time of filing the petitions that 
he would be unable [sic] to see either case through to completion-this is 
undisputed. Even if the Petitioners were acting under time constraints, that does 
not justify Lewies acting in an ethically questionable manner." (R. 188). As such, 
10 
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the district court appropriately recognized that the filing of the Petitions would 
instantaneously cause problems for both the Petitioners and the County. The 
district court was further concerned with Lewies failure to timely file a motion to 
withdraw that would have allowed the Petitioners to have immediate 
representation as the matter progressed through the appeals process. Further, any 
suggestion by Lewies that he completed his representation of Petitioners is devoid 
of verifiable facts in the record. It is merely supposition and reliance on Lewies 
representations only that the full representation was limited to filing the Petitions. 
Rather, the fact that immediate withdrawal was not performed at least causes a 
question about the actual scope of representation and Lewies ability to 
appropriately represent the petitioners. 
The district court at the January 22, 2013 hearing specifically addressed 
his concern for the ramifications Lewies conduct would have on the County: 
I don't think Mr. Hall should have had to file a 
Motion in January of 2013 to bring this issue to the 
Court's attention. I think this should have been 
brought to the Court's attention earlier by Mr. 
Lewies himself and even if the Court were to find 
that the questionable decision to file this after the 
election wasn't inappropriate, even if I were to 
agree with Mr. Lewies on that, certainly the Petition 
should have been followed with an immediate 
substitution of counsel indicating the new attorneys 
for the Petitioners were appearing. This puts the 
County in unfair jeopardy and uncertainty, it put the 
11 
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Petitioners in a certain level of jeopardy, as well as 
there was uncertainty about their future 
representation. Now, granted, this didn't occur 
during a critical phase of these proceedings because 
we're still preparing the transcript and the record, 
but nevertheless, there are strategic decisions that 
are made in cases like this that require someone to 
have counsel that can act without conflict and I 
think Mr. Lewies' actions put everybody in a certain 
degree of jeopardy. I certainly think Mr. Hall was 
justified in bringing his Motion when he did in the 
manner that which you did. 
(Tr. 23:13-24:11). 
Lewies' reading of Rule 11 is overly simplistic and ignores the explicit 
requirement that an attorney who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper for an 
improper purpose. The lower court explicitly detailed the improper purpose and 
appropriately employed its power to manage its docket. The district court's 
decision and the underlying rationale for imposing Rule 11 sanctions was within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and reached through an exercise of reason. 
As such, this Court should uphold the district courts imposition of sanctions 
against Lewies. 
B. Lewies Disputed Hall's Continued Representation of the County 
Which Unnecessarily Prolonged This Litigation and the Cost to the County. 
Lewies contends that the Court abused its discretion by suggesting that 
Lewies "initially refused to withdraw as counsel for the County." Lewies' 
12 
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contention is taken out of context and clearly designed to misstate the district 
courts understanding of Lewies' representation in the Petitions. In fact, it is clear 
from the January 22,2013 hearing transcript that Lewies did not believe the 
County Commissioners had made the necessary findings to hire Nelson Hall Parry 
Tucker to represent the County on the Petitions. Lewies specifically stated on the 
record that he did not believe Nelson Hall Parry Tucker should represent the 
County: 
Well, Your Honor, I'd like to note for the record 
that I don't believe Mr. Hall is properly here 
representing Fremont County because the Idaho 
Constitution required the County Commissioners 
make a public finding of necessity before retaining 
their own private counsel. 
I've reviewed the Minutes of the County 
Commissioners. I've had my Deputy, Billie 
Siddoway, review the Minutes of the County 
Commissioners and we find no finding of 
necessity-
(Tr. 16:13-22 (emphasis added)). At the hearing, Lewies continued to maintain 
that his office could represent the County and he was involved in crafting this 
argument. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that Lewies' continued instance on who could 
properly represent the County caused a delay in this matter. As a result ofLewies' 
position, additional briefing was necessary and further hearings were required. 
13 
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This procedural argument pursued by Lewies undoubtedly caused a delay 
in the adjudication of the Petitions. As the court noted at the January 22, 2013 
hearing, "Now, granted, this didn't occur during a critical phase of these 
proceedings because we're still preparing the transcript and the record, but 
nevertheless, there are strategic decisions that are made in cases like this that 
require someone to have counsel that can act without conflict and I think Mr. 
Lewies' actions put everybody in a certain degree of jeopardy." (Tr. 24:2-9). 
There were legitimate concerns that invariably caused the district court concern 
about who would be representing the County and this had a delay on the 
proceedings-especially because the briefing schedule had to be adjusted. (R. 
142-143). 
To suggest that the district court did not understand Lewies' role in 
representing the County is a liberal restatement of the procedural history in this 
matter. Moreover, as discussed more fully above, the district court clearly 
understood Lewies' role and the significant difficulties imposed both on the 
respondents and the County. It is clear from the record that the district court 
understood Lewies' role and there was no abuse of his discretion in its findings. 
14 
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c. Lewies Has Waived Any Argument Challenging the County Retaining 
Private Legal Counsel. 
Lewies continues to argue that the County could not retain private legal 
counsel. Lewies does not have standing to pursue this issue and further, the 
Fremont County Deputy Prosecutors Siddoway and Dustin both confirmed that 
there was no continued challenge by their office of the County's retaining Nelson 
Hall Parry Tucker as private legal counsel in defending against the Petitions. 
It is unclear what Lewies is attempting to argue because his own office has 
previously conceded that they would be withdrawing this issue. Once directed by 
the district court to provide information on whether Lewies' office could represent 
the County given the circumstances of the Petitions, Siddoway filed a Notice of 
Conflict of Interest on February 6, 2013, stating: 
I respectfully submit this notice in response to the 
Court's request for briefing of January 22, 2013. A 
conflict of interest under Rule 1. 7 of the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct prevents me from 
taking a position adverse to the decision of the 
Fremont County Commission to retain outside 
counsel in this matter. I have provided legal advice 
to the Fremont County Commission on the matter of 
retaining outside counsel and, while I do not 
represent the County in this matter, I consider the 
County to be a "current client" as that term is used 
in Rule 1.7. 
15 
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(R. 72). Subsequently, following a motion to extend the briefing schedule filed by 
Lewies' office, on February 19,2013, Lewies' office filed a Notice of Withdrawal 
of Motion to Represent Fremont County. (R. 145-149). The Fremont County 
Prosecutor's office unequivocally stated with regard to representation ofthe 
County as follows: "Upon further review of all aspects of the unique facts peculiar 
to this particular situation and for the considerations states, the Fremont County 
Prosecutor's Office withdraws its motion to represent Fremont County in these 
petitions for judicial review." (R. 149). 
Lewies has waived any argument that outside legal counsel's continued 
representation of the County is inappropriate. In fact, the Court's comment that 
"deem[ ed] it appropriate" for the County to have retained private legal counsel is 
consistent with the filings by the Fremont County Prosecutor's Office. Finally, 
the Memorandum Decision was filed well after Lewies' office conceded it could 
not represent the County on the Petitions. Accordingly, any argument on outside 
legal counsel's continued representation is irrelevant, moot, and has been waived 
byLewies. 
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D. There Is No Evidence Of Bias Or Prejudice By Judge Moeller. 
1. Lewies Has Waived Any Argument of Bias By Failing to File a 
Motion to Disqualify. 
Lewies' suggestion that Judge Moeller was biased and/or prejudiced 
against Lewies has been waived because Lewies did not file a motion to disqualify 
Judge Moeller pursuant to Rule 40(d)(2), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure. 
Specifically, Rule 40(d)(2)(A) states that "any party to an action may disqualify a 
judge or magistrate for cause from presiding in any action upon any of the 
following grounds: ... 4. That the iudge or magistrate is biased or preiudiced 
for or against any party or the case in the action." (Emphasis added). Had Lewies 
legitimately believed Judge Moeller was biased or prejudiced against him, his 
appropriate remedy was to file a Motion for Disqualification for Cause. Lewies 
did not pursue this remedy and any claims are now waived. 
2. The Ex Parte Communication was Appropriate and Does Not 
Exhibit Bias or Prejudice. 
Lewies alleges Judge Moeller was biased and/or prejudiced against him 
for two reasons (1) there was an ex parte communication, and (2) the award of 
Rule 11 sanctions was awarded sua sponte. However, neither argument is 
17 
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supported by competent evidence in the record to support Lewies' claim of bias or 
prejudice . 
Lewies argues that the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(B)(7) 
was violated by Judge Moeller when an ex parte communication occurred in 
chambers following the January 22,2013 hearing.4 Cannon 3(B)(7) states in 
relevant part as follows: 
A judge shall accord to every person who has a 
legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's 
lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A 
judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, or consider other communications 
made to the judge outside the presence of the parties 
concerning a nending or impending proceeding 
except that: 
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte 
communications for scheduling, administrative 
purposes or emergencies that do not deal with 
substantive matters or issues on the merits are 
authorized; provided the iudge reasonably 
believes that no partv will gain a procedural or 
tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte 
communication . 
I.C.J.C, Cannon 3(B)(7)(a) (emphasis added) . 
4 Of note, the County was unaware that there was ever any ex parte 
communication until a passing comment was made at the February 26, 2013 
hearing. The district court further addressed the communication in his written 
Memorandum Decision . 
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Lewies summarizes his recollection of the communication that occurred 
on January 22, 2013 following the hearing. However, it is clear from the record 
and Lewies' affidavit that the ex parte communication did not involve any 
substantive issues. Lewies suggests, despite no evidence to support this 
statement, that Judge Moeller stated that Lewies had "to decide what hill you want 
to die on." (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). However, the affidavit ofLewies describes 
the interaction quite differently, "following the court hearing on these matters held 
January 22,2013, District Judge Gregory Moeller, invited me into his chambers 
and told me he was aware of the ongoing bitter personal disputes among my 
predecessor-in-office, Joette Lookabaugh and her deputy prosecutor, Blake Hall, 
and myself. Judge Moeller advised me that everyone would be better off if the 
disputes ended." (R. 65-66). 
In the Memorandum Decision, Judge Moeller took exception to Lewies' 
description of the communication: 
The Court disagrees with Lewies' account of the 
conversation that took place after the hearing on 
January 22, 2013, because he appears to imply the 
Court was critical of the County Commissioners and 
Hall. While the Court acknowledges that it briefly 
met with Lewies in chambers following the January 
22, 2013 hearing, the Court merely advised him to 
avoid allowing a political grudge to interfere 
with his professional judgment. The merits of 
the cases were not discussed. The Court initiated 
19 
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this conversation after consulting Idaho Code of 
Judicial Conduct. Cannon 3(D), which provides. 
in part: "Judges are encourae;ed to brine; 
instances of unprofessional conduct by jude;es or 
lawyers to their attention in order to provide 
them opportunities to correct their errors 
without disciplinary proceedine;s; ... " 
(R. 189, fu. 14 (emphasis added)). The district court did not violate Cannon 
3(B)(7) because there was no discussion of substantive issues. Furthermore, the 
communication was specifically initiated for a proper purpose, to highlight 
potential unprofessional conduct and allow Lewies to correct his errors. 
Additionally, as noted by Judge Moeller, the conversation did not address 
substantive issues of the Petitions, and in fact, substitute counsel was involved by 
that time representing the petitioners interests. Thus, the merits of the cases are 
being dually considered by the district court without consideration of Lewies' 
involvement in the adjudication of the Petitions. In sum, the conversation was 
appropriate and covered an issue that was appropriate, within the bounds of a 
judge's role, and had no bearing on the adjudication of the Petitions. 
Accordingly, there was no bias or prejudice exhibited by the ex parte 
communication on January 22, 2013. 
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3. The District Court's Rule 11 Sanction Did Not Demonstrate 
Bias or Prejudice. 
Lewies suggests that Judge Moeller exhibited bias or prejudice because the 
court sua sponte awarded fees pursuant to Rule 11, Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 11 specifically permits a sua sponte award under the Rule: "[i]f a 
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ... " I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) 
(emphasis added). Thus, a sua sponte award is not inappropriate. 
The district court further explained its rationale in awarding fees as a 
sanction pursuant to Rule 11 in the Memorandum Decision. The district court 
explained it's reasoning as follows: 
At the conclusion of the January 22, 2013 hearing, 
the Court invited the County to submit an affidavit 
setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in 
seeking Lewies' disqualification. Although much 
of the oral argument and briefing has since focused 
on a prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54( e) 
and LC. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that 
such an effort is misplaced. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has made clear that "[t]he reasons for which 
attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to I. C. § 12-
121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are not reasons that will 
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
11(a)(1)." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho 
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Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 96, 803 P.2d 993, 1002 
(1991). 
Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court 
appears to more closely fall under the provisions of 
Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 186). The Court did state in a footnote, however, that "[i]n the event I.R.C.P. 
54( e) and I.C. § 12-121 were controlling, the Court notes that the record would 
support findings that the County was the prevailing party and that both petitions 
were brought and pursued unreasonably." (R. 186, fn. 11). The district court 
clearly articulated the rationale for awarding fees pursuant to Rule 11, also noting 
that an analysis under Rule 54( e) and§ 12-121 would also lead to the same result. 
Ultimately, Lewies' argument of bias and/or prejudice is premised entirely 
on supposition and a very liberal account of the procedural history of this matter. 
Lewies takes numerous statements out of context in an effort to argue bias. This 
tactic is improper and ignores the factual record before this Court. There is no 
evidence that the award of Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte was improper or the 
result of bias or prejudice. The district court acted appropriately and within its 
discretion. 
E. There Was No Unethical Or Improper Conduct By Mr. Hall 
Lewies inappropriately suggests that Mr. Hall somehow engaged in 
improper or unethical conduct by not reaching out to Lewies before filing the 
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motion for disqualification. This tactic appeaers to be a continued attempt by 
Lewies to impugn Mr. Hall and further distract the Court from Lewies improper 
conduct that warranted sanctions. Lewie~ improperly suggests there were three 
violations by Hall regarding his representation ofthe County: (1) failure to contact 
Lewies prior to filing the Motion for Disqualification; (2) improperly discussing 
continued representation of the County on the Petitions; and (3) claiming an 
hourly rate of $225 per hour for work. Each of these allegations is baseless and 
unsupported by the record before the Court. 
1. There Was No Requirement to Notify Lewies of the Motion 
For Disqualification Prior to Filing. 
Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 requires a telephone call to 
opposing counsel prior to filing a motion. Absent in Rule 11 is any language 
suggesting that an attorney is required to contact another attorney before filing a 
motion. Rather, the plain language of Rule 11 states "that to the best of the 
signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law ... " I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l). The 
only requirement is that the motion be grounded in fact and that the signing 
attorney has made an inquiry that the facts support the motion. In this case, the 
facts unequivocally support the filing of the Motion for Disqualification. (R. 18-
23 
Page 329 of 408
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
22). This fact is evidenced both by the filing by Lewies seeking withdrawal from 
the case (R. 30-33) and the district courts position that the County had acted 
appropriately. Specifically, the district court stated at the January 22, 2013 
hearing, "I don't think Mr. Hall should have had to file a Motion in January of 
2013 to bring this issue to the Court's attention. . .. I certainly think Mr. Hall was 
justified in bringing his Motion when he did in the manner that which you did." 
(Tr. 23:13-24:11). In its written Memorandum Decision, the district court 
specifically stated ''the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the County 
to remind him [Lewies] ofhis legal and ethical duties before filing the motion for 
disqualification. There is no requirement in Rule 11 to contact opposing counsel 
prior to filing and the Court implicitly found that the filing was appropriate and in 
all likelihood "may have actually prevented Lewies from suffering the ethical 
consequences of failing to withdraw sooner." (R. 189). 
2. The County Appropriately Hired Nelson Hall Parry Tucker. 
Lewies argues that Hall was precluded from continuing to work for the 
County once the County recognized Lewies would inevitably have a conflict of 
interest in further representation of the County on the Petitions. Lewies argues 
that Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii), Idaho Rules ofProfessional Conduct, was somehow 
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violated by the County requesting that Hall continue to represent the County in 
defending against the Petition. Rule 1.11 (d) states as follows: 
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently 
serving as a public officer or employee: 
(1) is subject to Rules 1. 7 and 1.9; and 
(2) shall not: 
(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated 
personally and substantially while in private practice or 
nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government 
agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or 
(ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who 
is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which 
the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that 
a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative 
officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as 
permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in 
Rule 1.12(b). 
I.R.P. C. 1.11 (d). Rule 1.11 (d) is specifically designed to ensure that a lawyer 
does not seek employment where from a party where confidential or other 
information may be obtained. This is specifically noted from the importance 
placed on Rules 1.7 (Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients) and 1.9 (Duties to 
Former Clients). A lawyer owes both current and former clients certain 
obligations of confidentiality and Rule 1.11 is intended to ensure a lawyer does 
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not abuse those obligations. The comments to Rule 1.11 further reiterate the 
intent of Rule 1.11 : 
The Rule represents a balancing of interests. ON one hand, where 
the successive clients are a government agency and another client, 
public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in 
that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. 
A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other 
client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional 
functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage 
could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential 
government information about the client's adversary obtainable 
only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand, 
the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a 
government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit 
transfer of employment to and from the government. 
I.R.P.C. 1.11, Cmt. 4. It is clear that there was nothing improper with the County, 
recognizing the inherent conflict of interest with Lewies, would seek alternative 
representation of Hall. The County recognized that Hall had knowledge of the 
proceedings and was in the best position to advocate for their interests. Rule 1.11 
does not address a current governmental employee continuing representation of 
the governmental entity in a private capacity. It is simply a continued 
representation of the governmental on the same matters and no special benefits or 
advantages would be provided to the County. To suggest that there was any 
violation of Rule 1.11 is patently false and inconsistent with the clear intent of 
Rule 1.11. 
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3. There Were No False Statements Made To The District Court. 
Lewies erroneously suggests that the rate of $225 was inappropriate. 
Lewies claims that the affidavit states that Hall's hourly rate was $225 per hour 
was somehow false because Hall agreed to represent the County at $150 per hour 
for his work as private legal counsel. These accusations are patently false and 
fails to recognize that Hall was a salaried employee at the time the motion for 
disqualification was made. Further, Hall specifically stated his position on the 
sanction of Lewies: 
... quite frankly, I don't have any skin in this fight. If you award 
attorney's fees, it doesn't go to Blake Hall, it goes to the County. 
The reason I say I don't have any skin in this fight is I get paid 
either way. It's the County-! have not been harmed, it is the 
County that has been harmed by the circumstances that we're 
dealing with and so I just don't want anyone to come across or feel 
that there's something personal in this fashion on this issue, 
because certainly from my vantage point there never been anything 
personal and I just don't take the practice personally. 
(Tr. 45: 10-21 ). Hall clearly articulated that he had no personal animosity towards 
Lewies and that any attorney fee award would go directly to the County. 
When the affidavit of costs and fees was prepared, the law requires that a 
reasonable attorney fee be used. Mr. Hall's normal and customary hourly rate at 
the time was $225 per hour for private work. This is an accurate and truthful 
statement of Hall's hourly rate and were "reasonable and similar to, or less than, 
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those charged by attorneys with comparable experience and expertise in the 
vicinity ofFremont County, Idaho." (R. 52). Lewies reference to the $150 per 
hour billable rate was an unrelated contractual agreement between the County and 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. for legal work to be performed once Lewies took 
office. At the time the motion for disqualification was prepared, Mr. Hall was 
still a salaried employee of the County and was not operating under the agreement 
for $150 per hour. As is customary, an attorney is entitled to agree to a lesser 
hourly rate than his customary hourly rate. It is important to note, however, that 
the district court did lower the rate from $225 to $150 per hour in calculating the 
final attorney fee award. However, in this case, the work performed related to the 
preparation and filing of the Motion for Disqualification was accurate reflection of 
Hall's billing rate. The contracted rate really had not bearing on the rate for which 
work was performed while employed by the County. Thus, there is not evidence 
of any false statements being made by Hall. 
Ultimately, Lewies has frivolously and improperly raised these issues 
regarding Mr. Hall in an effort to assail Mr. Hall's character. This issue has never 
been raised by Lewies in any pleading and no hearing was ever held on this matter 
either. The County has never really had the ability to address Lewies erroneous 
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statements. Lewies conduct is inappropriate and should not be condoned by this 
Court. 
F. The County Is Entitled To Attorneys' Fees on Appeal 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, the County seeks an award of 
attorney fees in accordance with Idaho Code Section 12-11 7. Section 12-117 
provides for a municipality to recover attorney fees when "the party against whom 
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Under 
the statutes, the County is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
inasmuch the appeal has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without 
foundation. 
Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to 
make a legitimate showing that the trial court misapplied the law. Bowles v. Pro 
Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999). In this case, there is no 
legitimate argument that the trial court misapplied the law. Lewies simply takes 
numerous statements out of context to suggest that the Rule 11 sanction was 
inappropriate. Lewies' arguments fail to consider the plain standard of abuse of 
discretion and the totality of the Memorandum Decision that clearly articulates the 
basis for the Rule 11 sanction. As a result of Lewies frivolous and unwarranted 
filing, the County has been forced to expend significant costs and fees in 
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defendant against Lewies questionable conduct. Accordingly, the County requests 
an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Idaho 
Supreme Court find that the district court appropriately acted within the bounds of 
its discretion and exercised reason when it sanctioned Mr. Lewies. The 
Respondents respectfully request that this Court find that the sanction in the 
amount of$1,185.00 against Lewies personally was appropriate and that Lewies 
be required to pay said amount. These Respondents further request an award of 
costs and fees incurred in filing and arguing this appeal before this Honorable 
court. 
Dated this _jz day of September, 2013. 
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St. Anthony, ID 83445 
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W. Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
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FILED IN CHAMBERS AT REXBURG, 
MADISON COUNTY, IDAHO. 
Date: Ocdcbtr lb 1Qbl3 
~DI R CT JU • ~;e: . ~D-~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, 
CLARY PICKARD, GEORGE TY 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2012-580 
DECISION ON REVIEW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the District Court on a petition for judicial review filed by 
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Clay Pickard, Laura Pickard, George Ty 
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow ("Petitioners"). Petitioners seek judicial review of the Fremont 
County Board of Commissioners' ("the County" or "the Board") decision to adopt Fremont 
County Ordinance No. 2013-01, which created an official road map of Fremont County ("the 
Official Road Map"). This map designated a road that crosses Petitioners' lands ("the Old 
Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek Road" or "the North Road") as a public right-of-
way. Petitioners allege that the Board failed to make any factual determinations regarding 
whether the North Road was public or private before designating it as public on the Official 
Road Map. Accordingly, Petitioners contend that the Board engaged in unlawful procedure, 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or abused its discretion. Petitioners also seek injunctive 
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relief from any public or private use and/or maintenance of the North Road that may result 
through reliance upon the Official Road Map. Finally, Petitioners seek attorney fees and costs. 
Following briefing, oral argument took place on August 27, 2013, after which the Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
II. FACTUALBACKGROUND 
In preparing to adopt an official county road map pursuant to Idaho Code§ 40-202 
(20 11 ), 1 the Fremont County Board of Commissioners (''the Board") gave public notice that 
"[a]fter months of research [it was] close to establishing the official County road map" and 
solicited public comments? The Board received written comments and held three "public 
information hearings" in July of2012 to further identify public roadways.3 All then-identified 
roads were presented on maps available at the public hearings and on the Fremont County 
website.4 "After the public information hearings, Fremont County Public Works staff reviewed 
the comments for validity and applicability."5 The maps were then adjusted accordingly.6 
On September 11 and 18, 2012, the Board published notice in the Standard Journal, the 
local newspaper of record, that a public hearing was scheduled for September 27, 2012.7 The 
purpose of the public hearing was "to take public comments on the proposed official County 
Road Map(s)."8 At the hearing, Commission Chairman Ron "Skip" Hurt further explained, "So 
tonight it's kind of a culmination of about two years of research that Betty Davis, who works in 
[the] Public Works Department[,] has done."9 He later added, "So we feel like we've gone over 
these [maps] pretty carefully and tonight what we want to hear from you is if there's anything on 
these maps that you think is not designated correctly, something that we missed or something 
that's private which should be public or that should be private."10 
1 The Court recognizes that the current version of Title 40 has been amended. Unless it indicates otherwise, the 
Court will cite the sections as they appeared during the times relevant to this matter. 
z R., p. I. 
3 !d. 
4 R., p. 73. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. 
7 R., p. 22. 
8 R.,p.21. !d. atp.4:12-17. 
9 R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 4:18-20. 
10 /d. atp. 5:12-17. 
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Ty and Tuk Nedrow attended the Public Hearing.ll During the public comments, Ty 
Nedrow stated that two roads on the proposed County map were incorrectly designated as county 
roads. 12 He referred to these roads as the "East Road" and the "North Road." Tuk Nedrow 
stated that no County equipment had ever been on either road and that the County had never 
maintained the North Road. 13 Tuk and Ty Nedrow claimed that both roads lead to nowhere. 14 
Concerning the East Road, Ty Nedrow said that it went through his field and that fishermen 
occasionally got stuck in it while attempting to get to a nearby reservoir. 15 Concerning the North 
Road, Tuk Nedrow explained, "It goes through a quarter mile of our property and a quarter mile 
of Mr. [Achtley's] and it goes through a half a mile ofBLM and then hits the Forest Service 
[road] .... " 16 Ty Nedrow also explained that although the North Road was referred to as the 
"mail route," his grandpa had told him that it was a shortcut and had never been used for 
carrying mail or passengers but only for stage coaches returning from West Yellowstone without 
cargo; the lava rock grates on the road broke many wheels. 17 He also explained that the North 
Road was gated on his property and that it was also gated before it reached Mr. Atchley's 
property. 18 
A discussion arose during the Public Hearing as to whether the North Road was an R.S. 
24 77 road, which was explained to be a road in use before 197 5 that could not be taken from the 
public. 19 Recognizing that certain roads might be R.S. 2477 roads, Chairman Hurt indicated that 
the Board had "60 days after this hearing to make a decision, and ... we may have to collect 
more information. We may have to have another public hearing .... "20 
About two weeks later, on October 15, 2012, the Board held a meeting where it 
considered the content of the proposed County map in light ofthe public comments.21 The 
Board brought up Ty and Tuk Nedrow's objections concerning the East Road and the North 
II R., pp. 23-24. 
12 R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 20 12), p. 4:18-20. 
13 /d. atpp. 21:16-18; 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14. 
14 /d. at pp. 15:19-20,21:16-18,21:25-22:3. 
15 /d. at p. 15:16-21. 
16 !d. at p. 22:3-10. 
17 /d. at pp. 16:22-17:20. 
18 /d. at p. 18:15-18. 
19 Jd. at 18:22-19:23. In reality, R.S.-2477 was repealed in 1976, and any "rights created under it are valid ifthey 
existed before October 21, 1976." Farrell v. Bd. ofComm'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378, 384,64 P.3d 304, 310 
(2002), overruled on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (20 12). 
20 R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 20:7-20:17 
21 R., pp. 57-58. 
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Road and agreed that the East Road should be closed to the public, recognizing the issues Ty 
Nedrow had raised during the Public Hearing.22 However, it decided to leave the North Road 
designated as a public road. An unidentified woman present at the meeting informed the Board 
that "an old Shell Oil map on the Internet" seemed to show that people were being directed down 
the North Road as far back as 1956.23 The Shell Oil map was apparently not presented at the 
meeting and does not appear anywhere in the record?4 The Board then concluded that "any 
roads [used] prior to [1976] cannot be closed. They fall under this RS-2477 that ifthey were 
ever used as public roads then public domain takes precedence."25 In other words, the Board 
concluded that because the North Road had been "ascertained a 2477 road," it would be 
designated on the Official Road Map as a public road?6 
At an October 29,2012 meeting, the Board voted and approved by a two-to-one vote the 
Official Road Map,27 which was published as Ordinance No. 2013-01.28 The Official Road Map 
lists the East Road as one of various "Private Roads" and the North Road as a "County Dirt 
Road."29 The Board's findings of fact state that the "[r]oads [in the Official Road Map] were 
identified as Fremont County roads based on" several criteria, one of which was that "[t]he roads 
had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or are the 
sole essential connection roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads."30 In its conclusions oflaw, the 
22 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording), 5:09-9:53. All future references to this audio recording are contained within this 
timeframe. Regarding the East Road, the Board stated that people were "going up and getting stuff." I d. It did not 
specifically mention, as discussed earlier, that Ty Nedrow expressed concern during the Public Hearing that the East 
Road went through his field and that many fishermen got stuck in it while attempting to get to a reservoir. R., p. 53, 
Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21. 
23 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). The audio recording does not clearly state whether this comment was directed at 
the North Road or the East Road; however, in the context of the discussion, the Court concludes that the comment 
concerned the North Road. I d. Also, the audio recording does not clearly identify the woman speaking, but those 
present at the meeting were "Commissioners Skip Hurt, Lee Miller, Jordon Stoddard," "Clerk Abbie Mace, Deputy 
Clerk Laura Singleton, Public Works Director Marla Vik, Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh, Greg Newkirk, 
and Debbie Davis." R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21. 
24 The Court is mindful that Respondent's attorneys have alleged in their brief that "the Commissioners reviewed" 
the map in question. Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7. However, the recorded transcript does not confirm this assertion 
and the record does not indicate the Mr. Hall or Mr. Starnes were present at the meeting. 
25 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). 
26 Jd. 
27 R., p. 64. 
28 R., p. 66. 
29 R., p. 93. 
30 R., pp. 72-73, ~ 6. Paragraph 6 ofthe Findings of Fact begins: "Roads were identified as Fremont County roads 
based on the following criteria: ... " !d. This language suggests that the roads met all six listed criteria; however, 
this would be problematic since the North Road seems to have been asserted as meeting only the last of the six 
criterion, which concerns R.S. 2477 roads. Therefore, the Court interprets this list to suggest that roads met at least 
one of the listed criteria. 
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Board stated that "[a]ll roads identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined by the 
Fremont County Board of Commissioners to be County roads, either paved, gravel or 
unimproved (dirt); and are not recorded in the Board of Commissioners' official minutes as 
vacated or abandoned; and are routinely maintained by the County."31 The Board more 
specifically stated that "[a]ll roads identified in [the Official Road Map] as being R.S.-2477 
roads are determined by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners as having been asserted 
under Federal Law R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in 
official records in the Fremont County Public Works office."32 The Board also stated that "[a]ll 
roads found on the Official Fremont County Road Map constitutes public notice that evidence 
has been presented to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners that the roads may qualify as 
a public right-of-way."33 It also clarified, "Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County 
Road Map does not constitute validation or abandonment of any road. "34 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Decisions made by a board of county or highway district commissioners in an 
abandonment, vacation or validation proceeding are subject to judicial review pursuant to I. C. § 
40-208." Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Bd. ofComm 'rs ofTeton Cnty., 141 Idaho 855, 858, 119 
P.3d 630, 633 (2005). In such cases, the court conducts a review without a jury and is confined 
to the record. I.C. § 40-208(6). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
governing board regarding the weight ofthe information on questions of fact. I.C. § 40-208(7). 
In the case at bar, Petitioners do not challenge a decision regarding an abandonment, 
vacation, or validation proceeding, but rather the Board's decision to place a disputed road on an 
official county highway map in a§ 40-202 proceeding. In Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 858, 
119 P.3d at 633, the Supreme Court stated: 
[S]ince I.C. § 40-202 is contained in the section of the Code relating to general 
provisions for the establishment and maintenance of the state and county highway 
system, including procedures required for abandonment, vacation or validation of 
highways, it is logical that the statutorily mandated standard of review under § 40-
208 should apply to § 40-202 decisions. 
31 R., p. 74. 
32 !d. 
33 R., pp. 74-75, ~ 9 (emphasis added). 
34 Jd. 
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Under this code section, the reviewing court may affirm a board's decision or remand the case 
for further proceedings. I.C. § 40-208(7). Additionally, 
!d. 
[t]he Court may reverse or modify the [Board's] decision if substantial rights of 
the appellant have been prejudiced because the [Board's] findings, inferences, 
conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; 
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) Affected by other error of law; 
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial 
information on the whole record; or 
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or 
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by competent and substantial evidence 
even though conflicting evidence exists. Wulffv. Sun Valley Co., 127 Idaho 71, 73-74, 896 P.2d 
979, 981-82 (1995). "Substantial and competent evidence is 'relevant evidence that a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion."' Huffv. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d 
1244, 1246 (2006) (quoting Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 211, 217 
(2000)). "Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal." 
Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859, 119 P.3d at 634 (citing Love v. Board of County Comm 'rs 
of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558, 559, 671 P.2d 471,472 (1983)). Accordingly, this Court can 
freely review any question oflaw, but it will not substitute its own judgment for the Board's as 
to the weight afforded the evidence on a question of fact. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW 
Petitioners present the following issues on review for consideration by the Court: 
1. Did the Board give proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map (Fremont 
County Ordinance No. 2013-01)? 
2. Did the Board make proper factual determinations in support of adopting the Official 
Road Map (Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01)? 
3. By failing to make proper factual determinations, did the Board engage in unlawful 
procedure, act arbitrarily and capriciously, or abuse its discretion when it placed the North Road 
on the Official Road Map? 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. The Board gave proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map. 
"Idaho Code § 40-202 provides the manner in which a board of county commissioners or 
highway district designates public highways and rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho 
at 859, 119 P.3d at 634. This "initial selection of the county highway system and highway 
district system" requires that the "board of county or highway or district commissioners" take 
several actions. I.C. § 40-202(1). These are: 1) prepare a map "showing the general location of 
each highway and public right-or-way in their jurisdiction;" 2) give notice of its "intention to 
adopt the map as the official map of that system;" and 3) "specify the time and place [for a 
public hearing] at which all interested persons may be heard" regarding the adoption of the 
proposed map. !d. 
Although Petitioners have asserted that the Board did not provide proper notice, they 
have failed to articulate the nature of the deficiency. The Court finds that the Board has fulfilled 
the three requirements of I. C. § 40-202(1 ). Specifically, it prepared a map facially complying 
with the statute, indicated its intent to adopt the proposed County map, and published proper 
notice of the time and place of the public hearing on that map in the Standard Journal on 
September 11 and 18, 2012. Petitioners have failed to point to any procedural deficiency in the 
manner in which the Board conducted its adoption of the disputed ordinance. Therefore, the 
Court must conclude as a matter of law that the Board has fully complied with the notice 
requirements of I. C. § 40-202(1 ). 
B. The Board failed to make adequate factual determinations before adopting 
the Official Road Map. 
Idaho Code § 40-202(1) also requires that "[a ]fter the hearing, the commissioners shall 
adopt the map, with any changes or revisions considered by them to be advisable in the public 
interest, as the official map of the respective highway system." !d. Petitioners claim that before 
adopting the map, the Board failed to make proper factual determinations regarding the public or 
private status of the North Road. They contend that the North Road is not an R.S. 2477 road and 
that the Board is required to prove such status. 
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Although the process outlined in I.C. § 40-202(1)-iffollowed properly-results in an 
official county map of roads, it "does not also serve to adjudicate the public status of any roads 
within the county or create new public highways or rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141 
Idaho at 859-60, 119 P.3d at 634-35.35 Thus, when adopting an initial county map of roads, the 
Board neither validates nor vacates roads as R.S. 2477 or other roads. Rather, the Board makes 
"a determination that a particular roadway occupies the status, in fact, of a public highway or 
right-of-way." Jd. at 861. Therefore, the process for establishing an R.S. 2477 road is relevant 
to the extent that the Board could reasonably find, based on the evidence before it, that the North 
Road was, in fact, an R.S. 2477 road and therefore a public right-of-way. 
Under United States Revised Statute 2477, a state government entity can grant public 
status to a road on public lands. The Idaho Supreme Court explained this process: 
The federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads provided that "[t]he right of way for 
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is 
hereby granted." 43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866) (repealed 1976). While this statute has 
been repealed, otherwise valid leases, permits, patents and similar rights created 
under it are valid if they existed before October 21, 1976. Pub.L. 94-579, § 706(a) 
(1976). 
Farrell v. Bd. ofComm 'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378, 384, 64 P.3d 304, 310 (2002), overruled 
on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). 
Concerning this "freezing" ofR.S. 2477 rights as they existed in 1976, the lOth Circuit stated: 
The difficulty is in knowing what [valid and existing rights] means. Unlike any 
other federal land statute of which we are aware, the establishment ofR.S. 2477 
rights of way required no administrative formalities: no entry, no application, no 
license, no patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public 
acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom the right was vested. As 
the Supreme Court of Utah noted 75 years ago, R.S. 2477 '"was a standing offer 
of a free right of way over the public domain,"' and the grant may be accepted 
"without formal action by public authorities." Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. 
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646,648 (1929), (quoting Streeter v. Stalnaker, Ql 
Neb. 205, 85 N.W. 47,48 (1901)). In its Report to Congress on R.S. 2477: The 
History and Management of R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way Claims on Federal and 
35 It is worth noting that the Idaho Legislature has revised I.C. § 40-202 in what appears to be approval of the 
Homestead Farms decision. Subsection 8 now states in relevant part: 
The purpose of this official map is to put the public on notice of those highways and public rights-
of-way that the board of county or highway district commissioners considers to be public. The 
inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way from such a map does not, in itself, 
constitute a legal determination of the public status of such highway or public right-of-way. Any 
person may challenge, at any time, the inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way 
from such map by initiating proceedings as described in section 40-208(7), Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 40-202 (2013). 
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Other Lands 1 (June 1993), the Department ofthe Interior explained that R.S. 
24 77 highways "were constructed without any approval from the federal 
government and with no documentation of the public land records, so there are 
few official records documenting the right-of-way or indicating that a highway 
was constructed on federal land under this authority." 
In short, identifying valid R.S. 2477 roads is a difficult and controversial matter. Indeed, 
it appears nothing has been done legislatively on the federal level to clarify the process: 
Despite decades of litigation over R.S. 2477 roads, Congress has not spoken to the 
issue by amending FLPMA [which repealed R. S. 24 77 in 197 6] and providing a 
statutory framework to help courts resolve the discrepancies between the statutes; 
nor has it delegated authority to federal management agencies to promulgate 
regulations guiding their administration ofR.S. 2477 claims. In fact, Congress has 
actually prohibited the BLM from adopting regulations establishing a framework 
for agency adjudication ofR.S. 2477 claims. There is also no legislative history of 
R.S. 2477 that might provide informal guidance to litigants. 
Hillary M. Hoffmann, Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: The Wilderness Society v. Kane County 
Leaves Everyone Confused About Navigating A Right-of-Way Claim Under Revised Statute 
2477, 18 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 3, 9-10 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
Without guidance from the federal government, "[ s ]tate law governs the manner in which a road 
on federal property becomes public under R.S. 2477." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, 
814,264 P.3d 916,921 (2011) (citing Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 160, 191 P.3d 233, 
238 (2008)); accord Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1974); 
United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 503,505 (lOth Cir.1949); Smith v. Mitchell, 21 Wash. 536, 
540, 58 P. 667, 668 (1899) ("[Under R.S. 2477,] a highway may be established across or upon 
such public lands in any of the ways recognized by the law of the state in which such lands are 
located .... "). 
In Idaho, a valid and existing R.S. 2477 road exists if"the local government accepted the 
road from the federal government." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310. This acceptance 
can occur in two ways: "through a positive act of acceptance by the local government or 
compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at the time." Galli, 146 Idaho at 159, 191 
P.3d at 237 (explaining Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310). A positive act of acceptance 
"is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state road creation statute[s]." Farrell, 138 
Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Also, the Supreme Court has stated: 
No R.S. 2477 road may be established once the land has been removed from the 
public domain. However, if an R.S. 2477 road is established prior to the land 
exiting the public domain, regardless if it is officially recognized or not, then that 
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!d. 
grant remains effective even though the land which the road traverses is now 
private property. 
Due to the difficulty in granting and/or adjudicating R.S. 2477 roads, it is understandable 
that some states, like Idaho, have procedures for state public officials to identify pubic rights-of-
way on maps, including those that may be R.S. 2477 roads, short of adjudication. This is a less 
formal process with often non-binding results. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 72-3-105 (West) 
("Each county shall prepare maps showing to the best of its ability the class D roads within its 
boundaries which were in existence as of October 21, 1976 [the date that R.S. 24 77 was 
repealed] .... The county shall provide a copy of any map ... to the department. ... The 
department is not responsible for the validity of any class D road . ... ")(emphasis added). 
In Idaho, when mapping an initial selection of the county highway system, a board is 
required to show by the record that-before adopting the Official Road Map--it considered 
objections, provided evidence, and made findings concerning the public status of roads contained 
therein. Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 861, 119 P.3d at 637. The evidence provided must be 
substantial and competent; in other words, it must support whatever factual findings made before 
concluding that the road in question is an R.S. 2477 road. As explained above, in Idaho, an R.S. 
2477 road must be established prior to the land exiting the public domain and prior to October 
21, 197 6. If a road is so established but not yet officially recognized, the original grant remains 
effective even after the land is privately acquired, regardless of the date of acquisition. 
In the case at bar, the Board met together after the Public Hearing and discussed whether 
the North Road was established prior to 1976. Although Ty Nedrow had testified at the Public 
Hearing that the North Road had been a shortcut used for empty stage coaches returning from 
West Yellowstone, the record establishes that the Board did not consider his testimony and made 
no factual determination regarding it. Instead, the Board and those present focused mainly on 
the statement of an unidentified woman present at the meeting: "I actually came across an old 
Shell Oil map on the Internet that, by looking at it, it looks like that that's actually the way back 
in 1956 they were trying to route people."36 The Board accepted this interpretation ofthe map, 
even though it apparently never actually saw a copy of the referenced map. Additionally, the 
record contains neither a copy of the map nor further mention of where to locate the map. 
36 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). 
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Therefore, this Court has no way of confirming that (1) the map actually existed, (2) the 
unidentified speaker's interpretation of the map was correct, and (3) the map provided the Board 
with substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support its factual determination that the 
North Road had been established prior to 1976. Ultimately, this Court cannot properly evaluate 
the Board's conclusion that the North Road had been "ascertained a 2477 road" and should be 
designated on the Official Road Map as a public road.37 
The Court is mindful that the Board neither attempted to adjudicate the North Road as an 
R.S. 2477 road, nor was it not required to do so. See Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859-60, 
119 P.3d at 634-35. However, the evidence before the Board in the record must at a minimum 
support its determination that the North Road qualifies for R.S. 2477 status. See !d. at 861, 119 
P.3d at 636. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Board's findings and 
conclusions on this issue. 
Even assuming that the Board properly considered Ty Nedrow's testimony and that this, 
in conjunction with the "old Shell Oil map," somehow provided substantial and competent 
evidence to support the Board's determination that the North Road was in use and established 
prior to October 21, 1976, nothing in the record establishes that this occurred before the North 
Road left the public domain. This is an additional requirement before an R.S. 2477 road can be 
established. The record only shows that Petitioners currently own the land around the North 
Road. Although Ty Nedrow said that the North Road had been used for stagecoaches, 
suggesting a strong possibility that the road was used and established prior to it being privately 
owned, nowhere in the record does the Board address or make findings regarding this necessary 
element of an R.S. 2477 road. In sum, the Board did not, before adopting the Official Road Map, 
make adequate factual determinations that the North Road was established prior to the land 
exiting the public domain and prior to October 21, 1976. Thus, its inclusion in the Official Road 
Map as a public road was clearly erroneous. I.C. § 40-208(7)(e). 
The Court recognizes that when it sits in an appellate capacity, it should not "search the 
record for error." Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004). 
Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, and to assist the parties on remand, the Court 
believes it is appropriate to note that other factual findings of the Board are problematic.38 For 
37 !d. 
38 These matters did not provide the basis for the Court's decision. 
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example, the Official Road Map appears to list the North Road as a "County Dirt Road," not as 
an R.S. 2477 road.39 However, in its conclusions oflaw, the Board stated that "[a]ll roads 
identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined ... to be County roads, either paved, gravel 
or unimproved (dirt); ... and are routinely maintained by the County."40 While the North Road 
appears to be listed as a "County Dirt Road," there is no factual support in the record for finding 
that that the North Road is routinely maintained by the County. On the contrary, Tuk Nedrow 
stated at the Public Hearing that the County had never placed equipment on or maintained the 
North Road.41 Even if the Board had depicted the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road on the 
official map, rather than as a "County Dirt Road," it specifically stated that "[a]ll roads identified 
in [the Official Road Map] as ... R.S.-2477 roads ... hav[e] been asserted under Federal Law 
R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in official records in the 
Fremont County Public Works office."42 The record is devoid of any official record that 
identifies the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road. 
C. The record establishes that the Board's decision designating the North Road 
on the Official Road Map as an R.S. 2477 Road was clearly erroneous and it acted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
"An action is capricious if it was done without a rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was 
done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining 
principles." Am. Lung Ass 'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dep 't of Agric., 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130 
P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Board's decision that the North 
Road was an R.S. 2477 road appears from the record to be based entirely upon an interpretation 
of an alleged map found on the Internet that the Board itself failed to examine or include in the 
record for the Court to examine. Also, although the Board concluded that the North Road was 
routinely maintained by the County, it neither provided support for this conclusion nor addressed 
the oral testimony claiming the contrary. Moreover, it did not consider or make factual 
determinations regarding when the North Road left the public domain. Therefore, the Board's 
decision was clearly erroneous because it lacked adequate factual support from reliable, 
39 R., p. 93. 
40 R., p. 74. 
41 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording), pp. 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14. 
42 R., p. 74. 
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probative, and substantial evidence. Additionally, the decision to rely upon the limited evidence 
set forth in the record was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of its discretion. 
D. Petitioners are not entitled to attorney fees or costs. 
Petitioners failed to provide a legal basis for awarding attorney fees and/or costs in their 
brief on appeal. Nevertheless, the Court notes that under I.C. § 12-117, a court is not allowed to 
"award attorney fees in an appeal from an administrative decision." Smith v. Washington Cnty., 
150 Idaho 388, 391,247 P.3d 615,618 (2010). Petitioners also request attorney fees under I.C. § 
12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54( e). "Attorney fees are not available to a party on appeal from an agency 
decision under [I.C. § 12-121]" because it pertains to civil actions. Staff of Idaho Real Estate 
Comm'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630,637,22 P.3d 105, 112 (2001). Idaho Rule ofCivil 
Procedure 54( e) also pertains to civil actions and is, therefore, inapplicable to this case. Lastly, 
Petitioners have failed to articulate a legal basis for an award of costs under I.R.C.P. 84. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the record below and the applicable laws and standards, the Court finds 
that the Findings and Conclusions issued by the Board in support of County Ordinance No. 
2013-01 on October 29, 2012 violate I.C. §§ 40-202 or 40-208. Therefore, the portions of 
County Ordinance No. 2013-01 declaring the North Road to be a public right-of-way (either as 
an R.S. 2477 Road or as a County Dirt Road) are hereby VACATED. This matter shall be 
REMANDED to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to properly consider the status of 
the North Road and issue a new County Map in a manner consistent with this opinion. 
In light ofthis decision, Petitioners' request for injunctive relief has been rendered moot. 
However, if the County or members of the general public attempt to maintain and/or use the 
North Road in reliance on the current Official Road Map and/or County Ordinance No. 2013-01, 
Petitioners' claim for injunctive relief would at that time become ripe for adjudication. 
Finally, Petitioners' demand for attorney fees is DENIED. Petitioners, as prevailing 
parties, may request recovery of their costs, provided they can articulate a legal basis for such an 
award under I.R.C.P. 84 or other applicable rules. 
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.• ~ 
SO ORDERED this Jfl:_ day of October, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECISION ON 
REVIEW was this /5 day of October, 2013, served upon the following individuals via U.S. 
Mail: 
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Lynn Hossner 
Attorney at Law 
1 09 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Blake G. Hall, esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Fremont County Board of Commissioners 
151 West 1st North 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
By: ~::...._____ _ 
TJ,f1~ Clerk 
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The Real Party In Interest - Appellant, Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies"), submits this reply 
brief in support of his appeal from the final decision of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District in and for Fremont County (the "Court"). 
!.ARGUMENT 
A. Scope of Review on Appeal. 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority on this issue. (Cf Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 12-14) 
B. The Court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(l) sanctions against Lewies 
based on extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of Rule II signature certification requirements. 
Respondents' main argument on this issue is that Rule 11 allows courts to impose sanctions 
for "misguided filings" and "litigative misconduct. " (Respondents' Brief, p. 6) However, 
Respondents fail to identifY what those terms actually mean. Further, they fail to identifY what 
conduct, if any, Lewies engaged in that fell within the meaning of those terms. 
For guidance on what the terms mean, the case of Conley v. Looney, 117 Idaho 627, 630-
31,790 P.2d 920,923-24 (Ct. App. 1989) proves helpful. In Conley, the court wrote as follows: 
"This Court recently decided that I.R.C.P. 11 sanctions should not be applied to 
make a 'lump-sum compensatory attorney fee award.' Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 
22,773 P.2d 290 (Ct.App.l989). The Kent court further stated that '[i]n our view, 
Rule 1l(a)(l) is not a broad compensatory law. It is a court management tool. The 
power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on 
discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the 
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overall course of a lawsuit.' Id at 23, 773 P.2d at 291. Here, it is impossible to 
determine from the record whether or not the I.R.C.P. 11 sanction was imposed 
for particular litigative misconduct (the filing of frivolous motions) (or as a broad 
form of compensation in the form of an award of attorney fees incurred to defend 
the entire action." (Emphasis added.) 
Additionally, in Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 23, 773 P.2d 290,291 (Ct. App. 1989), the 
court wrote concerning Rule 11 as follows: 
"This rule authorizes sanctions (including attorney fees) for pleadings which are 
not 'well grounded in fact,' which are not 'warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law,' or 
which are 'interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause 
urmecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.' In our view, Rule 
ll(a)(1) is not a broad compensatory law. It is a court management tool. The 
power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on 
discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the 
overall course of a lawsuit." 
According to the above authorities, litigative misconduct means "filing frivolous motions." 
In the instant case the Court determined that Lewies' petitions were far from frivolous. As Judge 
Moeller said, they contained "important issues" and he wanted to "get straight to the merits." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 33) 
Respondents' also argue that in imposing Rule 11 sanctions the Court applied a totality of 
the circumstances test to Lewies' conduct and "viewed Lewies' conduct in the broad picture of the 
'integrity of the judicial process;"' and that "the integrity of the judicial process (litigative 
misconduct) was harmed by Lewies' failure to identifY the significant conflict issues that would 
inevitable [sic] be created by Lewies' filings." (Respondents' Brief, p. 9) They then cite the 
Court's decision language as follows, "Lewies' filings of the petitions against a known, future client 
was a significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system." (I d., p. I 0) 
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Respondents' are contending that Rule II sanctions were appropriate because given the 
totality of the circumstances Lewies failed to identifY significant conflict issues (pertaining to a 
"known,future client") and that such failure harmed the integrity of the judicial process. However, 
as previously explained in Appellant's Brief at page 16, nothing in Rule II prohibits an attorney 
from filing a well-grounded legal action against a known, future client. Further, the Court cited no 
authority that prohibits such a filing. Rather, conflicts of interest are matters governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct - they are ethical concerns. Running afoul of an ethics rule is not 
tantamount to filing papers for an improper purpose subjecting one to sanctions under Rule 11.1 
Next, the notion that filing well-grounded petitions against a known, future client constituted 
an improper purpose under Rule II because doing so "harmed the integrity of the judicial process" 
is without merit. The Court clearly believed the petitions contained "important issues "2 so the bare 
fact that they were filed against a known future client cannot support imposition of Rule II 
sanctions. Under Rule II 's analytical framework, since the Court openly acknowledged the 
importance of the merits of the petitions,3 it could not subsequently find that they had been filed for 
any improper purpose. As explained by Judge William Schwarzer, " .. .If a reasonably clear legal 
justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no improper purpose can be found 
and sanctions are inappropriate." Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II - A Closer Look, 
Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985). 
1 In the instant case, no ethical violations were found. (R. 188) 
2 Appellant's Brief, p. 33. 
3 See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 32-33. 
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Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies for filing petitions that admittedly contained 
"important issues" was an abuse of discretion. 
Also of substantial significance in determining whether the Court improperly considered 
extrinsic factors in imposing Rule 11 sanctions was the Court's opening question put to Lewies, 
"What were you thinking filing these petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were 
elected to be Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney?" 4 The judge improperly delved into Lewies' 
subjective intent. As a direct result of the Court's foray into state of mind, the following harmful 
consequences warned of by Judge Shwarzer5 actually ensued: (l) satellite litigation was spawned 
(i.e. this appeal); (2) advocacy was chilled (i.e. a private practice attorney, once elected to public 
office albeit not yet sworn-in, can no longer zealously represent6 his private clients); and (3) Lewies 
was stigmatized by the bad faith finding (i.e. publication of the finding in regional newspapers 
resulting in damage to Lewies' professional reputation and community standing). 
Rather than venturing into the subjective realm of states of mind to discern why Lewies filed 
the petitions, the Court should have objectively examined Rule II sanctions in light of existing 
4 See, Appellant's Brief, p. 7. 
5 "In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the court need not delve into the attorney's 
subjective intent...Ifa court were to entertain inquiries into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially 
harmful consequences, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chilling advocacy ... Finally, a bad 
faith test would make courts more reluctant to impose sanctions for fear of stigmatizing a lawyer by a bad faith fmding." 
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II -A Closer Look, Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) 
6 I.R.P.C. 1.3, comment I, provides in relevant part, as follows: "A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a 
client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical 
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and 
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." Comment 2 to I.R.P.C. 
1.3, provides in relevant part, "A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time ... ; in 
extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed." 
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federal and state authorities and determined whether Lewies had made a proper investigation upon 
reasonable inquiry into the factual basis and legal basis for the petitions. Durrant v. Christensen, 
117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1990). By inquiring into Lewies' state of mind and 
apparently concluding that he harbored some sort of political grudge against the County 
Commissioners that served as a bad faith motive for filing petitions against them, the Court 
ventured far beyond any actual evidence before it, and far beyond Rule 11 's objective standard. 
Imposition of sanctions without finding a lack of reasonable inquiry was not an adequate 
analysis under Rule 11. Hanfv. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 816 P.2d 320 (1991). Without 
such a determination, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. Ibid. 
C. The petitions filed by Lewies in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 did not violate 
the signature certification requirements ofi.R.C.P. ll(a)(l). 
Respondents argue that "Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 can only be used where a 
filing violates the signature certification requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(l)." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 6) They also argue that "Lewies' reading of Rule 11 is overly simplistic and 
ignores the explicit requirement that an attorney who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper for an 
improper purpose." (Ibid., p. 12) 
Contrary to Respondents' understanding, the fact is that a Rule 11 violation occurs at the 
time the offending paper is signed and submitted to the court. Cooter & Gel! v. Hartmarx Corp., 
496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed. 2d 359 (1990). "The certification which results 
from the attorney's signature of the paper is directed at the three substantive prongs of the rule: its 
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- ------~-----
factual basis, its legal basis, and its legitimate purpose .... " (Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21, citing 
Sanctions Under the New Federal Ru1e 11- A Closer Look, Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181 
(1985)) However, in the instant case, the Court failed to inquire into any of the three prongs. It 
made no inquiry into the factual basis of the petitions, it made no inquiry into the legal basis of the 
petitions, and it made no objective inquiry into the legitimate purposes of the petitions. 
Accordingly, the Court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-22) 
D. Attorney's fees as Rule 11 sanctions. 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority to refute Lewies' contention that Rule 
11 is a sanctions statute and not a fee shifting provision. By ordering Lewies to pay attorney's fees 
for time Hall spent on motions to disqualify him, but then converting such fee award into Rule 11 
sanctions, sua sponte (without any motion or argument from Hall), was an abuse of discretion. (See, 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-23) 
E. The Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel {Or the County" 
because Lewies never represented the County in either case number CV -12-580 or CV-12-581. 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority to refute Lewies' contention that he 
never represented the County in these proceedings, but that from the very outset, Hall did. (See, 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25) In fact, Hall still does. 
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F. The court erred in finding that Lcwies' actions "delayed adiudication o(the petitions for 
iudicial review. " 
Respondents argue that "Lewies did not believe the county commissioners had made the 
necessary findings to hire Nelson Hall Parry & Tucker to represent the County on the petitions." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 13) Respondents' further argue that "Lewies' continued instance [sic] on 
who could properly represent the County caused a delay in this matter. ... additional briefing was 
necessary and further hearings were required." (Ibid., p. 13) 
Lewies agrees that he did not believe the county commissioners had made the requisite 
constitutional finding of necessity to hire Hall and that the "necessity issue" required briefing and 
hearings. However, such in-court activity can provide no basis for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 15) Indeed, Judge Moeller, himself, found the necessity issue to be a "very 
tough question" and he was relieved the question had been voluntarily withdrawn by the Office of 
the Prosecuting Attorney so he did not have to decide the question. (Ibid., pp. 28-29) 
Because there was a reasonably clear legal justification for raising the constitutional 
necessity issue, and because it was raised in-court, the Court could not find that any paper had been 
filed for any improper purposes that could justifY imposition of Rule II sanctions. 
G. The Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have retained private 
legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 
because the legal question whether the County's hiring of private counsel in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution's necessity requirement had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the 
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Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the Court for its decision. 
Respondents have misunderstood the argument advanced by Lewies on this issue. In their 
brief Respondents write that "Lewies continues to argue that the County could not retain private 
legal counsel." (Respondents' Brief, p. 15) That misses the point. Lewies is not arguing whether or 
not the County could retain private legal counsel. Indeed, Lewies' deputy prosecuting attorney 
withdrew that legal question. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-29) Rather, Lewies is arguing that "the 
Court improperly decided a question that was not before it." (Ibid., p. 28) 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority on the actual issue presented on 
appeal. 
H. The Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his representation of 
petitioners. 
Respondents argue that any suggestion by Lewies that he completed his representation of 
petitioners is "devoid of verifiable facts in the record." (Respondents' Brief, p. 11) However, 
Respondents' have seemingly overlooked Lewies' undisputed oral representations made to the 
Court, and his undisputed affidavit contained in the record, showing that his representation of 
petitioners was limited 7 to drafting and timely filing petitions for judicial review in order to 
preserve and protect his clients' legal rights relative to their private roads. (Appellant's Brief, p. 30) 
More to the point, though, Respondents' have submitted no argument or authority to refute 
7 I.R.C.P. 1.2(c), provides, "A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under 
the circumstances and the client gives informed consent." Comment 6 to the rule, provides in relevant part that, "A 
limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation." 
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the issue actually presented on appeal: that "unless and until an actual case or controversy was 
presented to the Court on the question whether Lewies had completed his limited representation of 
petitioners, the Court should have refrained from issuing an opinion on the matter." (Ibid., pp. 30-
31) 
I. Judge Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies by engaging in the 
following actions: 
Respondents argue that "Had Lewies legitimately believed Judge Moeller was biased or 
prejudiced against him, his appropriate remedy was to file a motion for disqualification for cause. 
Lewies did not pursue this remedy and any claims are now waived." (Respondents' Brief, p. 17) 
While LR.C.P. 40(d)(2) allows any party to an action to file a motion to disqualifY a judge 
for cause, failure to file such a motion does not waive a party's right to claim bias or prejudice on 
appeal. Indeed, up until the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Lewies first read the 
language contained in it and denouncing him personally - e.g. "committing a significant offense 
against the integrity of the judicial system "8 - Lewies could not possibly have known the full extent 
of any latent bias or prejudice against him. But, once the Memorandum Decision was issued, 
published in the regional newspapers, and the general public and members of the Idaho State Bar 
began commenting on the judge's disdain for Lewies, actual bias became patently evident. 
8 Appellant's Brief, p. 38, R. 182. 
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a.) Ex parte communication. 
Respondents argue that the "district court did not violate Canon 3(B)(7) because there was 
no discussion of substantive issues." However, when Judge Moeller warned Lewies, and only 
Lewies, not to let a "political grudge interfere with his professional judgment," to "decide what 
hill he wanted to die on," and tbat the conversation "never happened," he was warning about tbe 
petitions Lewies had filed against the County Commissioners (i.e. substantive law)9 He was not 
warning Lewies about any aspect of procedurallaw. 10 
By delving into Lewies' state of mind and concluding that he harbored some sort of 
political grudge against the County Commissioners tbat served as his motivation for filing 
petitions for judicial review against them, Judge Moeller ventured far beyond any actual 
evidence before him. Then, by acting on his own unsupported conclusions about Lewies' state 
of mind and initiating an ex parte communication to warn Lewies about not letting his political 
grudge interfere with his professional judgment, Judge Moeller demonstrated actual bias or 
prejudice. 
b.) Converting an award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions, sua sponte. 
Respondents' argue that "The district court further explained its rationale in awarding fees 
as a sanction pursuant to Rule 11 ... as follows: 
9 "Substantive law" means "The part of the law tbat creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of 
parties. Cf. Procedural law." Black's Law Dictionary, 9" Ed. (2009). 
10 "Procedural law" means "The rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as 
opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. (2009). 
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'At the conclusion of the January 22, 2013 hearing, the Court invited the County to 
submit an affidavit setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in seeking 
Lewies' disqualification (emphasis added). Although much of the oral argument 
and briefing has since focused on a prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54( e) 
and I.C. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that such an effort is misplaced. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that 'the reasons for which attorney fees may 
be awarded pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54( e)(!) are not reasons that will 
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l) .. .Instead, the heart of 
the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the provisions of 
Rule 11 ... "' 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-22) 
Yes, it is true that the Court invited the County to submit an affidavit setting forth attorney 
fees "reasonably incurred in seeking Lewies' disqualification." (Ibid.) But, why did it then convert 
that fee award into Rule II sanctions? What went into the Court's conversion decision? 
All that is actually known, is that in its Memorandum Decision the Court arbitrarily 
announced, "Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the 
provisions of Rule II." Did the Court undertake a Rule II analysis? Did it objectively inquire into 
the three prongs of Rule II- the petitions' factual basis, legal basis, and legitimate purposes? Not 
at all. So, what caused the Court to convert its award of routine attorney's fees into Rule II 
sanctions? 
Applying a totality of circumstances test to the following facts suggests that the Court's sua 
sponte conversion may have been the product of bias or prejudice against Lewies. The facts are as 
follows: (I) the Court's opening question put to Lewies was, "What were you thinking filing these 
petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were elected to be Fremont County 
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Prosecuting Attorney" (Appellant's Brief, p. 7); (2) the Court delved into Lewies' subjective state 
of mind- and found a political grudge; (3) the Court subjectively believed (without any supporting 
evidence) that Lewies had filed the petitions to "provoke" the County Commissioners (Ibid., p. 32, 
fn. 26); (4) Judge Moeller initiated an ex parte communication and warned Lewies "not to let a 
political grudge interfere with his professional judgment" (Id., p. 32); (5) the Court warned the 
parties in open court "that it was going to do what it could to put an end to [the pettiness]" (Id., p. 
31, fn. 23); and (6) the Court publically denounced Lewies for, among other things, committing a 
"significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system" by filing petitions against a known, 
future client. (Id., p. 38) 
Based on these facts, it reasonably appears that as a result of the "political grudge" 
conclusion reached by the Court after its inquiry into Lewies' subjective intentions for filing the 
petitions, the Court was biased or prejudiced against Lewies, and as such, was not and acting fairly 
and impartially towards him when it converted its earlier award of routine attorney's fees into Rule 
II sanctions. 
c.) Disregarding allegations of Hall's unethical and improper conduct. 
Contrary to Respondents' arguments that there was no unethical or improper conduct by 
Hall (Respondents' Brief, pp. 22-29), the actual issue on appeal is not whether Hall committed the 
alleged acts of unethical or improper conduct, but whether the Court demonstrated bias or prejudice 
against Lewies by choosing not to mention in its Memorandum Decision - not one word- any of 
the allegations he made against Hall, but going to great lengths to denounce Lewies. 
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During the course of the proceedings, Lewies alleged three instances of unethical or 
improper conduct engaged in by Hall. First, that Hall should have conducted a reasonable inquiry 
under Rule II into the facts prior to filing motions to disqualifY Lewies. (Transcript p. 61, lines 15-
25) (Transcript p. 64, lines 13-25; and p. 65, lines 1-18) Second, that Hall violated I.R.P.C. 1.11 
prohibiting attorneys who are currently serving as public employees from ... negotiating for private 
employment with any person who is involved as a party in a matter in which the lawyer is 
participating ... (Transcript p. 69, lines 24-25; and p. 70, lines 1-18) Third, that Hall violated 
I.R.P.C. 3.3 prohibiting lawyers from making false statements of fact to a tribunal, as follows: "He 
says he's billing $225, that's not the case, he got a contract for $150." (Transcript p. 70, lines 19-25; 
and p. 71, lines 1-10) 
Yet, the Court mentioned nothing at all about any of Lewies' allegations against Hall in its 
Memorandum Decision. Why not? Why not at least mention the allegations, and if deemed 
unfounded, then say so. By completely ignoring the allegations against Hall, in their entirety, it 
reasonably appears that the Court was biased or prejudiced against Lewies, and as such, was not and 
acting fairly and impartially towards him. 
d.) Issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision denouncing Lewies. 
Respondents' have submitted no argument or authority on this issue. (Cf, Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 38-39) 
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J. Attorney's fees should not be awarded to the County. 
Respondents' argue that they are entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, 
because Lewies' appeal was brought "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." However, as has 
been shown in the preceding pages, there is clearly a reasonable basis in both fact and law for 
appealing imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against petitions that contained important issues; and 
there is clearly a reasonable basis in both fact and law for appealing whether the Court demonstrated 
bias or prejudice against Lewies. 
Under LA.R. 41(a), Lewies respectfully requests the Supreme Court to permit his later claim 
for attorney's fees on the grounds that Respondents' have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law in this matter. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that the lower Court 
failed to conduct an adequate analysis under Rule 11 before imposing sanctions on Lewies, and 
therefore, such sanctions cannot be sustained. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that 
the petitions filed by Lewies did not violate Rule 11 signature certification requirements; that the 
lower Court's imposition of attorney's fees as a Rule 11 sanction was improper and cannot be 
sustained; that the lower Court erred in finding that Lewies (a) had not withdrawn as counsel for 
the county; (b) delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review; (c) deeming it 
appropriate for the Commissioners to have retained Hall as private counsel; (d) finding that 
Lewies was unable to complete his representation of petitioners; and that presiding Judge 
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Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies. 
Submitted this 91h day of October, 2013 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Real Party in Interest - Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, 
CLARY PICKARD, GEORGE TY 
NEDROW, and DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2012-580 
AMENDED DECISION ON REVIEW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the District Court on a petition for judicial review filed by 
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Clay Pickard, Laura Pickard, George Ty 
Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow ("Petitioners"). Petitioners seek judicial review of the Fremont 
County Board of Commissioners' ("the County" or "the Board") decision to adopt Fremont 
County Ordinance No. 2013-01, which created an official road map of Fremont County ("the 
Official Road Map"). This map designated a road that crosses Petitioners' lands ("the Old 
Yellowstone Mail Route Road and Snow Creek Road" or "the North Road") as a public right-of-
way. Petitioners allege that the Board failed to make any factual determinations regarding 
whether the North Road was public or private before designating it as public on the Official 
Road Map. Accordingly, Petitioners contend that the Board engaged in unlawful procedure, 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or abused its discretion. Petitioners also seek injunctive 
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relief from any public or private use and/or maintenance of the North Road that may result 
through reliance upon the Official Road Map. Finally, Petitioners seek attorney fees and costs. 
Following briefing, orai argument took place on August 27, 2013, after which the Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
II. FACTUALBACKGROUND 
In preparing to adopt an official county road map pursuant to Idaho Code§ 40-202 
(20 11 ), 1 the Fremont County Board of Commissioners ("the Board") gave public notice that 
"[a]fter months of research [it was] close to establishing the official County road map" and 
solicited public comments.2 The Board received written comments and held three "public 
information hearings" in July of2012 to further identify public roadways.3 All then-identified 
roads were presented on maps available at the public hearings and on the Fremont County 
website.4 "After the public information hearings, Fremont County Public Works staff reviewed 
the comments for validity and applicability."5 The maps were then adjusted accordingly.6 
On September 11 and 18,2012, the Board published notice in the Standard Journal, the 
local newspaper of record, that a public hearing was scheduled for September 27, 2012.7 The 
purpose of the public hearing was "to take public comments on the proposed official County 
Road Map(s)."8 At the hearing, Commission Chairman Ron "Skip" Hurt further explained, "So 
tonight it's kind of a culmination of about two years of research that Betty Davis, who works in 
[the] Public Works Department[,] has done."9 He later added, "So we feel like we've gone over 
these [maps] pretty carefully and tonight what we want to hear from you is ifthere's anything on 
these maps that you think is not designated correctly, something that we missed or something 
that's private which should be public or that should be private."10 
1 The Court recognizes that the current version of Title 40 has been amended. Unless it indicates otherwise, the 
Court will cite the sections as they appeared during the times relevant to this matter. 
z R., p. 1. 
3Id 
4 R., p. 73. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. 
7 R., p. 22. 
8 R.,p.21. /d.atp.4:12-17. 
9 R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 4:18-20. 
10 !d. atp. 5:12-17. 
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Ty and Tuk Nedrow attended the Public Hearing. 11 During the public comments, Ty 
Nedrow stated that two roads on the proposed County map were incorrectly designated as county 
roads. 12 He referred to these roads as the "East Road" and the "North Road." Tuk Nedrow 
stated that no County equipment had ever been on either road and that the County had never 
maintained the North Road. 13 Tuk and Ty Nedrow claimed that both roads lead to nowhere. 14 
Concerning the East Road, Ty Nedrow said that it went through his field and that fishermen 
occasionally got stuck in it while attempting to get to a nearby reservoir. 15 Concerning the North 
Road, Tuk Nedrow explained, "It goes through a quarter mile of our property and a quarter mile 
of Mr. [Achtley's] and it goes through a half a mile ofBLM and then hits the Forest Service 
[road] .... " 16 Ty Nedrow also explained that although the North Road was referred to as the 
"mail route," his grandpa had told him that it was a shortcut and had never been used for 
carrying mail or passengers but only for stage coaches returning from West Yellowstone without 
cargo; the lava rock grates on the road broke many wheels. 17 He also explained that the North 
Road was gated on his property and that it was also gated before it reached Mr. Atchley's 
property. 18 
A discussion arose during the Public Hearing as to whether the North Road was an R.S. 
2477 road, which was explained to be a road in use before 1975 that could not be taken from the 
public. 19 Recognizing that certain roads might be R.S. 2477 roads, Chairman Hurt indicated that 
the Board had "60 days after this hearing to make a decision, and ... we may have to collect 
more information. We may have to have another public hearing .... "20 
About two weeks later, on October 15, 2012, the Board held a meeting where it 
considered the content of the proposed County map in light of the public comments.21 The 
Board brought up Ty and Tuk Nedrow's objections concerning the East Road and the North 
II R., pp. 23-24. 
12 R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 4:18-20. 
13 Id. at pp. 21:16-18; 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14. 
14 Jd. at pp. 15:19-20,21:16-18,21:25-22:3. 
15 !d. at p. 15:16-21. 
16 !d. at p. 22:3-10. 
17 !d. atpp. 16:22-17:20. 
18 Jd. at p. 18:15-18. 
19 Jd. at 18:22-19:23. In reality, R.S.-2477 was repealed in 1976, and any "rights created under it are valid ifthey 
existed before October 21, 1976." Farrell v. Bd. ofComm'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378, 384, 64 P.3d 304, 310 
(2002), overruled on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). 
20 R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 20:7-20:17 
21 R., pp. 57-58. 
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Road and agreed that the East Road should be closed to the public, recognizing the issues Ty 
Nedrow had raised during the Public Hearing.22 However, it decided to leave the North Road 
designated as a public road. An unidentified woman present at the meeting informed the Board 
that "an old Shell Oil map on the Internet" seemed to show that people were being directed down 
the North Road as far back as 1956.23 The Shell Oil map was apparently not presented at the 
meeting and does not appear anywhere in the record.Z4 The Board then concluded that "any 
roads [used] prior to [1976] cannot be closed. They fall under this RS-2477 that if they were 
ever used as public roads then public domain takes precedence. "25 In other words, the Board 
concluded that because the North Road had been "ascertained a 2477 road," it would be 
designated on the Official Road Map as a public road.26 
At an October 29, 2012 meeting, the Board voted and approved by a two-to-one vote the 
Official Road Map,27 which was published as Ordinance No. 2013-01.28 The Official Road Map 
lists the East Road as one of various "Private Roads" and the North Road as a "County Dirt 
Road."29 The Board's findings of fact state that the "[r]oads [in the Official Road Map] were 
identified as Fremont County roads based on" several criteria, one of which was that "[t]he roads 
had been asserted under Federal Law R.S.-2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107 or are the 
sole essential connection roads asserted as R.S.-2477 roads."30 In its conclusions oflaw, the 
22 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording), 5:09-9:53. All future references to this audio recording are contained within this 
timeframe. Regarding the East Road, the Board stated that people were "going up and getting stuff." !d. It did not 
specifically mention, as discussed earlier, that Ty Nedrow expressed concern during the Public Hearing that the East 
Road went through his field and that many fishermen got stuck in it while attempting to get to a reservoir. R., p. 53, 
Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21. 
23 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). The audio recording does not clearly state whether this comment was directed at 
the North Road or the East Road; however, in the context of the discussion, the Court concludes that the comment 
concerned the North Road. !d. Also, the audio recording does not clearly identifY the woman speaking, but those 
present at the meeting were "Commissioners Skip Hurt, Lee Miller, Jordon Stoddard," "Clerk Abbie Mace, Deputy 
Clerk Laura Singleton, Public Works Director Marla Vik, Prosecuting Attorney Joette Lookabaugh, Greg Newkirk, 
and Debbie Davis." R., p. 53, Public Hearing Transcript (September 27, 2012), p. 15:16-21. 
24 The Court is mindful that Respondent's attorneys have alleged in their brief that "the Commissioners reviewed" 
the map in question. Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7. However, the recorded transcript does not confirm this assertion, 
and the record does not indicate that Mr. Hall or Mr. Starnes were present at the meeting. 
25 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). 
26 Jd. 
27 R., p. 64. 
28 R., p. 66. 
29 R., p. 93. 
30 R., pp. 72-73, ~ 6. Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact begins: "Roads were identified as Fremont County roads 
based on the following criteria: ... " Jd. This language suggests that the roads met all six listed criteria; however, 
this would be problematic since the North Road seems to have been asserted as meeting only the last of the six 
criterion, which concerns R.S. 2477 roads. Therefore, the Court interprets this list to suggest that roads met at least 
one of the listed criteria. 
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Board stated that "[a ]11 roads identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined by the 
Fremont County Board of Commissioners to be County roads, either paved, gravel or 
unimproved (dirt); and are not recorded in the Board of Commissioners' official minutes as 
vacated or abandoned; and are routinely maintained by the County."31 The Board more 
specifically stated that "[a]ll roads identified in [the Official Road Map] as being R.S.-2477 
roads are determined by the Fremont County Board of Commissioners as having been asserted 
under Federal Law R.S. 2477 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-107. The same are identified in 
official records in the Fremont County Public Works office."32 The Board also stated that "[a]ll 
roads found on the Official Fremont County Road Map constitutes public notice that evidence 
has been presented to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners that the roads may qualify as 
a public right-of-way."33 It also clarified, "Inclusion of roads on the Official Fremont County 
Road Map does not constitute validation or abandonment of any road. "34 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Decisions made by a board of county or highway district commissioners in an 
abandonment, vacation or validation proceeding are subject to judicial review pursuant to I. C. § 
40-208." Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofTeton Cnty., 141 Idaho 855,858, 119 
P .3d 630, 633 (2005). In such cases, the court conducts a review without a jury and is confined 
to the record. I. C. § 40-208(6). The court may not substitute its judgment for that ofthe 
governing board regarding the weight of the information on questions of fact. I.C. § 40-208(7). 
In the case at bar, Petitioners do not challenge a decision regarding an abandonment, 
vacation, or validation proceeding, but rather the Board's decision to place a disputed road on an 
official county highway map in a§ 40-202 proceeding. In Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 858, 
119 P.3d at 633, the Supreme Court stated: 
[S]ince I.C. § 40-202 is contained in the section of the Code relating to general 
provisions for the establishment and maintenance of the state and county highway 
system, including procedures required for abandonment, vacation or validation of 
highways, it is logical that the statutorily mandated standard of review under § 40-
208 should apply to § 40-202 decisions. 
31 R., p. 74. 
32 !d. 
33 R., pp. 74-75, ~ 9 (emphasis added). 
34 !d. 
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Under this code section, the reviewing court may affirm a board's decision or remand the case 
for further proceedings. I. C. § 40-208(7). Additionally, 
!d. 
[t]he Court may reverse or modify the [Board's] decision if substantial rights of 
the appellant have been prejudiced because the [Board's] findings, inferences, 
conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; 
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) Affected by other error of law; 
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial 
information on the whole record; or 
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or 
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by competent and substantial evidence 
even though conflicting evidence exists. Wulffv. Sun Valley Co., 127 Idaho 71,73-74,896 P.2d 
979, 981-82 (1995). "Substantial and competent evidence is 'relevant evidence that a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion."' Hu.ffv. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d 
1244, 1246 (2006) (quoting Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406,412, 18 P.3d 211,217 
(2000)). "Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal." 
Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859, 119 P.3d at 634 (citing Love v. Board of County Comm 'rs 
of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558,559,671 P.2d 471,472 (1983)). Accordingly, this Court can 
freely review any question oflaw, but it will not substitute its own judgment for the Board's as 
to the weight afforded the evidence on a question of fact. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW 
Petitioners present the following issues on review for consideration by the Court: 
1. Did the Board give proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map (Fremont 
County Ordinance No. 2013-01)? 
2. Did the Board make proper factual determinations in support of adopting the Official 
Road Map (Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01)? 
3. By failing to make proper factual determinations, did the Board engage in unlawful 
procedure, act arbitrarily and capriciously, or abuse its discretion when it placed the North Road 
on the Official Road Map? 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. The Board gave proper notice of its intent to adopt the Official Road Map. 
"Idaho Code § 40-202 provides the manner in which a board of county commissioners or 
highway district designates public highways and rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho 
at 859, 119 P.3d at 634. This "initial selection ofthe county highway system and highway 
district system" requires that the "board of county or highway or district commissioners" take 
several actions. I.C. § 40-202(1). These are: 1) prepare a map "showing the general location of 
each highway and public right-or-way in their jurisdiction;" 2) give notice of its "intention to 
adopt the map as the official map of that system;" and 3) "specify the time and place [for a 
public hearing] at which all interested persons may be heard" regarding the adoption of the 
proposed map. Id. 
Although Petitioners have asserted that the Board did not provide proper notice, they 
have failed to articulate the nature of the deficiency. The Court finds that the Board has fulfilled 
the three requirements of I. C. § 40-202(1 ). Specifically, it prepared a map facially complying 
with the statute, indicated its intent to adopt the proposed County map, and published proper 
notice of the time and place of the public hearing on that map in the Standard Journal on 
September 11 and 18, 2012. Petitioners have failed to point to any procedural deficiency in the 
manner in which the Board conducted its adoption of the disputed ordinance. Therefore, the 
Court must conclude as a matter of law that the Board has fully complied with the notice 
requirements ofl.C. § 40-202(1). 
B. The Board failed to make adequate factual determinations before adopting 
the Official Road Map. 
Idaho Code§ 40-202(1) also requires that "[a]fter the hearing, the commissioners shall 
adopt the map, with any changes or revisions considered by them to be advisable in the public 
interest, as the official map of the respective highway system." Id. Petitioners claim that before 
adopting the map, the Board failed to make proper factual determinations regarding the public or 
private status of the North Road. They contend that the North Road is not an R.S. 2477 road and 
that the Board is required to prove such status. 
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Although the process outlined in I.C. § 40-202(1)-iffollowed properly-results in an 
official county map of roads, it "does not also serve to adjudicate the public status of any roads 
within the county or create new public highways or rights-of-way." Homestead Farms, 141 
Idaho at 859-60, 119 P.3d at 634-35.35 Thus, when adopting an initial county map of roads, the 
Board neither validates nor vacates roads as R.S. 2477 or other roads. Rather, the Board makes 
"a determination that a particular roadway occupies the status, in fact, of a public highway or 
right-of-way." !d. at 861. Therefore, the process for establishing an R.S. 2477 road is relevant 
to the extent that the Board could reasonably find, based on the evidence before it, that the North 
Road was, in fact, an R.S. 2477 road and therefore a public right-of-way. 
Under United States Revised Statute 2477, a state government entity can grant public 
status to a road on public lands. The Idaho Supreme Court explained this process: 
The federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads provided that "[t]he right of way for 
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is 
hereby granted." 43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866) (repealed 1976). While this statute has 
been repealed, otherwise valid leases, permits, patents and similar rights created 
under it are valid ifthey existed before October 21, 1976. Pub.L. 94-579, § 706(a) 
(1976). 
Farrellv. Bd. ofComm'rs, Lemhi Cnty., 138 Idaho 378,384,64 P.3d 304,310 (2002), overruled 
on different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). 
Concerning this "freezing" of R. S. 24 77 rights as they existed in 197 6, the 1Oth Circuit stated: 
The difficulty is in knowing what [valid and existing rights] means. Unlike any 
other federal land statute of which we are aware. the establishment ofR.S. 2477 
rights of way required no administrative fom1alities: no entry, no application, no 
license, no patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public 
acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom the right was vested. As 
the Supreme Court ofUtah noted 75 years ago, R.S. 2477 "'was a standing offer 
of a free right of way over the public domain,"' and the grant may be accepted 
"without formal action by public authorities." Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. 
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646, 648 (1929), (quoting Streeter v. Stalnaker, 61 
Neb. 205, 85 N.W. 47, 48 (1901)). In its Report to Congress on R.S. 2477: The 
History and Management of R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way Claims on Federal and 
35 It is worth noting that the Idaho Legislature has revised I. C. § 40-202 in what appears to be approval of the 
Homestead Farms decision. Subsection 8 now states in relevant part: 
The purpose of this official map is to put the public on notice of those highways and public rights-
of-way that the board of county or highway district commissioners considers to be public. The 
inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way from such a map does not, in itself, 
constitute a legal determination of the public status of such highway or public right-of-way. Any 
person may challenge, at any time, the inclusion or exclusion of a highway or public right-of-way 
from such map by initiating proceedings as described in section 40-208(7), Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 40-202 (2013). 
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Other Lands 1 (June 1993 ), the Department of the Interior explained that R.S. 
24 77 highways "were constructed without any approval from the federal 
government and with no documentation of the public land records, so there are 
few official records documenting the right-of-way or indicating that a highway 
was constructed on federal land under this authority." 
In short, identifying valid R.S. 2477 roads is a difficult and controversial matter. Indeed, 
it appears nothing has been done legislatively on the federal level to clarify the process: 
Despite decades oflitigation over R.S. 2477 roads, Congress has not spoken to the 
issue by amending FLPMA [which repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976] and providing a 
statutory framework to help courts resolve the discrepancies between the statutes; 
nor has it delegated authority to federal management agencies to promulgate 
regulations guiding their administration ofR.S. 2477 claims. In fact, Congress has 
actually prohibited the BLM from adopting regulations establishing a framework 
for agency adjudication ofR.S. 2477 claims. There is also no legislative history of 
R.S. 2477 that might provide informal guidance to litigants. 
Hillary M. Hoffmann, Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: The Wilderness Society v. Kane County 
Leaves Everyone Confused About Navigating A Right-of-Way Claim Under Revised Statute 
2477, 18 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 3, 9-10 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
Without guidance from the federal government, "[s]tate law governs the manner in which a road 
on federal property becomes public under R.S. 2477." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, 
814,264 P.3d 916, 921 (2011) (citing Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 160, 191 P.3d 233, 
238 (2008)); accord Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1974); 
United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 503, 505 (lOth Cir.1949); Smith v. Mitchell, 21 Wash. 536, 
540, 58 P. 667, 668 (1899) ("[Under R.S. 2477,] a highway may be established across or upon 
such public lands in any of the ways recognized by the law of the state in which such lands are 
located .... "). 
In Idaho, a valid and existing R.S. 2477 road exists if"the local government accepted the 
road from the federal government." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. This acceptance 
can occur in two ways: "through a positive act of acceptance by the local government or 
compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at the time." Galli, 146 Idaho at 159, 191 
P.3d at 237 (explaining Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310). A positive act of acceptance 
"is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state road creation statute[s]." Farrell, 138 
Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Also, the Supreme Court has stated: 
No R.S. 2477 road may be established once the land has been removed from the 
public domain. However, if an R.S. 2477 road is established prior to the land 
exiting the public domain, regardless if it is officially recognized or not, then that 
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grant remains effective even though the land which the road traverses is now 
private property. 
Due to the difficulty in granting and/or adjudicating R.S. 24 77 roads, it is understandable 
that some states, like Idaho, have procedures for state public officials to identify pubic rights-of-
way on maps, including those that may be R.S. 2477 roads, short of adjudication. This is a less 
formal process with often non-binding results. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-105 (West) 
("Each county shall prepare maps showing to the best of its ability the class D roads within its 
boundaries which were in existence as of October 21, 1976 [the date that R.S. 2477 was 
repealed] .... The county shall provide a copy of any map ... to the department. ... The 
department is not responsible for the validity of any class D road . ... ") (emphasis added). 
In Idaho, when mapping an initial selection of the county highway system, a board is 
required to show by the record that-before adopting the Official Road Map-it considered 
objections, provided evidence, and made findings concerning the public status of roads contained 
therein. Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 861, 119 P.3d at 637. The evidence provided must be 
substantial and competent; in other words, it must support whatever factual findings made before 
concluding that the road in question is an R.S. 2477 road. As explained above, in Idaho, an R.S. 
24 77 road must be established prior to the land exiting the public domain and prior to October 
21, 1976. If a road is so established but not yet officially recognized, the original grant remains 
effective even after the land is privately acquired, regardless of the date of acquisition. 
In the case at bar, the Board met together after the Public Hearing and discussed whether 
the North Road was established prior to 1976. Although Ty Nedrow had testified at the Public 
Hearing that the North Road had been a shortcut used for empty stage coaches returning from 
West Yellowstone, the record establishes that the Board did not consider his testimony and made 
no factual determination regarding it. Instead, the Board and those present focused mainly on 
the statement of an unidentified woman present at the meeting: "I actually came across an old 
Shell Oil map on the Internet that, by looking at it, it looks like that that's actually the way back 
in 1956 they were trying to route people."36 The Board accepted this interpretation of the map, 
even though it apparently never actually saw a copy of the referenced map. Additionally, the 
record contains neither a copy of the map nor further mention of where to locate the map. 
36 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording). 
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Therefore, this Court has no way of confirming that (1) the map actually existed, (2) the 
unidentified speaker's interpretation of the map was correct or reasonable, and (3) the map 
provided the Board with substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support its factual 
determination that the North Road had been established prior to 1976. Ultimately, this Court 
cannot properly evaluate the Board's conclusion that the North Road had been "ascertained a 
2477 road" and should be designated on the Official Road Map as a public road.37 
The Court is mindful that the Board neither attempted to adjudicate the North Road as an 
R.S. 2477 road, nor was it not required to do so. See Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859-60, 
119 P.3d at 634-35. However, the evidence before the Board in the record must at a minimum 
support its determination that the North Road qualifies for R. S. 24 77 status. See !d. at 861, 119 
P.3d at 636. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Board's findings and 
conclusions on this issue. 
Even assuming that the Board properly considered Ty Nedrow's testimony and that this, 
in conjunction with the "old Shell Oil map," somehow provided substantial and competent 
evidence to support the Board's determination that the North Road was in use and established 
prior to October 21, 1976, nothing in the record establishes that this occurred before the North 
Road left the public domain. This is an additional requirement before an R.S. 2477 road can be 
established. The record only shows that Petitioners currently own the land around the North 
Road. Although Ty Nedrow said that the North Road had been used for stagecoaches, 
suggesting a strong possibility that the road was used and established prior to it being privately 
owned, nowhere in the record does the Board address or make findings regarding this necessary 
element of an R.S. 2477 road. In sum, the Board did not, before adopting the Official Road Map, 
make adequate factual determinations that the North Road was established prior to the land 
exiting the public domain and prior to October 21, 1976. Thus, its inclusion in the Official Road 
Map as a public road was clearly erroneous. I. C. § 40-208(7)( e). 
The Court recognizes that when it sits in an appellate capacity, it should not "search the 
record for error." Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213,218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004). 
Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, and to assist the parties on remand, the Court 
believes it is appropriate to note that other factual findings of the Board are problematic. 38 For 
37 Jd 
38 These matters did not provide the basis for the Court's decision. 
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example, the Official Road Map appears to list the North Road as a "County Dirt Road," not as 
an R.S. 2477 road.39 However, in its conclusions of law, the Board stated that "[a]ll roads 
identified in [the Official Road Map] are determined ... to be County roads, either paved, gravel 
or unimproved (dirt); ... and are routinely maintained by the County."40 While the North Road 
appears to be listed as a "County Dirt Road," there is no factual support in the record for finding 
that the North Road is routinely maintained by the County. On the contrary, Tuk Nedrow stated 
at the Public Hearing that the County had never placed equipment on or maintained the North 
Road.41 Even if the Board had depicted the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road on the official map, 
rather than as a "County Dirt Road," it specifically stated that"[ a]ll roads identified in [the 
Official Road Map] as ... R.S.-2477 roads ... hav[e] been asserted under Federal Law R.S. 
24 77 and Idaho Code 40-204 and 40-1 07. The same are identified in official records in the 
Fremont County Public Works office.'.42 The record is devoid of any official record that 
identifies the North Road as an R.S. 2477 road. 
C. The record establishes that the Board's decision designating the North Road 
on the Official Road Map as an R.S. 2477 Road was clearly erroneous and it acted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
"An action is capricious if it was done without a rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was 
done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining 
principles." Am. Lung Ass 'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dep 't of Agric., 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130 
P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Board's decision that the North 
Road was an R.S. 2477 road appears from the record to be based entirely upon an interpretation 
of an alleged map found on the Internet that the Board itself failed to examine or include in the 
record for the Court to examine. Also, although the Board concluded that the North Road was 
routinely maintained by the County, it neither provided support for this conclusion nor addressed 
the oral testimony claiming the contrary. Moreover, it did not consider or make factual 
determinations regarding when the North Road left the public domain. Therefore, the Board's 
decision was clearly erroneous because it lacked adequate factual support from reliable, 
39 R., p. 93. 
40 R., p. 74. 
41 R., p. 59 (audio CD recording), pp. 21:25-22:1; 22:13-14. 
42 R., p. 74. 
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probative, and substantial evidence. Additionally, the decision to rely upon the limited evidence 
set forth in the record was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of its discretion. 
D. Petitioners may seek reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
Petitioners seek recovery of their attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-117 and 
12-121, as well as I.R.C.P. 54( d) and (e). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that fees 
and costs could not be awarded against a county in a petition for judicial review under I. C. § 12-
117 inasmuch as it would not qualify as "a civil action" because it was not "commenced by the 
filing of a complaint with the court." Smith v. Washington County, Idaho, 150 Idaho 388,391, 
247 P.3d 615, 618 (2010). However, I.C. § 12-117(1) was amended by the Idaho legislature in 
2012, changing the language from "any administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding" 
to "any proceeding." Additionally, I.C. § 12-117(5) was amended to specifically include a 
"petition for judicial review" among the type of cases defined as a "proceeding." Therefore, the 
amendments to I.C. § 12-117 appear to be a deliberate response by the legislature to avoid the 
holding in Smith. 
Under the current version ofi.C. § 12-117, a court "shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." This language not only 
covers attorney fees but "reasonable expenses," which the Court interprets to include what are 
generally referred to as "costs" under I.R.C.P. 54( d). Therefore, Petitioners are entitled to seek 
costs and fees under I.C. § 12-117 and have fourteen days to submit a memorandum of costs and 
fees. 
Petitioners have also requested attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54( e). 
"Attorney fees are not available to a party on appeal from an agency decision under [I.C. § 12-
121]" because it pertains to civil actions. Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 
Idaho 630, 637,22 P.3d 105, 112 (2001); see also Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 
148 Idaho 630, 635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) also 
pertains to civil actions and is, therefore, likewise inapplicable to this case. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the record below and the applicable laws and standards, the Court finds 
that the Findings and Conclusions issued by the Board in support of County Ordinance No. 
2013-01 on October 29, 2012 violate I.C. §§ 40-202 or 40-208. Therefore, the portions of 
County Ordinance No. 2013-01 declaring the North Road to be a public right-of-way (either as 
an R.S. 2477 Road or as a County Dirt Road) are hereby VACATED. This matter shall be 
REMANDED to the Fremont County Board of Commissioners to properly consider the status of 
the North Road and issue a new County Map in a manner consistent with this opinion. 
In light of this decision, Petitioners' request for injunctive relief has been rendered moot. 
However, ifthe County or members of the general public attempt to maintain and/or use the 
North Road in reliance on the current Official Road Map and/or County Ordinance No. 2013-01, 
Petitioners' claim for injunctive relief would at that time become ripe for adjudication. 
Finally, Petitioners, as prevailing parties, are entitled to seek costs and fees under I.C. § 
12-11 7, by filing an appropriate motion and memorandum of costs and fees within fourteen days. 
f'cl 
SO ORDERED this __QJ_: day of October, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECISION ON 
REVIEW was this 23,..,( day of October, 2013, served upon the following individuals via U.S. 
Mail: 
Lynn Hossner 
Attorney at Law 
109 North Second West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Blake G. Hall, esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Fremont County Board of Commissioners 
151 West 1st North 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
By:~~~~ 
a Cle k 
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From: 
BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 656-7108 
ISB Nos. 2434 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Respondents 
11/06/2013 13:17 #276 P.003/ 005 
DISTFliCT SEVEN COURT 
County o1 fremont State of Idaho 
Filed: -------=.::::::::::--...  ::::::.=--~ -6 2013 
ABBie l'vlACE, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the state of Idaho, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individual1y and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
STIPULATION FOR 
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
Defendants, by and through counsel of record, NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, 
P.A., hereby stipulate that the law firm of HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP, shall be 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 1 
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From: 11/06/2013 13:18 #276 P.004/005 
substituted as counsel of record for Defendants, and copies of all pleadings or other papers 
should be directed to: 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Phone:208-522-3003 
Fax: 208-656-7108 
Email: bgh@hasattorneys.com: nrs@hasattomeys.com 
6/28/13 
Date ake . Hall 
ON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
1116/13 
Date 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 2 
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From: 
11/06/2013 13:18 #276 P.OOS/005 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this _6_ day of November, 2013 by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
109N 2nd W 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax: 624-3783 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller 
FREMONT COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
151 W P'N 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL- 3 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[xfFax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
m:rnight Mail 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 656-7108 
ISB Nos. 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Respondents/ Appellants 
tllV -8 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political subdivision 
of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official 
capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1. Respondents hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision on 
Review 10/10/13 ); and Amended Decision on Review (10/23/13) by the Honorable Gregory W. 
Moeller. 
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2. Respondents have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court because the Decision 
on Review and Amended Decision on Review by the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller are final 
within the meaning ofRule 11(a)(2) and 11(f), Idaho Appellate Rules, pertaining to "judgments, 
orders and decrees." 
3. Appellants preliminary statement of issues on appeal are as follows: 
a. The Court erred in its application ofldaho Code§ 40-202; 
b. The Court erred in requiring Appellants to conduct a road validation 
proceeding of a single road (RS 2477 road) where the County is attempting to adopt 
the first official county roadmap; 
c. The Court erred in declaring that the Appellants acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in designating a single road (RS 24 77 road) as a public road and 
when adopting the first official county roadmap; 
d. The Court erred in finding that Petitioner's may seek reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal. 
4. A reporter's transcript of the oral argument hearing held on August 27, 2013 is 
requested, excluding nothing. 
a. Appellant otherwise requests appropriation ofthe entire reporter's standard 
transcript as defined in Rule 25 (c), Idaho Appellate Rule; 
b. Appellant requests, pursuant to Rule 26.1, Idaho Appellate Rules, that the 
reporter provide disks, or electronic media, of all transcripts. 
6. Appellant requests the following be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. the entire record on appeal with the district court; 
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b. all documents not formally filed by the Court or clerks but treated as 
"lodged" with the Court or clerk, including memoranda or otherwise. 
7. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
8. I certify that: 
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) the clerk of the district court has been paid $100 in advance to be held in trust 
for the court reporter for preparation of the transcript pursuant to Rule 24( c), Idaho 
Appellate Rules; 
(c) any additional fee will be paid upon determination of the amount required; 
(d) the clerk of the district court has been paid $100 in advance for preparation of 
the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 27(d), Idaho Appellate Rules; 
(e) the Appellate filing fee has been paid; 
(f) service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and David Marlow, CSR, Madison County Courthouse, PO 
Box 389, Rexburg, ID 83340, pursuant to Rule 24 (c), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this~ day ofNovember, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this 
__J:!:_ day of November, 2013 by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Rossner, Esq. f1 Mailing 109N 2ndw St. Anthony, ID 83445 Hand Delivery [ ] Fax 
Fax: 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
David Marlow, CSR 
M Mailing Madison County Courthouse Hand Delivery PO Box 389 [ ] Fax 
Rexburg, ID 83340 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller J><] Mailing 
Madison County Courthouse 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
PO Box 389 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
~ 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 656-7108 
JSB Nos. 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattorneys.com 
nrs@hasattorneys.com 
Attorneys for Respondents/ Appellants 
DiSTFilCT SEVEN COURT 
County o1 Fremont State of Idaho 
Filed: ·- ·---[~0~ 26 ~13] 
Qf.83lE MACE, CLt:iiK 
By· .... JZ!2~.L..------.=:-::-:-:-7":"~:-::L: 
· Dep:1ty Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political subdivision 
of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official 
capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1. RESPONDENTS, Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, by and 
through counsel of record, Hall Angell Starnes, LLP, hereby appeals against the above named 
PETITIONERS, Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay 
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Pickard, Geroge Ty Nedrow, and David Tuk Nedrow, by and through their counsel Lynn 
Rossner, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision on Review 10/10/13); and Amended 
Decision on Review (10/23/13) by the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller presiding. 
2. Respondents have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court because the 
Decision on Review and Amended Decision on Review by the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller 
are final within the meaning of Rule ll(a)(2) and ll(f), Idaho Appellate Rules, pertaining to 
"judgments, orders and decrees." 
3. Appellants preliminary statement of issues on appeal are as follows: 
a. The Court erred in its application ofldaho Code § 40-202; 
b. The Court erred in requiring Appellants to conduct a road validation 
proceeding of a single road (RS 24 77 road) where the County is attempting to 
adopt the first official county roadmap; 
c. The Court erred in declaring that the Appellants acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in designating a single road (RS 2477 road) as a public road 
and when adopting the first official county roadmap; 
d. The Court erred in finding that Petitioner=s may seek reasonable 
attomey=s fees and costs on appeal. 
4. A reporter's transcript of the oral argument hearing held on August 27, 2013 is 
requested, excluding nothing. 
a. Appellant otherwise requests appropriation of the entire reporter's 
standard transcript as defined in Rule 25 (c), Idaho Appellate Rule; 
b. Appellant requests, pursuant to Rule 26.1, Idaho Appellate Rules, that the 
reporter provide disks, or electronic media, of all transcripts. 
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6. Appellant requests the following be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. the entire record on appeal with the district court; 
b. all documents not formally filed by the Court or clerks but treated as 
"lodged" with the Court or clerk, including memoranda or otherwise. 
7. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
8. I certify that: 
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) the clerk of the district court has been paid $1 00 in advance to be held in trust 
for the court reporter for preparation of the transcript pursuant to Rule 24( c), 
Idaho Appellate Rules; 
(c) any additional fee will be paid upon determination of the amount required; 
(d) the clerk of the district court has been paid $100 in advance for preparation of 
the clerk=s record pursuant to Rule 27(d), Idaho Appellate Rules; 
(e) the Appellate filing fee has been paid; 
(f) service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and David Marlow, CSR, Madison County Courthouse, 
PO Box 389, Rexburg, ID 83340, pursuant to Rule 24 (c), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this __dQ_ day ofNovember, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this~ day ofNovember, 2013 by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Rossner, Esq. 
109N2ndw 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax: 
David Marlow, CSR 
Madison County Courthouse 
PO Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83340 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
PO Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT 
~ounty of Fremont State of Idaho 
In the Supreme Court of the S ate otidatlhl 
FLYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ) 
ATCHLEY, 'LAURA PICKARD, CLAY ) 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, DAVID ) 
TUKNEDROW, ) 
Petitioners-Respondents, 
v. 
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER RE: AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 41584-2013 
Fremont County No. 2012-580 
The Notice of Appeal filed November 8, 2013 in District Court and November 12, 
2013 with this Court is not in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17(o), for the reason there is 
no designation of who the Respondents or Respondents Counsel are. .In addition only the August 
27,2013 hearing will be prepared unless Appellant designates by date(s) and title(s) additional 
transcripts to prepare. Therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is SUSPENDED in order 
for Appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17( o ). 
The Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with the District Court within fourteen (14) days from 
the date of this Order or this appeal will be dismissed. 
DATED this~ day ofNovember, 2013. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
District Court Judge 
For the$J11Pre3rn 
ORDER RE: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL- Docket No. 41584-2013 
• 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAl DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
it 1 
FlYING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA ATCHLEY, LAURA PlOWU'>, 
CLAY PICKARD, GEORGE TV NEDROW, DAVID TUK 
NEDROW, 
Petitioners-Respondents, 
v. 
FREMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT and LEROY MILLER, 
Respondent~Appellant. 
Case No. CV-2012-0000580 
ClERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAl 
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDfOAl DISTRICT, FREMONT COUNTY. 
HONORABLE JUDGE GREGORY W. MOEUER PRESIDING 
CASE NUMBER FROM COURT: 
ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: 
AITORNEY FOR APPELLANT: 
A ITORNEV FOR RESPONDENT: 
APPEALED BV: 
APPEALED AGAINST: 
CV-2012-0000580 
Decision of Review and Amended 
Decision on Review 
Blake G. Hall 
lynn Hossner 
Board Of County Commissioners for 
Fremont County Idaho, Ronald 11Sklp" 
Hurt and leroy Miller 
Flying A Ranch, Inc., Clen Atchley, Emma 
Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay Pickard, 
George Ty Nedrow & David Tuk Nedrow 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: November 8, 2013 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: N/A 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAl FILED: N/A 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAl FILED: N/A 
APPEllATE FEE PAID: YES 
RESPONDENT OR CROSS-RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAl RECORD FILED: 
N/A 
TRANSCRIPT FILED: 
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED? YES 
DISTRICT COURT REPORTER: DAVID MARLOW 
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Dated this 8th day of November, 2013 
ABBIE MACE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 656-7108 
ISB Nos. 1434, 7011 & 7484 
bgh@basattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomevs.com 
Attorneys for Respondents/ Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF FREMONT 
FLYING "A • RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK. NEDROW, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS FOR FREMONT 
COUNTY, IDAHO, a political subdivision 
of the state of Idaho, RONALD "SKIP" 
HURT, individually and in his official 
capacity, and LEROY MILLER, 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-12-580 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Review 10/10113); and Amended Decision on Review (10123/13) by the Honorable OregoryW. 
Moeller. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
Page 402 of 408
2. Respondents have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court because the Decision 
on Review and Amended Decision on Review by the Honorable Oregory W. Moeller arc final 
within the meaning of Rule ll(a)(2) and ll(t), Idaho Appellate Rules, pertaining to "judgments, 
orders and decrees. • 
3. Appellants preliminary statement of issues on appeal are as follows: 
a. The Court erred in its application of Idaho Code § 40-202; 
b. The Court erred in requiring Appellants to conduct a road validation 
proceeding of a single road (RS 2477 road) where the County is attempting to adopt 
the :first official county roadmap; 
c. The Court erred in declaring that the Appellants acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in designating a single road (RS 2477 road) as a public road and 
when adopting the first official county roadmap; 
d. The Court erred in finding that Petitioner's may seek reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal. 
4. A reporter's transcript of the oral argument hearing held on August 27, 2013 is 
requested, excluding nothing. 
a. Appellant otherwise requests app1opriation of the entire reporter's standard 
transcript as defined in Rule 25 (c), Idaho Appellate Rule; 
b. Appellant requests, pursuant to Rule 26.1, Idaho Appellate Rules, that the 
reporter provide disks, or electronic media, of all transcripts. 
6. Appellant requests the following be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. the entire record on appeal with the district court; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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b. all docwnents not formally filed by the Court or clerks but treated as 
"lodged• with the Comt or clerk, including memoranda or otherwise. 
7. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
8. I certify that: 
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) the clerk of the district court bas been paid $100 in advance to be held in trust 
for the court reporter for preparation of the transaipt pursuant to Rule 24( c), Idaho 
Appellate Rules; 
(c) any additional fee will be paid upon determination of the amount required; 
(d) the clerk of the district court bas been paid S 100 in advance for preparation of 
the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 27(d), Idaho Appellate Rules; 
(e) the Appellate filing fee has been paid; 
(f) service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and David Marlow, CSR, Madison ColDlty Courthouse, PO 
Box 389, Rexburg, ID 83340, pursuant to Rule 24 (c), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this .:r_ day ofNovember, 2013. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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CERTmCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this 
_]!:_day of November, 2013 by the method indicated below: 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. f1 Mailing 109N2DCIW Hand Delivery St. Anthony, ID 83445 [ 1 Fax Fax: 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
David Marlow, CSR 
M Mailing Madison County Courthouse Hand Delivery POBox389 
[ 1 Fax Rexburg, ID 83340 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller X1 Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery Madison County Courthouse 
[ ] Fax P0Box389 [ J Overnight Mail Rexburg, ID 83440 
'~P...., sWE:Aizs ..(:.,.., 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
Page 405 of 408
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, 
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David 
Tuk Nedrow 
Pia intiff(s )/Respond ent(s ), 
vs 
Board Of County Commissioners for 
Fremont County, a political subdivision of 
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt, 
individually and in his official capacity, and 
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official 
capacity 
Defendant(s)/ Appellant(s). 
Supreme Court No: 41584-2013 
Case No: CV-2012-0000580 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
Notice is hereby given that on January 31. 2014, the Clerk's Record (X L 
Reporter's Transcript (X ) Exhibits ( X ) in the above referenced appeal was Lodged 
with the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
,,,, .... ,,,,, 
,,'~X. Q\V. D!Sr.¢~,, ,, ....... ~' ...•••••.•..• ~"(,> ~ 
..:- ~'<:' -·· •• , .... C...".. •• ~, ,~. . --
: C!i f SEVENTH\ ; :~ i JUDICIAL i ~: 
;~\ COURT~~§ ~ ~··. . .. ~- ..... , .. ... ~~ ~, o4i·······~~ ~~ 
,,,, COU~' ~\''' 
''''""''''' 
Abbie Mac 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, 
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David 
Tuk Nedrow 
Plaintiff(s}/Respondent(s}, 
vs 
Board Of County Commissioners for 
Fremont County, a political subdivision of 
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt, 
individually and in his official capacity, and 
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official 
capacity 
Defendant(s}/ Appellant(s}. 
Supreme Court No: 41584-2013 
Case No: CV-2012-0000580 
Appeal Record Certificate of Service 
I, Abbie Mace, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Fremont, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or 
admitted in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at St. Anthony, Fremont, Idaho, this 31st day of January, 2014. 
,,,, .... ,,,,,, 
,,,,X. \J.V. DIS lb.''~~ ,, -~ ••••••••••• :: uor ~ 
..:- f:!:' •• • ••• ~, 
' . . , ~ f5 /SEVENTH\ : 
§i i JUDICIAL j ;;..j§ 
';~\ COURT l~~ ~ -~ .. •.• ~- ..... 
, '~- .. .. ~~~ .... , ·'7o..,::..·······~··· ~ ~ ,, '"IC ' ,, ,,, au ,,, 
'''''""''' 
~~J AbbieM~ 
District Court Clerk 
Bee y Harrigfeld 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, 
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David 
Tuk Nedrow 
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s), 
Vs 
Board Of County Commissioners for 
Fremont County, a political subdivision of 
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt, 
individually and in his official capacity, and 
Leroy Miller, individually and in his official 
capacity 
Defendant(s)/ Appellant(s). 
Supreme Court No: 41584-2013 
Case No: CV2012-580 
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
I, Becky Harrigfeld, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that the 
following is a list of the exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with 
the Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION SENT/RETAINED 
Lodged Appeal Record Sent 
Picture of Map included in Lodged in Appeal Record Sent 
CD of Work Meeting- Not able to transcribe Sent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 31st day of January, 2014. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
Flying A Ranch, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Clen Atchley, Emma Atchley, laura Pickard, 
Clay Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David 
Tuk Nedrow 
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s), 
vs 
Board Of County Commissioners for 
Fremont County, a political subdivision of 
the state of Idaho, Ronald "Skip" Hurt, 
individually and in his official capacity, and 
leroy Miller, individually and in his official 
capacity 
Defendant(s)/ Appellant(s). 
Supreme Court No: 41584-2013 
Case No: CV-2012-0000580 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Abbie Mace, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record 
and any reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as 
follows: 
lynn Hossner 
109 North 2nd West 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Blake G. Hall 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 31st day January of, 2014. 
Abbie Mace 
Clerk of the District Court 
